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This thesis aims at investigating how Chinese government practices television regulation to ensure 
its concerns of “cultural security” in a post-WTO period. In particular, this thesis attempts to 
investigate the policy-making process of some important reform measures adopted by Chinese 
government after it became a World Trade Organization (WTO) member and how these reform 
measures have been implemented and influenced the operation of television practitioners. On the 
basis of qualitative analysis of the empirically documented evidences as well as a complementary 
textual analysis on the selected television contents, this study concludes that a sustained official 
embrace of market economy and seemingly adoption of neoliberal policies in a post-WTO period, 
are not necessarily leading to a more liberalized and democratized operation of Chinese producers. 
On the contrary, the state control power over its broadcasting system has been strengthened and the 
ideological function of Chinese television has been reinforced instead. Under such circumstances, 
Chinese television regulation is less likely to evolve into a “liberal” model, but more likely to be a 
“Bureaucratic Authoritarianism” model in which the state still remains a strong political power and 
the market interests are compromising for collaboration with the authorities rather than to challenge 
them and the cultural security has been secured to a large extent under such a new mechanism. 
 
 
             
             




1.1 Research Focus 
Television possesses cultural, political and economic characteristics that prompt governments to 
display a particular concern for it. As one of the most influential mediums for spreading 
audiovisual programs that can function as carriers of symbolic meanings, television has been 
widely believed to play a central role in shaping fundamental socio-political processes within a 
nation-state and has been inevitably manipulated by the ruling class as a political and cultural 
tool. It is these characteristics and the perception of its power that enable television to be not just 
a key factor in media policy but also a focus of academic research.  
This thesis is concerned with how the globalization of communication, especially its 
cultural aspect, has impacted television and government regulation. In this era of globalization, 
liberalized markets, transnational media companies and sophisticated communication 
technologies have become commonplace. Yet in terms of their impact on television, some 
scholars have argued that “the ability of nations to determine the nature of their own television 
provision has been fatally undermined by the irresistible twin forces of technological change and 
the liberalization of world markets”. This opinion, held by many liberalists, suggests that 
maintaining continued protection for television at the national level is an illusory goal, and overt 
government interventions are becoming less visible and less necessary (French, 2000: 43).  
From the cultural perspective, the impact of globalization on television has been 
intensively debated. One well-known argument, that of “cultural imperialism”, claims that the 
one-way flow of audiovisual products and services from the West to the rest of the world serves 
to undermine the cultures, morals and values of receiving countries (Schiller, 
1979;1985;Hamelink, 1983). Although this proposition has been criticized by many scholars 
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(Tomlinson, 1991;1997b;Thompson, 1995), it has undoubtedly had a major impact on the 
policy-making process in many less-developed countries, where government intervention has 
been widely sought to secure the “national culture” from alien influences, especially from being 
reduced, disappeared and replaced by so-called Western capitalist culture. 
However, in practice, not just political and cultural factors, but also economic factors, 
should be taken into consideration when addressing issues to do with television regulation. The 
implementation of cultural-protectionist policies in many developing countries is often riddled 
with difficulties that arise from the deregulation of the media market and these countries are then 
faced with the dilemma of whether to regulate or deregulate. On the one hand, it is necessary to 
maintain strict control over television in order to safeguard cultural security in the nation. On the 
other hand, strictly controlling every single aspect prevents national television from developing 
into a commercialized and hence a competitive player in the global arena. When faced with such 
a dilemma, governments in developing countries have often adopted what (Chan and Ma, 1996) 
have described as “pendulum-like” policies, oscillating between economic liberalization and 
political control. 
China has always been regarded as one of the most restrictive governments in its 
adoption of rather conservative policies in terms of the regulation of television. However, since 
the Chinese government adopted economic reforms in the 1980s, Chinese television has 
witnessed rapid commercial development, an increase in marketized operations enjoyed by its 
television actors and a proliferation of entertainment content on television screens. The 
traditional portrait of Chinese television regulation as being an “authoritarian” model or one that 
focuses on “ideological indoctrination” seems to be no longer appropriate as it does not capture 
these new changes. There is a growing body of literature focusing on the rapid commercial 
changes that took place in Chinese television during the 1990s and arguing for the 
decentralization, or rather, the de-monopolization of television (Lee, 1990;Yu, 1990;Lull, 1991). 
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Particularly after China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Chinese 
television has had to face intensified commercialism and a large amount of direct competition 
from foreign media. Some studies have argued that the state’s weakened control over the 
television system tends to invoke anxieties about cultural security (wenhua anquan) issues in a 
post-WTO period (Meng, 2001;Zeng, 2005;Zhang, 2006). 
As China’s media market becomes more and more commercialized in the era of 
globalization, it seems reasonable to assume that the extent of the party-state’s political control 
over its television system is becoming less and less intrusive, as the studies mentioned above 
have tended to make their arguments based on the assumption that commerce always goes 
against political control. “Politics” and the “market” tend to be treated as two opposing forces 
that operate as ‘push-and-pull’ factors in such circumstances (He, 1998). In facing the 
“liberalizing” forces of the market economy in a globalized era, the party-state’s power to 
control has thus been assumed to be compromised and it is understood to possess a weakened 
regulatory power, which makes it more difficult to protect the television system from being 
challenged by foreign competitors. Under such circumstances, another assumption that is made 
by these studies is that this would exacerbate the situation of cultural imperialism in China and 
cultural security could come under serious attack. 
Certain central questions are addressed here. Is it valid to argue that the party-state’s 
control power over its television system will finally give way to market forces? If so, is it valid 
to argue that the cultural security of China’s television is under serious attack in the post-WTO 
period? What might the future of China’s regulation of television look like? Will the regulation 
of China’s television system evolve from a traditional “authoritarian model” into a “liberal 
model” because of the liberalizing force of the market economy? This thesis is aimed at 
exploring such questions. China’s accession into the WTO is taken as a key point as this has 
been widely regarded as a crisis for the once stable and heavily regulated Chinese television 
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system. This thesis examines the official motivations, practices, consequences and evolution of 
new television reform policies which have been issued since China became a member of WTO. 
In particular, it explores the responses of different types of television practitioners and examines 
cultural security by analyzing how these responses are reflected in terms of television content. 
Finally, it attempts to capture the most up-to-date picture of how the Chinese government will 
implement its regulation policies in the 21st Century and provides a theoretical analysis of these 
new phenomena.  
1.2 Central Argument 
In contrast to the studies mentioned above that tend to over-consider the inherent antagonism 
between the forces of “politics” and the “market”, this thesis is based on the assumption that 
“politics” and the “market” do not necessarily go against each other. Under certain conditions, 
these two forces can co-exist with few antagonisms and even co-operate to pursue the maximum 
interest for themselves.   
This thesis puts forward the argument that the market-oriented television reforms in the 
post-WTO period are very likely to provide the conditions for the co-existence or co-operation 
of politics and the market. In particular, it is suggested that an increase in the marketable 
operations of television workers does not necessarily imply that the state’s control power is 
sacrificed. The effectiveness of state regulation has not been weakened but, instead, has been 
strengthened through the adoption of a series of  reform policies. Under such conditions, the 
status quo of cultural security has not been found to be seriously challenged. Instead, it has been 
reinforced to some extent due to the increased political and cultural affinities of television 
programs presented by different types of producers.  
During the period of reform, the Chinese authorities have exerted much effort to 
intensify the marketable operations of the television industry while still enforcing political 
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control across the nation. The central guideline “to let television operate as a market-oriented 
enterprise but serve as a political mouthpiece” has caused television reform in China to proceed 
with specific Chinese characteristics. These characteristics have provided favorable conditions 
for state broadcasters to gain market dominant positions and ultimately results in the 
marginalization of private producers. Within such a state-market context, the seemingly 
neoliberal reform measures, with empirical complexities, are less likely to move Chinese 
television into a free competition mechanism in the future, which is far from a platform from 
which various media capital are able to contest freely and fairly. Instead, it is more likely to 
move it into a new stage in which state-owned media have quickly gained monopoly over the 
country’s market while private producers have been led to a cooperative, albeit less ideologically 
and culturally antagonistic, relationship with the former.   
1.3 Research Methodology and Fieldwork Design 
This thesis employs a political-economy approach and a complementary textual analysis. The 
political-economy approach is adopted because the thesis demands a holistic understanding of 
how the media industry functions and what the key issues of the contemporary media industry 
are, such as media ownership, media control, media structure and the modes of production and 
consumption. Such insights are important in understanding how power and resources are 
distributed and contested in the media context. This method is especially useful for 
communication studies in China since the Chinese media, like a mirror of its politics, has been 
heavily influenced by the contemporary political atmosphere which has been the dominant factor 
shaping television content that is screened to audiences.  
As McKee has argued (2001: 138), “there is no such thing as ‘objective’ knowledge. We 
know that every methodology is partial”. The media industry cannot be fully explained by the 
political-economy approach alone. A complementary textual analysis needs to be employed to 
contribute an in-depth analysis of the media industry by examining how the political-economic 
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structure at the macro level influences the content creation of producers at the micro level. This 
method also provides a complementary understanding of how audiences make sense of the 
world around them and how they interpret the meaning of television programs.  
1.3.1 Research Site 
In order to investigate the official motivations, practices and consequences of the television 
reform policies and the responses of television practitioners, three big cities--- Beijing, 
Changsha and Wuhan (see Figure 1-1) were selected as the research sites because of their 
particularities. Beijing was the first city selected because it is the capital of China in which the 
central media authorities and important media are centered. The two important media regulation 
agencies, the party’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD) and the State Administration of 
Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), are located in the city of Beijing. Most media policies and 
central guidelines are formulated and issued by these two agencies. Conducting interviews with 
officials from these two government agencies is helpful to understanding the official motivations 
of television reform policies.  
Another reason for choosing Beijing as a site of research is that besides government 
bodies, some important TV stations are also located there. One is China Central Television 
(CCTV) and the other is Beijing Television (BTV). CCTV is the most well-known TV station in 
China which is at the top of China’s television hierarchy. This station serves as one of the most 
important mouthpieces of the Party and reports directly to high-level officials in the government. 
Having long enjoyed the highest level of prestige and privilege, CCTV is now the largest TV 
station in China and is accessible to almost 96% of the Chinese population, which covers more 
than 1.2 billion viewers. Besides the domestic market, millions of overseas audiences in more 
than 130 countries and regions are also able to watch CCTV programs.1 BTV is another state-
owned television station that is next in importance to CCTV in Beijing. It has developed into 
                                                
1 CCTV website: http://ad.cctv.com/20090219/109608_1.shtml. For more details, please refer to Chapter 3.   
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one of the most well-known TV stations in China and has produced numerous high-ranking 
television programs. Overall, because of their close proximity to the central government, both 
CCTV and BTV have been more influenced by central media policies than other local-level TV 
stations. Therefore, it is worthwhile to interview television workers in these two TV stations to 
examine how media policies are implemented in the industry.  
A third reason for studying Beijing is that most of the independent television production 
houses are centered there. Beijing is undoubtedly the political, economic and cultural centre of 
China. This city offers outstanding conditions for the development of independent producers, 
such as talent, experts and investment. Among these independent production houses, Guangxian 
Chuanbo 2  and Yinhan Chuanmei 3  are two top-ranking production companies in China. 
Guangxian Chuanbo was founded in 1998 by Wang Changtian, an ex-producer of BTV. This 
company has created many popular television programs, such as China’s Entertainment Report 
(Zhongguo Yule Baodao4) and Music Chart (Yinyue Fengyunbang5), and has become one of the 
few independent production companies that have successfully expanded the business to areas 
outside of television, such as movies, entertainment activities and pop concerts. Yinhan 
Chuanmei is another well-known independent production company in China. It was founded in 
2000 by Xia Jun and Wang Jianping, both of whom are famous ex-producers of CCTV. Yinhan 
Chuanmei has also made its own popular television programs, such as One-click Happy Life 
(Kuaile Shenghuo Yidiantong6) and Tales of Life (Shenghuo Guangjiao7). It has now become the 
major content supplier to many TV stations, including BTV, STV (Shanghai TV) and TJTV 
(Tianjin TV). In 2002, Wang Jianping left Yinhan Chuanmei to build his own production 
company, which was launched the next year and called Guanhua Shiji8. Wang invited many 
                                                
2 Chinese title: 光线传播 
3 Chinese title: 银汉传媒 
4 Chinese title: 中国娱乐报道 
5 Chinese title: 音乐风云榜 
6 Chinese title: 快乐生活一点通 
7 Chinese title: 生活广角 
8 Chinese title: 冠华世纪 
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experienced producers who once worked for TV stations to join his company. Guanhua Shiji 
now provides television programs to various TV stations, such as CCTV, BTV, Guizhou TV and 
Phoenix. In a word, the founders of the three production companies mentioned above are the 
explorers who have first attempted to pursue a pathway for independent production companies 
in China. They are representative of Chinese private producers. Interviewing them can help in 
understanding the situation of independent producers in China and how they manage to compete 
with state broadcasters.   
Fourthly, some foreign broadcasters have also set up their offices in Beijing. For 
example, Phoenix’s Beijing Branch (Fenghuang Huiguan9) and STAR TV’s Beijing Branch are 
located there. In recent years, Phoenix has moved the majority of its production facilities to 
Beijing. Its Beijing branch is in charge of communicating with high-level officials in the 
government and cooperating with local producers to create Chinese-language television 
programs. Similarly, Star TV’s branch is assigned to conduct its marketing affairs and build a 
good relationship with the central officials in Beijing. Phoenix and Star TV are among the few 
foreign broadcasters that are first allowed to broadcast in the mainland television system. They 
are representatives of foreign producers in China’s market. Hence, obtaining interviews with 
people in these two branches can help with understanding how they respond to restrictive media 
policies and censorship in China and how they manage to negotiate with the authorities.  
Fifth, it is worthwhile to conduct fieldwork in Beijing because it has other rich resources 
to offer. There are some top communication universities and important newspapers located in 
Beijing, such as the Communication University of China (CUC), School of Communication in 
Tsinghua University and Peking University, Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily and Beijing 
News. Conversations with famous scholars in these top communication universities can provide 
                                                
9 Chinese title: 凤凰会馆 
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useful insights for this research and talking to journalists can provide information that might be 
difficult for scholars to access otherwise.  
Besides Beijing, the other two cities of Changsha and Wuhan were selected as research 
sites. Changsha, the capital city of Hunan province, was selected because it is the location of the 
Hunan TV station, one of the most influential local TV stations and the main rival to CCTV. 
Hunan TV station achieved fame mainly due to the launch of its top-rated program called Super 
Voice Girl (Chaoji Nvsheng10) in 2005, whose audience rating of its final show exceeded that of 
CCTV’s Spring Festival Gala (Chunjie Lianhuan Wanhui11). This was an incomparable success 
for local TV stations because no local TV program had ever surpassed the success of the Spring 
Festival Gala before. Since then, the Hunan TV station has become well-known for its ability to 
produce excellent entertainment shows and it now constitutes a major force that challenges the 
monopoly of CCTV. Therefore, it is essential to interview television workers at the Hunan TV 
station in order to examine how local TV stations are able to compete with CCTV. 
Wuhan, the capital city of the Hubei province, was selected because it is the location of 
the Hubei TV station, which resembles a large number of mid-level TV stations in China. There 
are only a few of them, like Hunan TV station, that stand out from the proliferation of local TV 
stations in the country. Most local TV stations remain at mid-level success, enjoying less fame 
than CCTV, Hunan TV and Shanghai TV among audiences in the country. Therefore, 
conducting fieldwork at the Hubei TV station is also essential since it provides information 
about how some mid-level TV stations are able to compete with both CCTV and other famous 
local TV stations.        
                                                
10 Chinese title: 超级女声 
11 Chinese title: 春节联欢晚会 
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1.3.2 Research Interviewees  
The fieldwork for this study was carried out from September 2007 to February 2008. I 
interviewed a wide range of TV officials, practitioners at TV stations, workers in independent 
production companies, audiences, journalists and scholars in the three cities of Beijing, 
Changsha and Wuhan (information of “Interviewee and Interview Objective” is provided in 
Table 1-1). During my six months of fieldwork, I spent three and half months conducting 
fieldwork in the CPD, SARFT, CCTV, BTV, Yinhan Chuanbo, Guangxian Chuanmei, Guanhua 
Shiji, Phoenix and STAR TV’s offices in Beijing, another one month at Hubei TV station 
(Wuhan) and the rest at Hunan TV station (Changsha).  
I began my fieldwork by interviewing workers in the television industry. With five years 
of prior experience in the media industry, I came into these organizations by a “Role of 
Introduction”. I had once worked for Hubei TV station and graduated from the Communication 
School of Huazhong University of Science and Technology (HUST). Some of my former 
colleagues and classmates now work for CCTV, BTV, Hunan TV, Phoenix, STAR TV and 
independent production companies. With their assistance, I was given permission to hold a 
“multiple re-entry pass” to enter the buildings in which some TV stations are located and to gain 
opportunities to interview staff several times. In each organization, I interviewed more than 20 
staff (except in Phoenix and STAR TV’s branches, where because of the small number of their 
workers, I interviewed five or six staff in each branch), including the managers, producers, 
directors and even guests who had been invited to go on these media platforms. Based on my 
previous work experiences in the media industry, I was aware that some inside stories, 
especially when it comes to sensitive issues about censorship, usually cannot be told when the 
informant first gets to know the interviewer. Therefore, I used the “multiple re-entry pass” to 
spend three months in these media organizations, regularly attending their meetings and building 
a good relationship with them. Moreover, I held “informal discussions” with the staff during 
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their breaks and worked to build their trust by sharing my own media work experiences with 
them. Through such efforts, I was informed about many inside stories to do with censorship. 
Sometimes, these inside stories were told to my former colleagues or classmates in my presence. 
Sometimes, such information was provided to me personally over lunch. On other occasions, 
these stories were told during the regular meetings that I attended.  
  
 Figure 1-1: Map of China’s Main City 
Source: www.china-holiday.com/english/chinamap/ChinaCityMap/Map_of_Major_Cities.htm  
Address of research sites: 
CPD: The west city of Beijing, West Chang’an Street No.5 (北京市西城区西长安街 5号)  
SARFT: The west city of Beijing, Fuxingmen Waidajie No.2 (北京市西城区复兴门外大街 2号) 
CCTV: Beijing Haidian District, Fuxing Street No. 11 (北京市海淀区复兴路 11号) 12 
BTV:  Beijing Haidian District, The West Third Ring, North Street No.3 (北京市海淀区西三环北路 3号)13   
Guangxian Chuanmei: The East city of Beijing, Hepingli East Street No.11 building 3, third level (东城区和平里
东街 11号 3号楼 3层)  
Yinhan Chuanbo: Beijing Haidian District, Changwa Street No.5 (北京市海淀区厂洼街 5号院)  
Guanhua Shiji: The East Third Ring, Mid Street, Jianwai SOHO, building 15, 7th level (北京市东三环中路建外
SOHO 15栋 7层) 
STAR TV Beijing Branch:  The East city of Beijing, East Chang’an Street No.1 Oriental Plaza, #908 (北京市东城
区东长安街 1号东方广场 908室) 
Hunan TV: Changsha, Liuyang river, east Bridge, Golden Eagle Movie & TV Cultural City (长沙市浏阳河大桥东
金鹰影视文化城) 
Hubei TV: Wuhan, Wuchang, Zijin Village, Special No 1 (武汉市武昌紫金村特 1号)  
 
  
                                               
12 The fieldwork finished before 2008. In 2009, new CCTV building has moved to: The East Third Ring, Mid Road No.32 (东三
环中路 32号). 
13 The fieldwork finished before 2008. In 2009, new BTV building has moved to: Chaoyang District, Jianguo Street No. 98 (北






Table 1-1: Interviewee and Interview Objective 




Propaganda Department Officials 




Practitioners in TV Stations: CCTV, 
BTV, Hunan TV and Hubei TV Station; 
 
To investigate how the policies have 
been carried out by state broadcasters;  
To compare how different is the 
operation process between CCTV and 
local TV stations   
Practitioners in Independent Production 
Companies:  
Guangxian Chuanmei, 
Yinhan Chuanbo, and 
Guanhua Shiji Private Production 
Companies;  
To examine how the polices affect the 
operation of domestic private producers; 
To learn how private producers 
negotiate with TV stations and official 
censors 
Practitioners in Foreign-invested 
Production Company: Phoenix Beijing 
Branch and STAR TV Beijing Branch 
To investigate how the policies 
influence the foreign broadcasters; 
To learn how foreign actors pursue 
market profit in Chinese market 
Journalists Journalists in Beijing Media It is a complementary method to learn 
media environment in China by talking 
to the journalists who are able to 
interview the important persons in 
media department and are allowed to get 
more internal information than common 
scholars. 
Scholars Tsinghua University: Prof. Guo Zhenzhi 
and Lu Di; 
Peking University: Associate Prof. Shi 
Zengzhi; 
Huazhong University of Science and 
Technology: Prof. Shen Fan and Shi 
Changshun 
Interviewing scholars can help to 
provide some useful insights for my 
study and it is another useful method to 
collect second-hand information  
Viewers Informal interview with persons I met 
during the fieldwork period, such as 
members of the audiences, participants 
invited to join live TV shows, friends of 
my friends and their relatives. I did not 
conduct a comprehensive survey due to 
insufficient funding and infeasibility to 
access a large number of them 
To understand how television programs 





In addition, I simultaneously employed the “participant observation” method to learn 
their work, for example, by sitting to one side and observing the details of the whole process of 
production, from the topic selection, discussion, shooting and editing to the final censorship. In 
order to examine how different types of producers create television content and negotiate with 
censors, I chose to examine talk show programs created by CCTV, BTV, Hunan TV, Hubei TV 
and Phoenix in order to be able to make comparisons. I was assisted by my former colleagues to 
be able to participate in the production process of CCTV’s Artistic Life (Yishu Rensheng14), 
BTV’s Five Star Evening Talk (Wuxing Yehua15), Phoenix’s Tiger Talk (Yihu Yixitan16), Hubei 
TV’s Communication (Goutong 17 ) 18  and Hunan TV’s Make Progress Everyday (Tiantian 
Xiangshang19)20. It was interesting to join in the process of production and to make comparisons 
as it became quite clear that different types of producers pay attention to different parts of the 
programming process and undergo different processes of program censorship to ensure their 
“political correctness”. By employing the “participant observation” method, I was able to collect 
valuable findings on the content creation of producers and use them as evidence to prove the 
arguments put forward in this thesis (i.e. “STVPB”, “channel specialization” in Chapter 4; “case 
of phoenix” in Chapter 5).  
Besides the television industry, I also conducted fieldwork in the official media 
departments in Beijing. As expected, it was difficult to access these important persons at the 
SARFT and Propaganda Department. I had attempted to make appointments to interview 
someone in these two sectors, but the only people I was able to speak to were those at the 
reception. However, luckily I had the opportunity to have informal discussions with some TV 
officials through introductions by TV producers and scholars whom I had come to know while 
                                                
14 Chinese title: 艺术人生 
15 Chinese title: 五星夜话 
16 Chinese title: 一虎一席谈 
17 Chinese title: 沟通 
18 This program is somewhat of an imitation of Phoenix’s Tiger Talk. 
19 Chinese title: 天天向上 
20 The production team of Hunan TV’s Super Voice Girl had already been dismissed in 2007, but some of the producers 
continued to stay at the Hunan TV station and work for other programs. This was a valuable opportunity to interview some of 
them as they had stayed with the program Make Progress Everyday while I was conducting my fieldwork.  
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conducting my fieldwork at CCTV, Beijing TV station and the universities. What the TV 
officials told to me was not very different from what has been published in newspapers. 
However, their replies still provided some clues for examining China’s reform policies. For 
example, before conducting my fieldwork, my thesis proposal originally assumed that new 
policies issued after China’s entry into the WTO signified an official welcoming attitude 
towards private producers and that these new policies would encourage the commercial 
development of independent production companies. However, the officials revealed during our 
informative discussions that they were still greatly concerned about the monopoly of state 
broadcasters, and their statements alerted me and prompted me to pay more attention to how the 
lives of private producers could be affected by this.  
Besides television workers and officials, I also conducted some interviews and 
discussions with journalists, as they are the people who are able to interview important officials 
and who have more opportunities than common scholars to find out internal information. I also 
interviewed some scholars in top Chinese universities with a similar research background. Their 
ideas provided an alternative perspective for examining the media environment in China and in 
obtaining some useful second-hand data for my research. Regarding audiences, I did not conduct 
a wide-range survey due to insufficient funding and the infeasibility of accessing a large number 
of audience members. Nevertheless, some in-depth interviews of non-randomly selected 
audiences contributed to my understanding of how television content is interpreted by them. 
Finally, I have conducted extensive archival research in Chinese libraries in order to obtain more 
knowledge about China’s television and have monitored both television and film content during 
the period of my fieldwork. 
1.4 Outline of Chapters 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Following this brief introduction, Chapter 2, 
entitled “Globalization and Television Industry”, analyzes the existing literature and outlines the 
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theoretical perspectives on the globalization of communication, cultural security concerns and 
regulation features in East Asian countries. It attempts to clarify the definition of “cultural 
security” (wenhua anquan), provides a general picture of how East Asian countries adopt 
regulation policies to safeguard cultural security and puts forward the argument that the 
traditional portrayals of Chinese television regulation as an “authoritarian” model is no longer 
adequate for understanding the fast-changing media context in contemporary China. 
Chapter 3, entitled “Television Regulation in China and Debates on Cultural Security”, 
provides a historical analysis of the development of Chinese television regulation and 
summarizes the current academic debates on cultural security in China. It mainly introduces the 
ways in which commercial imperatives forced the Party to step back and loosen controls during 
the period from the 1980s to the 1990s, and discusses how this phenomenon raised huge 
academic concerns about “cultural security”, which has now become a popular term that is 
widely mentioned in recent Chinese literature.  
Chapter 4, entitled “Chinese TV Regulation in the Era of Globalization”, examines the 
new dynamics of Chinese television regulation in a post-WTO period. It investigates the newly 
adopted market-oriented Chanye Hua21reform of Chinese television from four major aspects, 
namely the four reform policies of the Separation of TV Production and Broadcasting (STVPB), 
Broadcasting Consolidation and Reorganization (BCR), Channel Specialization and the Going-
out Project. It is argued that Chanye Hua reform has been the result of a push by the party-
state’s anxieties to deal with its accession into the WTO and that excessive political 
interventions other than market principles have played a dominant role during the reform. 
Chapter 5, entitled “Chinese TV Operation in the Era of Globalization”, analyzes how 
these Chanye Hua reform policies have influenced the operations of TV practitioners and what 
strategies TV practitioners have adopted to negotiate with official censors. It is argued that 
                                                
21 Chinese title: 产业化 
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“Juxtaposition”, as a strategy to promote the spirit of Socialist mainstream melody with the 
expression technique of commercial style, has been widely adopted by domestic producers to 
simultaneously ensure the market returns and political correctness of their programs. Foreign 
producers adopt “localization” and “regionalization” as strategies to cater to both the Chinese 
authorities and their audiences and hence to ensure that their programs possess a high level of 
cultural and political affinity to China. 
Chapter 6, entitled “Chinese TV in the 21st Century”, examines the consequences of the 
producers’ negotiation process, the situation of cultural security and possible future changes to 
television regulation in post-WTO China. It is argued that the cultural security of Chinese 
television has not been seriously threatened to the extent that some existing studies have claimed. 
On the contrary, it has in fact been strengthened because television producers have become more 
subject to the government’s political and cultural regulations and the party-state’s propaganda 
work is going to be more effective. In such circumstances, Chinese television regulation is less 
likely to evolve into a “liberal” model but rather, is more likely to become what O’Donnell 
(1973) called a “Bureaucratic Authoritarianism” model, where the state retains its strong 
political power and “juxtaposition” thus becomes a dominant narrative strategy for producers in 
the future. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Firstly, as Stanley Rosen (2008: xv) has declared, while Chinese cinema has been extensively 
studied, there is a very limited amount of scholarly research outside China that is devoted to 
Chinese television. This study is an attempt to address this lack of studies on Chinese television, 
which has far greater popularity and hence holds greater importance among Chinese audiences. 
This thesis examines the new dynamics of the relationships between the state and media, and 
offers an up-to-date picture showing how television content has been influenced by a state-
market context through the lens of cultural security.  
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Secondly, this thesis contributes to the extant literature by providing a specific 
explanation of “cultural security”. The extant studies, including those on migration, international 
relations and communication studies, have displayed their concerns about cultural security with 
or without referring to the term “cultural security” (Shi, 2004;Pan, 2007;Chan, 2009;Wang and 
Servaes, 2000;UNDP, 1999;Waever, 1993;Zhang, 2006). However, these studies discussed 
cultural security in general terms and their concepts are too comprehensive to be measurable 
because they include almost every aspect of cultural phenomena into their discussions. In order 
to provide a specific explanation, this thesis defines “cultural security” from three aspects, 
namely the ability of the state to secure “national culture”, to secure the nation’s 
“communication sovereignty” and to secure the nation’s “soft power” to examine the role of the 
state in regulating the media in an era of globalization. Moreover, in the contemporary Chinese 
literature, cultural security has been extensively discussed due to greater concerns about cultural 
imperialism being raised after China’s accession into the WTO. Some have claimed that cultural 
security in China would encounter a more substantial challenge from an increased penetration of 
Western audio-visual products after China became a WTO member (Meng, 2001;Zeng, 
2005;Zhang, 2006). Contrary to such perceptions, this study argues that cultural security has not 
been threatened as seriously as they claim. Instead, it has been strengthened to a large extent if 
examined from the three specific aspects defined by this thesis.   
Thirdly, this thesis critically examines the official motivations and empirical implications 
of four important Chanye Hua reform policies, namely STVPB, BCR, Channel Specialization 
and the Going-out Project. Unlike the views held by some studies that Chanye Hua reform 
policies have been adopted as the outcome of market demands and provide local broadcasters 
with more freedom (Xiong and Liu, 2002;Zhang, 2002;Yu, 2002;Zhao, 2009), this thesis argues 
that these  Chanye Hua reform policies have basically been hastily adopted to address the party-
state’s anxieties in dealing with its accession into the WTO, for example STVPB which has been 
adopted as a temporary expedient to deal with the WTO’s Citizen Treatment Principle. 
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Moreover, during the implementation process of Chanye Hua reform, excessive political 
interventions rather than market principles have played a dominant role and this has resulted in 
an increase in the state’s control power rather than an increase in the amount of freedom that 
local broadcasters have. 
Fourthly, based on abundant empirical findings collected during my fieldwork in China, 
I propose the use of the term “Juxtaposition” to represent a new narrative strategy that has been 
recently employed by Chinese producers to negotiate with the strict but unpredictable censorship 
practice in China. I further show that juxtaposition has been proved to be an effective method for 
Chinese producers to ensure their programs’ simultaneous market returns and political 
correctness. I also reveal that this narrative strategy is so effective that even Chinese TV officials 
employ it to promote their propaganda work. This new phenomenon is discussed in great detail 
in Chapter 5 and I prefer to term it “Juxtaposition” to indicate the creativity of Chinese 
producers that they continue to promote the values of Socialist Mainstream Melody but weave 
into more expressive approaches of commercial television services.  
Finally, a growing body of literature has observed that the Chinese media has been 
experiencing a period of rapid change. Their studies have provided a valuable understanding of 
what the future of Chinese media regulation could look like and what model could be 
appropriate for analyzing it. Chan and Ma (1996) have conceptualized Asia as a whole as being 
akin to a “pendulum-like” regulation model; Curran and Park (2000) have divided the world 
media into two types - ‘the authoritarian” and “the democratic political” system; Thomas (2005) 
has classified Asia into categories like “active suppression” and “latent suppression”; Ma (2000) 
and Lee, He and Huang (2006) have used O’Donnell’s concept of the “Bureaucratic 
Authoritarianism” (BA) model to indicate the regulatory regime of the Chinese media. Among 
these studies, this thesis has been influenced by the convincing arguments offered by Ma and 
Lee, and He and Huang. This thesis attempts to contribute a complementary analysis to 
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employing such the BA model to analyze the Chinese media. The empirical findings collected 
during my fieldwork in China are used to prove that the future of Chinese television regulation 
is very likely to evolve into such a BA model in which the “state” and “market” are no longer 
two opposing forces. They can cooperate with each other to ensure that both their interests are 
met. Within such a BA model, there will be more types of economic cooperation between the 
state and private media capital, at the same time, with less political and cultural antagonism.  
21 
 
2 Globalization and Television Industry 
2.1 Globalization of Mass Media 
Globalization, one of the most widely discussed terms today, has influenced our daily life from 
every single aspect. With the advance of globalization, not only economic relations but also 
political and cultural orders among nation-states have been significantly transformed. Indeed, 
the fast-changing global situations have invoked a great amount of theoretical discussions. 
Questions, such as ‘what is globalization’, ‘what globalization has brought us’ and ‘where will 
the globalization lead us’, have been extensively explored, and many tentative answers have 
been proposed in academia. Although a precise definition is still open for academic debates, 
researchers have captured many important features of globalization in the extant literature, 
including ‘internationalization’, ‘liberalization’, ‘universalization’, ‘deterritorialization’ and 
even specifically as ‘westernization’ or ‘Americanization’ (Scholte, 2000).   
Globalization has been regarded as both the cause and one of the consequences of the 
development of contemporary mass media. Facilitated by advanced communication technologies, 
media systems now operate across national borders, and instantaneous access to information 
originating from remote sources become possible to almost everyone. An unprecedented 
increasing flow of media and cultural products on a global scale has thus been witnessed in the 
twentieth century. With these transformations of media industries, many communication 
scholars argue for bringing the concern of media development into the broader issue of 
globalization.  
The development of global communication, or ‘media globalization’, has become a 
regularized and pervasive feature of social life in the twentieth century (Thompson, 2000). 
Although the range of development of global communication is wide and complex, some salient 
features can be picked up and categorized into the following: (1) sophisticated infrastructure of 
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communication, (2) development of the media conglomerates, (3) expansion of market 
deregulation, and (4) global consumption of cultural commodities. The rest of this section will 
briefly introduce these features as an overview of media globalization: 
2.1.1 Sophisticated Infrastructure of Communication 
The sophistication of global communication network is primarily due to some important 
information technologies introduced since the 1960s, such as satellite communication, cable 
systems, as well as digital processing methods which had helped to construct a global 
broadcasting system without any territorial constraints. Making information processing 
incredibly efficient, these new information technologies made the spread of images and voices 
faster and remote messages more easily accessible. We begin to experience living in a growing 
‘technologically’ integrated world. McLuhan’s (1964) popular expression of ‘global village’ has 
thus been widely referenced to highlight such ‘shrinkage’ of our contemporary world as a 
community without restrictions of time and space. He described that “today, after more than a 
century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system in a global embrace, 
abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned” (1964: 3). Harvey (1989) 
provided similar description that the ever greater ‘time-space compression’ which links distant 
spaces on the planet as a whole becomes increasingly intensified in the last few decades, 
marking the introduction of globalization. 
Although the perception of living in an integrated world is not novel for us, scholars argue 
that the emergence and development of sophisticated communication networks have become 
significant only in very recent decades. Negrine (1997) points out that the faster and more 
efficient forms of communication become obvious only since the early 1980s, though these new 
technologies were introduced during the 1960s. It is only since the early 1980s that computers 
have become commonplace. He indicates that recent technological revolutions signify a 
transition from the traditional forms of communication via the wire-telephone network to a more 
23 
 
sophisticated system of communication which links together computers, telephones, cables and 
satellites. As the networks have removed technological barriers to carry diverse types of data, 
information can now be more easily accessed and transferred from one system to the others.  
Sharing a similar observation that the operation of new information technologies has recent 
origins, Thompson (2000) points out that direct broadcasting by satellite (DBS) system first 
operated in the USA in 1975 and a variety usage was found only by the early 1990s. With the 
wide employment of DBS, the established terrestrial-based networks of broadcasting systems 
have been transformed into a new one which possesses a long-distance coverage. He further 
identifies that cable systems can provide much greater capacity for information transmission, 
satellite communications can facilitate long-distance broadcasting and digital methods can offer 
easier information processing, storage and restoration.  
By late twentieth century, diverse types of ‘new’ media have been designed as advanced 
communication vehicles which provide more flexibility and mobility for consumers to obtain 
diverse types of messages such as voices, images and videos anywhere and anytime. Mobile 
phones and digital televisions have achieved huge popularity. The efficiency of information 
processing has been much improved by digitalization, through which information is converted 
into digital signals and becomes much easier to be reproduced, edited and transmitted.  
Nowadays, communication technologies become more and more cost-effective to spread 
huge volume information and reach large population instantaneously, making the exploration of 
global media market feasible and profitable. Communication ‘superhighway’ has been 
constructed to carry all forms of media materials globally. Compared with earlier periods, new 
technologies have fundamentally changed the manner of international communication in the 
twentieth century. They have formed a powerful tool in the process of media globalization, with 
their capacities of transmitting information ever faster, longer and broader.  
24 
 
2.1.2 Development of Media Conglomerates 
The process of media globalization has also been significantly driven by the activities of global 
media conglomerates. Disney, AOL-Time Warner, Viacom, News Corporation, Sony and 
Bertelsmann are some of the most well-known transnational media corporations (TNCs). They 
benefit from new communication technologies by which their business can be expanded from 
local to global markets. By utilizing cross-border communication technologies, their business 
penetrates into all parts of the world, covering America, Europe, Australia and Asia. Their 
‘global reach’ is a significant character of their development in the last few decades. With the 
technological assistance, especially satellite television, these large-scale media TNCs have 
emerged as major players in the global media market.  
Media conglomerates grew quickly through a long-term process of media consolidation, 
including horizontal absorption of small competitors and vertical integration of all means of 
media circulations. They have not only largely controlled the production, distribution, 
advertisement and broadcasting of media outputs, but also fully participated in distributing 
diverse types of media products like movie, television program, music, book, game and other 
derivatives. Indeed, being larger and more global provides more opportunities for media 
conglomerates, and business consolidations also help to reduce operation costs, say for example, 
by utilizing existing personnel, facilities and resources to produce their own programs, 
broadcasting in their own television channels, advertising in their own agencies and expanding 
their global coverage by cross-selling, cross-promotion, and privileged access. As Herman and 
McChesney (2000: 220-221) describe: “The 1990s has seen an unprecedented wave of mergers 
and acquisitions among global media giants…in this period of flux all media firms are 
responding to a general market situation that is forcing them to move toward being much larger, 
global, vertically integrated conglomerates”.  
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Media conglomerates gain increasing control over the global media markets based on their 
monopoly power (Table 2-1). From satellite television to cable systems, from news reporting to 
entertainment programs, products of these few largest players in the global marketplace are 
widespread and ubiquitous. Their size and power are becoming incredibly huge. For example, 
by 1997, the two largest media firms in the world, Time Warner and Disney, generated 30-35 
percent of their income outside of the United States (McChesney, 1997). As the trend of media 
consolidation becomes intensified, Ben H. Bagdikian (2000: xx-xxi) also points out:  
In 1983, fifty corporations dominated most of every mass medium and the biggest media merger in history 
was a $340 million deal…In 1987, the fifty companies had shrunk to twenty-nine…In 1990, the twenty-nine had 
shrunk to twenty three…In 1997, the biggest firms numbered ten and involved the $19 billion Disney-ABC deal, at 
the time the biggest media merger ever…[In 2000] AOL Time Warner’s $350 billion merged corporation [was] 
more than 1,000 times larger [than the biggest deal of 1983]. 
As Anup Shah observes (2009), at the end of the 1990s, there were only 9 corporations 
(mainly US) that dominated the media world: namely AOL-Time Warner, Disney, Bertelsmann, 
Viacom, News Corporation, TCI, General Electric (owner of NBC), Sony (owner of Columbia 
and TriStar Pictures and major recording interests), and Seagram (owner of Universal film and 





Table 2-1: The Largest Entertainment Media Companies in 1994 














$8.5 United States 
$7.5 United Kingdom 
$6.6 United States 
$6.5 United States 
$6.2 France 
$5.6 United States 
$4.3 United States 
$4.2 Netherlands 
$4.0 Netherlands 
$3.8 United States 
$2.6 United States 
Source: (Hamelink, 1997: 94) 
2.1.3 Expansion of Market Deregulation 
Some scholars argue that large-scale media corporations emerge as a consequence of the market 
deregulation and liberalization in the late twentieth century. Market deregulation tends to be 
intertwined with a strand of economic philosophy which believes that a ‘free’ market is the best 
regulator, appealing for the large-scale withdrawal of state’s controls, the abolition of regulatory 
trade barriers, de-monopolization of markets, as well as reduction of state ownership of 
productive assets. Scholte (2000: 15) interprets the contemporary liberalized period as “a 
process of removing government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order 
to create an ‘open’, ‘borderless’ world economy”. Hamelink (1997: 96) comments that in 
response to the global trend of deregulation and liberalization, “many countries around the world 
are revising their communication structures. In this process, the leading stratagem would seem to 
be ‘more market, less state’ and the buzzwords have become privatization and liberalization”.  
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Deregulation became the key policy orientation during late twentieth century. Hall (1997: 
229) points out that the ‘liberal’ policies were first advocated by the Reagan and Thatcher 
regimes in the US and the UK, quickly followed by many similar regimes elsewhere such as 
Italy, Spain, Canada, Australia and so on. The decades were characterized by a wave of 
telecommunications deregulation, and the 1996 US Telecommunications Act has been regarded 
as an important event for opening up the era of media consolidation while the commercial spirit 
permeates all national media policies (Herman and McChesney, 2000). Thomas (2005: 52) 
provides extra evidence that the global trend of deregulation continues expanding to developing 
countries in a following period, especially on the Asian region since the 1990s. Asian states have 
lessened the regulatory limitations, liberalized the media industries that were previously under 
their control, and exposed their domestic media markets to greater international competition. 
Deregulation has rapidly integrated the media industries into the trend of privatization and 
commercialization, brought about the independence of media industries from the state’s 
interference and facilitated a faster assimilation of local media markets into a global system.  
At the international level, the dominant international agencies continue to work toward the 
elimination of all barriers to a global market. World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its substitute World Trade 
Organization (WTO) are the important institutions, aiming at removing trade boundaries among 
their member countries or regions. As Herman and McChesney (2000) have observed, these 
institutions have begun to pay more attention to media industries as media become more and 
more central to the world economy. Both IMF and WTO have been committed to encouraging a 
single global market for commercial media. For instance, in January 1997, Canada was ruled by 
the WTO to not impose special taxes or tariffs on US magazine publishers to protect Canadian 
periodicals. There is an increasing acceptance of reduced national government control in the area 
of communication and “the centerpiece of neoliberal policies is invariably a call for commercial 
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media and communication markets to be deregulated.” Governments are required to “minimize 
any activities that might undermine the rule of business and the wealthy” (McChesney, 2000: 2). 
2.1.4 Global Consumption of Cultural Commodities  
Media globalization has also manifested in the growing consumption of cultural commodities on 
a global scale. Globalization has encouraged a spread of “commodification” into the areas of 
communications. Henceforth, items such as art, literature, music and picture have become 
objects that can function as commodities, produced by transnational factories and consumed 
globally (Scholte, 2000: 113). Media commodities nowadays are circulated not only in domestic 
markets but also in the global arena. A large number of locally-produced media programs can be 
consumed by many audiences from other countries. “Media outputs are growing at a faster rate 
than GDP almost everywhere in the world…There is a media and entertainment boom around 
the world” (Herman and McChesney, 2000: 216). Assisted by the growing ‘global reach’ of 
mega transnational communication corporations, together with the sophisticated system of 
communication and information technologies, media products have been overwhelmingly 
circulated worldwide across geographic and cultural borders.  
During the decades when commercial satellite was launched, international trade in terms of 
exports and imports increased from $293 billion to $7409 (IMF, 1988). Consumption of cultural 
commodities has almost tripled between 1980 and 1991, from $67 to $200 billion (UNDP, 1999). 
The global television ownership multiplied from 192 million in 1965 to 710 million in 1991 
(Mohammadi, 1991). A survey in 1996 which targeted on teenagers in television-owning 
households in forty-one nations found that young people watch on average six hours of 
television per day (Levere, 1996). Employment in Los Angels’ entertainment industry alone 
doubled from 53,000 in 1988 to 112,000 in 1995 (Johnson, 1996).  
Exploring new purchasing power for the increased number of cultural commodities has been 
immediately encouraged. The promising markets in Asia have thus been selected as the main 
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targets by media TNCs. During the past decades, Asia has experienced such tremendous and 
pervasive proliferation of television channels, heavy demand for transnational programming as 
well as a flood of alien programs. For example, South Korea imported 8074 programs in 1994 
with a total sales value of US$10,648,000. After commercial cable television was launched in 
1995, 12,921 programs were imported with a total sales value of US$17,802,000, showing a 60 
percent increase in just one year (Cho, 1996). In Taiwan, 71 percent of the cable television 
programs were imported from foreign sources in 1995, and, in Singapore, 55 percent is imported 
from English-speaking countries (Hong and Hsu, 1999: 231). The exploration of Asian market 
has not only stimulated a flood of transnational satellite TV services, including many Western 
and regional-based commercial services, but also accelerated transnational programming 
activities, such as co-productions, joint ventures, visits, international forums and sharing of 
expertise throughout Asia (Chan and Ma, 1996). As the Asian market, which has the population 
about 60 percent of the world, becomes more and more integrated into the world’s economy, it 
can be expected that the rate of consumption of global cultural commodities will keep rising in 
the following years.  
2.1.5 Summary 
While a precise interpretation on media globalization is still ongoing, the four features 
mentioned above have been widely observed and can be held to mark out contemporary 
developments of the media industry. Many communication scholars attempt to adopt the notion 
of globalization to theorize what globalization has brought to the area of media based on these 
features. According to Wang and Servaes (2000: 3), the term ‘global’ used in the area of media 
studies ‘refers primarily to the extent of coverage, with the popularity of satellite television and 
computer networks serving as evidence of the globalization of communications’. They point out 
that ‘coverage’ should not be the only dimension of media globalization while others need to be 
discussed, such as dynamics of the market, modes of production and the contents and messages 
transmitted. Thompson (2000: 208) and Mohammadi (1997: 3) also claim that the process of 
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media globalization has many dimensions. These salient features, such as the 
transnationalization of television system throughout the world, are by no means the only aspects 
of media globalization. The globalization of communication not only refers to the way in which 
communication is stretched across the globe, but also involves a re-composition of social 
relationships and power under contemporary conditions. In summary, media globalization 
cannot be restricted to the growing connectedness of disparate places in the world and the 
dramatically accelerated flow of information. It also should be noted with the complex forms of 
interaction and interdependency at the global and local level.  
It is arguable that media globalization may not always be a harmonious and balanced 
process from which all the parts of this world could benefit. The unevenness of international 
communication and the conflicts between diverse cultural groups have been engendered and 
enlarged by the rapid development of media globalization.  
2.2 Cultural Implications of Media Globalization  
In the globalization era, our daily experiences and cultural senses are no longer limited to 
‘domestic’, but are also influenced and permeated by distant events. What we receive when 
watching television, including news, images, music, information and etc, have increasingly 
made us form a sense of global cultural exchange. Our world seems to be an integrated place, 
not just spatially and temporally, but also culturally. With the ever-increasing worldwide 
circulation of cultural products, some questions have been naturally asked: What will happen if 
different types of culture meet together? How will local people interpret alien cultures? Why 
some people feel ambiguous and insecure about the cultural consequences of globalization, 
whereas others start to celebrate the technical and economic achievements of globalization? 
In this section, I attempt to explore explanations for these questions. At first, I examine 
some special attributes of media products. These attributes not only make media products 
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economically tradable but also culturally communicative, accelerating a global cultural 
exchange where cultural practices become more interrelated and interactive. Secondly, I will 
investigate the unevenness of cultural exchange between the developed and less developed 
countries. Due to such inequalities, a widespread sense of uneasiness about the outcome of 
cultural exchange has been raised, and many research issues have been explored in the academia. 
Finally, I will present a big picture of the arguments about whether our cultural exchange will be 
ultimately homogenized or heterogenized.  
2.2.1 Culture 
Culture, which seems to be one of the most common words used in our daily life, may be the 
most difficult term to be defined and illustrated. As Tomlinson (1999: 18) points out, “culture is 
such a complex and elusive idea” (Williams, 1981;Clifford, 1988;McGuigan, 1992;Thompson, 
1990). But generally, culture can be understood as “the order of life in which…people make 
their lives, individually and collectively, meaningful by communicating with each other”. Trying 
to reconcile different conceptions in defining culture, United Nations Educational Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) provides a tentative definition of culture as follows:  
“Culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group and that it encompass, in addition to arts and 
literature, lifestyle, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (UNESCO, 
2002). 
Culture is so important to our daily life because one of its fundamental functions is to help 
forming and maintaining a society or community for us, in which culture gives a sense of 
belonging to its members, builds up invisible bonds among people and ties them together with 
commonly shared norms, values and beliefs. Culture has played a significant role in shaping the 
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principles of life, giving significance to its members’ activities and laying the foundation for 
social control from which people monitor their own standards and patterns of behavior.    
2.2.2 Cultural Exchange 
Cultural exchange implies the situation that different types of culture encounter each other. 
Cultural exchange becomes possible due to the worldwide circulation of media products, such as 
books, magazines, films, music and television programs and etc. Media products posses some 
special attributes ---‘cultural’ and ‘commercial’ attributes--- that enable media products play an 
important role in the process of global cultural exchange.  
Cultural Attribute: 
Media products are special products. They have been embedded with a lot of cultural 
connotations when produced. Cultural values, norms and political ideologies are inevitably 
infused into the production process and transmitted from one to another cultural group through 
the process of audiences’ consumption. During the course of circulation, media products 
perform as symbolic vehicles, conveying cultural messages which have been transmitted 
through a encoding/decoding process (Hall, 1973) and being communicative to the recipients 
through a set of meaningful ‘social actions’. Hall (1997: 208) puts it: “systems or codes of 
meaning give significance to our actions. They allow us to interpret meaningfully the actions of 
others…Social action is meaningful, both to those who perform it and to those who observe it.” 
Due to such a cultural attribute, ‘media product’ is always used interchangeably with the term 
‘cultural product’.  
Commercial Attribute 
Media products are also commercial products. Since the spread of ‘commodification’ into 
the sphere of communication, cultural items such as art, literature, music and picture have 
become objects that can function as tradable commodities. When mass media started to develop 
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from a small-scale enterprise into a sophisticated globally-connected industry, with the 
assistance of information technologies, especially the DBS service (Direct Broadcasting 
Satellite), as well as the activities of media TNCs, media products are no longer restricted within 
domestic fields but were able to move across national borders. Possessing such market-oriented 
attribute, the business of mass media, such as launching satellite television channels, seeking 
overseas advertisements, producing, circulating and exchanging of media products, have to 
operate within market rules.  
However, global cultural exchange does not necessarily lead to a balanced international 
communication as well as a smooth reception process of alien cultures. Some cultural conflicts 
among nation-states and worries of “cultural homogenization” subsequently emerge when 
media/cultural products become a sort of transnational economic products, constituting serious 
difficulties to governments’ political and cultural regulation. Proponents of media protectionism 
hold the assumption that media/cultural products cannot be treated as pure economic 
commodities. Realizing the importance of the political and cultural nature of media products, 
countries with less competitive communication system become more sensitive toward alien 
political and cultural ‘invasions’ and put much emphasis on the political and cultural usage of 
mass media.  
2.2.3 Imbalance of International Communication 
There is a growing body of studies showing that the global media market had been almost 
dominated by western cultural products (predominantly North America and Western Europe). 
The less developed countries tend to be marginalized in the so-called free-market competition 
and gradually lose their shares of the global market due to the following two main factors:  
2.2.3.1 Unevenness in economic resources 
As the consequences of market deregulation and liberalization, media industry has been driven 
into a global market for free competition with less state protection. In the global market, the 
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starting situations of different countries have already been determined by their economic 
disparities. Obviously, the developed countries with economic privileges have held an advantage 
and more opportunities to make their products prevail in the global market. Stronger media firms, 
with more financial supports, sophisticated infrastructures and advanced technologies, are more 
likely to occupy a large share of the market. Smaller competitors, on the contrary, may suffer 
from their lack of such resources from the beginning and gradually lose their shares through the 
competition. The passion for liberalism is ambivalent. It advocates a free and fair competitive 
environment for players, but it may fail to do so due to the unequal starting positions of the 
players. Curran (2001: 219) points out that ‘the natural processes of competition (sometimes) 
tend to undermine competition, particularly in the (media) industries…a relationship of 
competitive inequality between the strong and weak…tends to result in the latter failing or being 
marginalized’.  
Economic privileges have also caused a trend of media concentration and consolidation, 
through which some major conglomerates have emerged and sustained their global dominance 
while the weaker are merged, marginalized, or even eliminated. Martin (1993: 30) captures an 
extremely unequal distribution of economic resources between the companies. He points out that 
“80% of foreign investment and 70% of world trade are controlled by 500 corporations that, 
between them, own 30% of the world’s gross domestic product”. McChesney claims that similar 
concentration can be found in the global media market. He cites the words of a media analyst 
that “What you are seeing is the creation of a global oligopoly. It happened to the oil and 
automotive industries earlier this century; now it is happening to the entertainment industry.” He 
further argues that the global media market has come to be dominated by nine transnational 
corporations, namely General Electric, AT&T/Liberty Media, Disney, Time Warner, Sony, 
News Corporation, Viacom, Seagram, and Bertelsmann. In the highly concentrated media 
industry, Time Warner, with its annual revenues of $27 billion in 1998, is about 50 times larger 
than the world’s fiftieth-largest media firm (2000: 260).   
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2.2.3.2 Unevenness in cultural flows 
Such an imbalanced international communication has resulted in uneven cultural flows 
between the West and the rest of the world. UNESCO reports show that of the 78 largest 
communication conglomerates, 39 are based in United States, 25 in Western Europe, 8 in Japan, 
5 in Canada and 1 in Australia; none are based in the Third World (UNESCO, 1989) cited from 
(Thompson, 2000: 209)). Nordenstreng and Varis in (1974) have documented a clear asymmetry 
in the international flow of television programs which can be characterized as a one-way cultural 
flow of news and entertainment programs from the West to the rest of the world. The United 
States has been found to be the most powerful country whose audiovisual products have 
overwhelmingly dominated the world’s cultural trade. It has exported far more cultural products 
than other countries. ‘Statistics for the early 1990s show that US mass media products accounted 
for 75 percent of broadcast and basic cable television revenues, 85 percent of pay-TV revenues, 
55 percent of theatrical film rentals and 55 percent of home video billings worldwide’ (Bernstein, 
1990) cited from (Chen, 2004). 
Uneven cultural exchange has also been reinforced due to a heavy dependence of the Third 
World upon the cultural imports from the West. The rapid development of information 
technologies has promoted a proliferation of satellite and cable television channels in less 
developed countries, however, indigenous media industries in these countries have not 
developed enough to produce sufficient programs to fill the rapidly increased broadcasting 
schedules. Due to the shortage of financial resources, locally-produced programs have not been 
able to satisfy the increased market demands quantitatively, nor qualitatively. It thus becomes 
cost-effective for Third World countries to ‘stuff’ from western programming libraries which are 
full of already-made programs with high quality. As local media and audience become 
increasingly reliable upon cultural imports, local markets become gradually flooded with 
western products and their own programs swept away. The gap between the developed and less 
developed countries continues to widen. Unequal market competition consequently leads to an 
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unequal products distribution---that is---one way flow of cultural goods from the West to the rest 
of the world. Western media’s hegemony has led to a media uniformity where only few choices 
can be selected and few voices can be heard.  
2.2.4 Summary 
Although communication technologies are now able to overcome the geographical 
boundaries by bringing distant events and ideas to local people, it is still not easy for media 
products to overcome the cultural boundaries in people’s minds. While people are more familiar 
with distant cultures and personalities, frictions and conflicts are more likely to be invoked as 
well, especially when different cultures do not hold the same or similar understanding on certain 
events. Perceptual differences become the main obstacles for merging distinct types of cultures 
into a whole. Treating the penetration of Western cultural products as a type of neo-colonialism, 
less-developed countries have fears of being culturally marginalized in the global arena and thus 
called for the necessity of regulation to resist cultural or even political influences from the West.  
2.3 Cultural Security and Television Regulation 
Television might be the most influential medium among the mass media due to its ability to 
reach a huge amount of audiences easily. Largely due to its tremendous influential power, 
television has always been manipulated by governments as an excellent medium for education. 
Television products are often exploited to reinforce the political and cultural solidarity of the 
ruling class. In Asia, the state’s tight control over television, however, underwent great changes 
since the early 1980s. Governments in many Asian developing nations widely adopted neo-
liberal policies to respond to globalization. Asian television has become increasingly 
transnational and western television programs, especially the US ones, were found widely in the 
local media markets. These changes have seriously challenged not only the dominance of 
national television in Asia but also the domestic cultures as well as the role of national television 
to shape cultural and national identity in a sovereign state. It has alarmed the governments in 
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less-developed countries to take some regulatory measures to keep foreign satellite signals from 
freely flowing into their territories. 
2.3.1 Cultural Security 
Security can be generally defined as a form of protection against danger, fear, loss and damage. 
Nation-state security normally involves the maintenance of country’s independence, military 
force, governance, legitimacy, as well as the preservation of traditional mechanism of language, 
ideology, culture and religious practices in a sovereign country. Nation-state security can be 
further divided into several dimensions, such as military, economic, energy, information and 
cultural security. Cultural security concerns issues about culture, yet it raises issues beyond 
culture itself, involving political and economic factors as well. Regulation of cultural security is 
a rather complex and tricky problem to policy makers since ‘cultural security’ is still a concept 
open for debate, and some questions about cultural security are far from settled, such as ‘How to 
secure a culture, and what cultures or which cultural components need to be preserved?’  
The term ‘cultural security’ was put forward to respond to such assertions as “cultural threat” 
or “cultural invasion” (with a very ideologically conservative tone) in the discourse of cultural 
homogenization. It was predominantly used by cultural nationalists who are so anxious to 
prevent the effects of cultural imperialism, reflecting their fears of their own cultures being 
eroded and assimilated by other cultures, especially the so called ‘global culture’ in media 
globalization. A ‘cultural exemption’ of audio-visual trade, raised by France during the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993, reflected the cultural 
nationalists’ fears of the perceived negative effect of the foreign goods (Tomlinson, 1997b). This 
‘cultural exemption’ argument surrounding the GATT has justified the ‘cultural protectionist 
mechanism’ in the later WTO’s treaty The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and 
resulted in a majority of WTO member countries acting together to resist the US free trade 
agenda in the name of protecting cultural security (Keane, 2002). 
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Ole Waever (1993: 23) tries to capture cultural security under the global trend of migration 
as ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and 
possible or actual threats”. More specifically, he is concerned with the sustainability, within 
acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and 
religious and national identity and custom.  
Shi Zhongying (2004) provides a comprehensive analysis for what is cultural security. 
Generally, as he argues, cultural security may refer to ‘cultural security in a nation-state’ which 
is under protection from both internal and external challenges. The components involve diverse 
dimensions such as cultural systems, societal systems, cultural identities, languages, knowledge 
and religions in a sovereignty state. Shi also argues that, sometimes, cultural security can 
specifically refer to those components primarily based on certain political unities, such as related 
political systems, political values, political ideologies and political identities. 
Zhang Zhijun (2006) examines ‘cultural security’ from a communication study perspective. 
He argues that cultural security should be the security of specific parts of culture which have 
been shared by specific ethnic groups, nations and societal systems. These specific parts of 
culture have a rather close relation to the histories of certain ethnic groups, nations and societal 
systems, and they tend to be too exclusive to be shared by different ones, for example, the 
political ideologies, cultural values and traditions. But these specific parts of culture have been 
put in jeopardy due to the rapid development of television trans-nationalization.  
Pan Yihe (2007: 28) regards cultural security as an issue of “nontraditional security”. He 
points out that cultural security becomes a serious concern just in recent years, since people have 
begun to worry about the cultural conflicts caused by the accelerated pace of globalization. He 
summarizes the main issue of cultural security as “the basic values and particularities of a 
culture will not disappear during the overwhelming trend of globalization”. He emphasizes that 
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almost all cultural components, like politics, education, religion, tradition, language and 
ethnicity, need to be protected. 
These studies have contributed to general understandings for cultural security. However, 
their analyses, being either too specific or too general, still have not been able to provide sound 
answers to the questions of cultural security. For example, Waever (1993), Shi (2004) and Pan 
(2007) examine cultural security from the perspective of migration studies and international 
relations. Though their studies are comprehensive, their definitions tend to be, to some extent, 
empirically immeasurable and not specific enough to communication studies. Compared to their 
studies, Zhang (2006) provides analysis from the communication perspective. However, he also 
talks in generalities and does not clarify the ‘subject’ of cultural security. As culture has been so 
widely consumed by a large population, it becomes crucial for scholars to clarify the potential 
distinctiveness among diverse groups of people and indicate the “subject” of analysis before 
moving on. 
Proving sound answers to each dimension of cultural security is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Instead, this thesis attempts to examine issues of television regulation at the national level 
and take “regulators” as “subject” of analysis. Cultural security as defined from the official point 
of view thus becomes the main dimension that this thesis tries to explore. In the following, I try 
to provide theoretical analysis for cultural security from regulators’ perspective and provide a 
new definition for cultural security.   
2.3.2 Television Regulation: The Necessity of Cultural Security 
Being the most influential medium, television has always been required by regulators to take 
responsibility for expressing its own culture to its own people. As Dowmunt (1993: 7) argues, 
“that responsibility is so fundamental that it cannot be left in the hands of out-siders, nor be 
usurped by them”. With media globalization, the expansion of transnational mega broadcasters 
and the penetration of alien audiovisual products have always been considered as threats to those 
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receiving societies, causing usual cultural security concerns. These cultural security concerns 
can be grouped into three aspects: 
2.3.2.1 Communication Sovereignty  
Communication sovereignty refers to “state’s exercise of authority over flows of ideas and 
information inside their territories” (Morris and Waisbord, 2001: viii), i.e. the right of a 
sovereign state to legislate its national communication policies, the right to regulate the 
operations of its domestic communication systems and the right to control the content of 
communication and information flows. Being the core of the issues about cultural security, 
communication sovereignty is the foremost concern for a nation-state. 
In the face of media globalization, communication sovereignty of a nation-state has been 
heavily challenged by these factors: the global expansion of liberalization and privatization of 
media systems, the rapid development of cable and satellite television technologies, and the 
hegemony of broadcasting mergers. These factors have made geographical limitations and 
national boundaries readily transcended. It becomes increasingly impossible for states to 
exercise power and maintain their control of communications within its territory. The ever-
increasing free flow of information on a global scale has thus been widely regarded as the best 
evidence of signaling the eclipse of states’ historical control over communications and the 
weakening of states’ communication sovereignty. 
Almost all nation-states, including the developed and less-developed ones, have to face the 
challenges of media globalization. However, media globalization undermines governments’ 
legitimacy and authority in the less-developed countries particularly. As Mohammadi (1997) 
observes, due to economic disparities, less-developed countries possess relatively lower share of 
global media business while developed countries benefit a lot from the consequences of the 
deregulation processes. That’s why the governments of developed countries, especially the US, 
are so concerned about and support media liberalization. Moreover, the developed countries, as 
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dominant players of international communication, also constantly resorted to the World Bank, 
IMF, WTO and other international agencies to spread a free market economy beyond national 
interference. As Scholte’s (2000) points out, these international economic agencies tend to be 
culturally blind. They contribute to some destruction of indigenous cultures by ruining cultural 
autonomy of developing countries and assisting the penetration of ‘capitalist culture’. Overall, 
privatization and deregulation undermine the states’ monopoly on communications in Asian 
developing countries particularly. They cause the authoritarian states no longer being able to 
control information flows and to block those inappropriate television contents effectively.   
2.3.2.2  National Culture 
National culture, defined from the perspective of regulators, mainly refers to certain cultural 
forms unique to a nation-state and shareable among its people. National culture can be regarded 
as the cultural representation of a sovereign country, therefore what national culture presents 
appears quite like ‘our culture’ or ‘national=our’ to the people in a nation-state. “Other” cultural 
forms are deemed to have negative impacts on ‘our culture’ and should be under restrictive 
regulation. National culture includes such cultural components as part of cultural traditions and 
state ideologies which are advocated by the contemporary government. Being the main 
component of cultural security, national culture is the fundamental concern for every 
government.  
The security of national culture has been a focus for attention largely due to its desperate 
future plausibly predicted by the discourse of cultural imperialism. Herbert Schiller (1979;1985) 
who laid the cornerstone for cultural imperialism theory consistently views international 
communication as the ideological and cultural battleground of contemporary international 
politics. He believes that globalization is the process of capitalist expansion, whereby all 
cultures are inevitably destroyed and replaced by one single ‘capitalist culture’. Mass media, 
especially satellite television, has been integrated fully into the marketing system and those 
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transnational media corporations have acted as the “ideologically supportive informational 
infrastructure” to expand the culture of capitalism, consumerism and individualism, and other 
cultures have no choices to die away on television screens (Schiller, 1979: 21).  
Cultural imperialism has a particular relevance to the developing countries in Asia, as many 
of them had been colonized before, and till now bitter memories of a colonial past are still 
haunting around. The collapse of governments’ monopolistic media systems, the decline of 
traditional collective values, and the breakdown of authoritarian political control in Asia seems 
to form the fact that Asia is in a phase of neo-colonialism which reinforces its dependency upon 
the advanced capitalist countries again, a new type of cultural and ideological subordination 
after the period of cold war. Asian societies suffer from the destruction of traditional cultures 
and loss of cultural uniqueness, in Ulf Hannerz’s terms (1991: 108), a “master scenario” for the 
absorption of peripheral cultures into a global-homogenized future. Hamelink (1983) points out 
that a small group of western countries control the international media trade. This results in a 
cultural hegemony of these countries and spreads their particular values, primarily individualism 
and consumerism, to a large number of developing countries in the world, causing these 
receiving societies to possess the cultural likeness to their dominators.  
2.3.2.3 Soft Power 
Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies” 
(Nye, 2004). National hard power is generally regarded as those measureable resources such as 
military and economic forces. By having such hard power, however, does not always produce a 
desired outcome when dealing with international affairs. Effectively exerting a nation’s soft 
power often serves as an alternative to get the outcomes you want. As Nye (2005) describes, 
“success depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins.” Being an 
important part of state’s capacities to compete with foreign cultures, soft power contributes and 
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complements the discussion of cultural security in a nation-sate and it has recently received 
more and more attentions regarding to cultural security. 
A nation’s soft power would gradually fade away if a state loses its capability to control 
information flows. Communication industries serve as a core element of political systems for 
both promoting government’s ruling ideologies domestically and expanding state’s influences 
internationally. Losing effective control over information flows severely undermines state’s 
communication sovereignty. Furthermore, it also weakens a state’s capability of promoting its 
cultural and political influences in the global arena. As Mowlana (1997: 19) describes, those 
who “hold mastery of information and ready capital, rather than military might, dictate the 
course of the world.” “Information means power and its manipulation can have far-reaching 
effects on economic, social, and political developments” (1997: 7).  
It is widely believed that the United-States is most effective in exerting its soft power in the 
world. This is partly due to its remarkable media industry, including those famous organizations 
such as Hollywood, CNN and Wall Street Journal. US media has contributed much to the build-
up of its soft power. A recent survey (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2008) shows that popular 
culture, one of the biggest U.S. exports, remains influential in Asia. The West, especially the US, 
still exert a super strong cultural and political influence all over the world. The developing 
countries continue to suffer from losing their political and cultural influences in world affairs, as 
their media industries appear too vulnerable to compete with the West. In short, a nation’s soft 
power would be powerless if its communication system lacks of competitiveness. The inherent 
asymmetry of resources between the developed and less-developed countries has led to an 
imbalanced information order, gradually weakening the capacities of those less-developed 
nations to exert soft power.  
Here, I deviate a little bit to answer some possibly-raised questions about soft power. One 
may ask why promoting soft power should be involved in the consideration of cultural security. 
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It can be easily understood that reinforcing state’s communication sovereignty can help to secure 
the national culture within the country. Does the state’s effort to expand soft power can also help 
to secure the national culture? Although there may not be a causal relation between expanding 
soft power and protecting local culture, the effort of expanding state power by means of active 
cultural diplomacy, such as increasing cultural exports, can have positive implications on 
securing national culture from two aspects. On the one hand, promoting good-salable cultural 
products overseas helps to improve the technique professionalism of domestic broadcasters, and 
this in turn improves the quality of local-made programs and subsequently the attractiveness of 
national culture to domestic audiences; On the other hand, promoting positive images of the 
nation-state to foreign audiences and letting them have more access to local voices help to make 
them more tolerable and acceptable to national culture, and this may in turn make foreign 
producers adopt less negative but more amicable portrays regarding the nation and subsequently 
less cultural imports with “harmful” effects on national culture. Chapter 6 provides more details 
about this argument. Overall, the state’s activities in promoting soft power is necessary to be 
involved in the consideration of cultural security because of these positive implications.  
I would like to close this subsection by reemphasizing that television regulation raises issues 
beyond culture itself. It involves political and economic considerations as well. Hence 
governments’ cultural security concerns not only include the security of “national culture” alone, 
but also include the closely-related activities adopted to protect national culture. ‘Cultural 
security’ can be conceptualized as:   
The ability of state to secure communication sovereignty that cultural flows on television 
screens are under effective control;  
The ability of state to protect national culture, including the ideology and traditions, not 
disappear at the national level;  
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The ability of state to strengthen soft power that the state is able to exert international 
influences through the improvements of national television competitiveness, local-made 
programs attractiveness and foreign-made programs friendliness. 
2.3.3 Television Regulation: From Theory to Practice 
2.3.3.1 Regulation Dilemma: Threats or Profits? 
Cultural security lays a theoretical basis for the necessity of television regulation. However, in 
less developed countries, policy-making often faces a dilemma between regulation and 
deregulation. On one hand, confining strict control of communication system, such as censoring 
media contents, setting quota for media imports and restricting foreign investment, is necessary 
in order to safeguard cultural security; On the other hand, strict control from every single aspect 
easily leads to an authoritarian regulation which prevents communication system from 
developing into a competitive player in the global arena. Sometimes, it might be inevitable to 
apply media deregulation to cultivate a commercial development for domestic media. This is 
especially meaningful to the less developed countries to compete with the West since a highly-
commercialized media industry is of great help to win over a free-market competition and give 
voices to its own country. Nevertheless, deregulation constantly undermines state’s political 
control over the nation’s communication system and its manipulation of certain cultural forms, 
such as ideologies, values and traditional morals. Such a dilemma of regulation and deregulation 
has been widely observed in many less-developed countries. Hence it is interesting to examine 
how policy-makers deal with this dilemma.  
Many East Asia countries, such as Korea, Singapore and China, have widely called for a 
heavy cultural protectionism of media industries but meanwhile employed neo-liberal policies. 
With the progress of media globalization, traditional monopolistic broadcasting systems in East 
Asia countries have been drastically affected. Since the early 1980s, adopting liberalized policy 
has become commonplace for many East Asian countries. Private ownership and more 
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competition in the television industry have been permitted. No longer be able to depend on 
government subsidies or license fees, television operators have become increasingly reliant on 
various forms of commercial revenue sources, such as advertising incomes, business 
sponsorships and program exchange profits (Chan and Ma, 1996;Yan, 2000;Zhao, 1998). Due to 
the tremendous change of their financial structures, television operators are more interested in 
pursuing market successes rather than the social benefits of television programs. Traditional 
concerns, like political and social stability and cultural integrity, are gradually giving way to 
commercial considerations (Hong and Hsu, 1999). Television operators are increasingly 
pursuing their own economic interests rather than working together with governments for 
national interests. Chinese local broadcasting organizations, for instance, have been frequently 
found to illegally air foreign programs beyond permissible limit to attract more audiences for 
high market returns (Guo, 2003). Facing the non-cooperation of broadcasters, governments feel 
more and more difficult to balance between promoting the deregulation and maintaining 
regulation of cultural flows. 
Media policies in East Asia can be characterized as a kind of “pendulum-like” style, 
oscillating between economic liberalization and political control (Chan and Ma, 1996). As Hong 
and Hsu (1999) point out, to a large extent, the deregulation and commercialization, or say de-
state monopolization, of East Asian broadcasting systems took place as a part of a more general 
process of economic liberalization in East Asia fostered by states’ efforts devoted to economic 
growth and as a response to external pressure from the West. Although involve in the global 
trend of economic deregulation, East Asia countries still want to maintain their political, 
ideological and cultural control over television. Governments feel that liberalization and 
deregulation are unavoidable but they simultaneously undermine the communication sovereignty, 
national culture, political ideology and social stability. As a result, the two contradictory 
positions—party logic and market logic—held by governments have prompted such “pendulum-
like” policies in East Asia.  
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2.3.3.2 Regulation Model: Authoritarian or Libertarian? 
Many scholars have argued about the best regulation model for running the communication 
system in a sovereignty state. One of the most influential studies is Four Theories of the Press 
written by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956). The theories state that the historical 
development of the press in the West goes through four phases: 
The first authoritarian phase in which the press is subject to overt government control, 
possesses no independence and functions to support the established authority;  
The second libertarian phase in which the press has full autonomy, operates within the 
market mechanism, discovers truth and checks on government;  
The third social responsibility phase in which the press becomes accountable to the public 
with professional obligations of being true, accurate, objective and balanced; 
The fourth soviet totalitarian phase in which the chief purpose of the press is to contribute to 
the dictatorship of the party, ownership is public and only loyal and orthodox party 
members can use media. 
The approach of Four Theories of the Press not only contributes valuable understanding of 
the relationship between the government and communication system, but also specifies a 
tentative evolution of media regulation. However, Siebert's theories tend to be normative, 
intending to specify that mass media should or could evolve within a certain way. Especially 
with the collapse of the soviet totalitarian model, such an evolution from an authoritarian to a 
libertarian model and finally to a social responsibility model, seems to “have claimed world 
historical relevance”, and celebrate “the triumph of liberalism and capitalism on a global scale”, 
argued by Zhao Yuezhi (1998: 8). Such questions remain to be asked: Can this Western liberal 
model be regarded as a normative standard? Is it applicable for analyzing East Asian television? 
Is such an evolution of regulation an inevitable process, especially for those countries in which 
national governance is now eclipsing with the progress of globalization?  
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                                        Is it the end? Is it normative? 
Authoritarian Model        Libertarian Model       Social Responsibility Model 
 
Some other scholars offer new categories for modeling the world’s media regulation. For 
example, Curran and Park (2000) divide the world into two ‘the authoritarian’ and ‘the 
democratic political’ systems, each of which are further subdivided into ‘neo-liberal’ and 
‘regulated economic’ systems. They provide an extra category, ‘transitional or mixed societies’, 
to refer to the countries that are being transformed or regions with mixed regimes. For instance, 
Japan stays in the “democratic neo-liberal societies”; South Korea and Taiwan drop into the 
“authoritarian neo-liberal societies”; and China falls in the “transitional or mixed societies”. 
Thomas (2005: 75), by examining the policies toward foreign programs, classifies Asia into the 
categories of ‘active suppression’, ‘latent suppression’, ‘controlled access’, and ‘liberal access’. 
Chan (1993) (1996) also observed a trend of media transformation in Asia and describes the 
changing process as “commercialization without independence” to indicate the predicament that 
the authoritarian Asian regimes struggled to maintain political control of national media in the 
face of the “liberating force” of the market.  
These regulation models are applicable for analyzing and characterizing the regulation 
practices in East Asian countries. First, a general picture of East Asian media regulation may be 
depicted as a kind of cultural-protectionist mechanism with some exceptions like Japan and 
Hong Kong. Although policy-makers in East Asia widely embrace the trend of globalization, 
they still believe that certain degree of regulation, or, a strong state, is indispensable to secure 
the nations’ stability of politics, economics and cultures. Especially influenced by the theory of 
cultural imperialism, East Asian governments are very sensitive about ‘cultural invasions’ of the 
West and attempt to remain their strict control to manipulate communication systems to serve 
for their own interests.  
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Certainly, East Asia, as a whole, presents a picture which is very complex. With different 
histories and economic developments, the regulation model of each country is different from 
that of others. For example, Japan is rather liberalized due to its quick economic development 
much earlier than other areas. Hong Kong, as a former British Colony city before 1997, adopts 
laissez-Faire economic policy, and its television operates in an almost completely free market 
environment. Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore employ cultural protectionism buttheir 
television systems enjoy a relatively higher degree of commercial operation than that of Socialist 
China and North Korea. North Korea has been commonly considered as the one with the lowest 
degree of media freedom and its television is tightly controlled and monopolized by extremely 
conservative policies which represent a cultural antagonism toward the West. 
Based on the above analysis, I would like to categorize the contemporary media regulation 
practices in East Asia, in terms of intervention, into three models: Libertarian Model (open 
market) for Japan and Hong Kong; Transitional Model (partially restricted) for Taiwan, South 
Korea and Singapore; and Authoritarian Model (highly restricted) for China and North Korea 
(Table 2-2). The major difference of existing typologies is about the countries or regions that are 
now being transformed with mixed features, such as China, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. 
By contrast, Japan, Hong Kong and North Korea are classified with few dissents due to their 
distinct features. With such considerations, I categorize Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore in a 
generally-defined model “Transitional Model” that shares a common feature of 
“commercialization without independence”. Although China is now widely embracing the 
global Capitalist structure and Chinese television experiences a rapid transformation which I 
will investigate in later chapters, here I still prefer to put it into “Authoritarian model” because 
of its tightly-controlled media ownership as well as the relatively lower degree of 




Table 2-2: Television Regulation Models in East Asia 





Libertarian Model (open market) 
Japan Public and private 
ownership coexist; 
strong political influence 
Liberal access A key player in global 
media; animation & 
computer games gain high 
popularity in the world 
Hong Kong Privately owned; 
minimal regulation 
Liberal access Exports are of growing 
importance; popular in 
China, Taiwan and 
overseas Chinese societies 






Moving from  
active suppression 
to controlled access; 
being relaxing; 
Aimed at increasing 
regional exports from 
China to Southeast Asia  
South Korea 
 
Dominated by either the 




prudent inaction to latent 
suppression; being 
tightening 
An increasing amount of 
television products; 




Major stakes owned by 
KMT, the military, or 
government; run as 
commercial enterprises with 
ideological limits 
Restricting imports to no 
more than 30%; bans 
Chinese programs 
(mainland) 
Awakened to the 
importance of exports; 
popular in China, Hong 
Kong, & overseas Chinese 
societies 
Authoritarian Model (highly restricted) 
China Mainland State monopoly, all Party-
controlled; 
 being commercialized. 
Moving from cultural 
anti foreignism to a less 
severe form of cultural 
protectionism; censorship 
and quota control 
Very limited; 
Programs were not 






Active suppression Very few 
Source:  
Information of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong is cited from Chan, J. (Chan, 1996: 152).  
Information of “Policy on Foreign Program” is cited from the typology of Thomas, A. (Thomas, 2005: 75-98): 
active suppression (severe restrictions on access to transnational media), latent suppression (generally against 
access), complacent inaction (lack of specific laws concerning access), prudent inaction (interim legal void 
concerning access), controlled access (access to those approved), and liberal access (access to all). 
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Information of “Exports” of Japan is cited from Iwabuchi, K. (Iwabuchi, 2000), South Korea is from Shim, D. 
(Shim, 2006) and Singapore is from Hong, J.H. (Hong and Hsu, 1999). 
Note: China is some special here since on one hand its media ownership still remain state-owned and strictly party-
controlled; but on the other hand its media operation becomes highly commercialized in recent years. It tends to be 
politically and culturally fettered but economically liberalized. It has been put into “Authoritarian model” primarily 
due to the tightly-controlled media ownership as well as the relatively lower degree of commercialized operation 
than that of South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
2.3.4 Summary 
Television programs have been widely circulated across national boundaries with the progress of 
media globalization. The commercial attribute of television programs requires that television 
industry should follow the market principle for production, circulation, and consumption to 
optimize resource allocation. However, its cultural attribute determines that the consumption of 
television programs is very different from that of other types of economic commodities. 
Viewing television involves an invisible process of decoding cultural meanings. 
Cultural concerns have prompted using regulation policies to secure the nation’s cultural 
security. Cultural security can be depicted from three aspects—the security of communication 
sovereignty that is the basic legitimate right of a sovereign state; the security of national culture 
that is important for the state to remain its political and cultural stability; and the security of soft 
power that promotes the nation’s international influences by improving local television 
competitiveness and foreign programs’ friendliness. Governments in East Asia generally believe 
that unprotected exposure to massive Western television products will bring uncontrollable 
challenges to their cultural security. Adoption of cultural protectionism is necessary because it 
would be problematic if leave television totally uncontrolled to the hand of free market, or 
usurped by outsiders.  
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Cultural security has urged the necessity for adopting television regulation. However, 
regulations have met with serious challenges when East Asian governments are also eager to 
adopt liberal policies to promote economic growth. The regulatory dilemma has shaped a 
“pendulum-like” policy in most East Asia countries, oscillating between economic liberalization 
and cultural regulation. As some scholars argued, in this era of media globalization, it is almost 
impossible for authoritarian systems to stop people from receiving foreign television program 
directly. The control power of a nation-state is undeniably much less than it used to be, and 
market force is expected to play a decisive role in the television industry (Wang, 1997;Wang and 
Servaes, 2000).  
In order to provide a general picture to examine how East Asian governments manage to 
deal with the regulatory dilemma, Table 2-2 tentatively classifies East Asia into three models: 
namely Libertarian Model including Japan and Hong Kong, Transitional Model including 
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore and Authoritarian Model which includes China and North 
Korea.  
 In summary, existing theories and models have been generally summarized in this chapter 
in order to provide theoretical basis for analyzing the television regulation in China. This thesis 
aims at investigating how Chinese government practices television regulation while facing the 
‘liberalizing’ force of globalization. This thesis will examine the official motivations, practices, 
consequences and evolutions of related television regulation policies which are issued after 
China becomes a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO accession has been 
widely regarded as a crisis for the once stable and heavily regulated Chinese television system, 
signifying the intensified commercialism and the most direct foreign competition to it. With 
such a fast-changing environment of Chinese television, there are a lot of new phenomenon and 
questions waiting for further exploration.  
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 This thesis attempts to present such new phenomenon and seek explanations for them. In 
particular, the following research questions developed as the main interests of this thesis. 
How Chinese government practices television regulation in the post-WTO era?  
How television practitioners respond to Chinese regulations?  
How Chinese regulation practices secure cultural security?  
How will Chinese regulation evolve?  
In the next chapter, I will review the historical backgrounds for Chinese television regulation. 
Chapter 4 examines new regulation policies in the post WTO China. Chapter 5 investigates the 
responses of television practitioners. And Chapter 6 finalizes the thesis by providing theoretical 
analysis for the status quo of Chinese cultural security and the new pattern into which Chinese 
television regulation is most likely to evolve.   
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3 Television Regulation in China and Debates on 
Cultural Security 
3.1 Television System before 1978 
3.1.1 An overview of national profile 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded on 1st October, 1949, after the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) came into power. The PRC is the largest of all Asian countries and has 
the largest population of any country in the world. Occupying nearly the entire East Asian, it 
shares borders with 14 countries, including Mongolia, Russia, and North Korea and etc (Figure 
1-1). It has 34 administrative units under the central government. These consist of 23 provinces, 
5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing) and 2 
special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau). The large population in China has very 
diverse ethnic groups and languages across the whole country. The great majority of the 
population is Chinese (Han), and the major language is Mandarin (Putonghua, based on the 
Beijing dialect). Other languages, for example, are Cantonese (Yue), Shanghainese (Wu), and 
Hokkien-Taiwanese (Minnan) dialects (China, 2006a). 
With a history of more than 5,000 years, China has rich cultural heritages that have been 
passed down through ancient dynasties in a continuous line. However there followed a century 
of economic, military, political and even cultural decline in China. This humiliating history has 
become a catalyst for the nationalist revolution that began in the early 20th century against the 
foreign imperialists, and cultivated a growing force of cultural anti-foreignism after the 
establishment of PRC.  
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3.1.2 Mao’s Era and the Indoctrinatory Model (1949-1976) 
China’s television was born as a party tool from the very beginning. Chairman Mao Zedong 
often spoke of the importance of mass media and regarded it as a weapon for class struggles. 
Based on his ideas, television in China has become a loyal servant for the Party and state. When 
television was first launched in 1958, it was, to a large extent, born as an outcome of the 
intensive ideological battle with Capitalism during the period of Cold War. While television was 
already popular in the United States in late 1950s and 1960s, it was still rare in China at that 
time. Having its own television system and using it to promote ideological dominance, therefore, 
became a crucial task for the CCP. The establishment of its own television system then has been 
enacted as part of the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) after the formation of the PRC, which 
aimed at improving China’s modernization and catch up with the Western capitalist countries as 
soon as possible.  
However, a more direct motive for launching television in 1958 was the competition with 
the KMT’s government in Taiwan. After having lost power in mainland China, the rest of KMT 
forces led by Chiang Kai-shek had fled to Taiwan Island and built up governance over there. In 
August 1957, Taiwan gave hints that it would start to broadcast television programs on its 
National Day, 10 October 1958. In order to broadcast earlier than Taiwan, CCP had rushed to 
prepare for building its own television system and the first television station, Beijing Television 
Station, started its first transmission on 2 September 1958. Shanghai TV also started operation in 
this year and other provincial stations have begun in the next two years (Zhao, 1998: 247). By 
1961, China had 26 TV stations. But the development suddenly slowed down due to the 
following political turbulences and economic setbacks (Yan, 2000: 503).   
The first setback was China’s breakup with the Soviet Union in 1960. Before the breakup, 
the Soviet Union supplied most of the equipment and technical assistance for building China’s 
television. The Soviet Union also promised to provide China with 300 industrial installations 
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and technical training centers (Chang, 1989). In 1960, the Soviet Union suddenly withdrew its 
support and this action made the ongoing establishment of China’s television stagnant. Lots of 
television stations were closed up and the total number of television stations was sharply 
reduced from 23 to 5 (Li, 1991). An even more fatal setback for China’s television was the 
Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976 which resulted in the interruption of Chinese television 
broadcasting. Many broadcasters were dismissed. Equipment was not maintained. Most 
television stations went off the air and stayed off for several years (Hong, 1998). China’s 
television development has been undermined seriously and did not recover until the economic 
reforms after 1978.        
In the period of Cultural Revolution, an extreme form of cultural protectionism, together 
with the sentiment of anti-foreignism which could be better described as anti-Westernism or 
anti-Capitalism, has been stressed by the contemporary Chinese leaders. China was almost 
isolated from the rest of world during this period. And it had witnessed an unprecedented 
accentuation on politics and the spread of socialist ideologies, especially the Marxist-
Leninismand Mao Zedong Thought. Quite few Western cultural imports were found on in China, 
since the Party regarded these contents as the “poison of Capitalism” upon its people’s minds 
and treated those Western capitalist nations as the most hostile enemies to the socialist China.  
In a word, the China’s television has born and developed as a party tool from the very 
beginning. Mao’s recognition of mass media has settled the keynotes for the practices of later 
Chinese broadcasters. Since then, television has served as a loyal mouthpiece for the ruling 
Party to release its policies and actions. It has been firmly controlled by the Party-state and 
manipulated for ideological indoctrination. 
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3.2 Television Transformation after 1978 
3.2.1 Deng’s Era and the Market-based Monopolistic Model (1978-1992) 
After 1978, Chairman Deng Xiaoping took over the regime and adopted a market-oriented 
“Reform and Opening Up” policy all across China. Since then, Chinese television has entered 
into a new stage of rapid development. A massive consumption and demand for television sets 
were increased significantly. In 1987, the production of black-and-white television in China has 
ranked the world’s number one and there were 120 million of television sets in use, with an 
audience of about 600 million people in China (Zhao, 1998: 248). In order to increase TV 
penetration throughout the whole nation, the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television 
(MARFT)22, in 1985, required all four levels of governments to establish and run their own 
television stations. A complete four-tiered national TV network has come into being, linking the 
central, provincial, municipal and county levels together (Yan, 2000: 503). By 1992, a total of 
676 TV stations have been accomplished, with one national broadcaster CCTV (China Central 
Television), 30 provincial stations, 295 municipal stations, and 350 county stations (People's 
Daily, 1992). About 75 percent of the total population in China, or 850 million people were 
covered by the four-tiered TV network and it was estimated that about 90 percent of urban 
residents was among the main audience (Hong, 1993).  
China’s four-tiered television system had remained a monopolistic structure for decades. 
The whole structure functioned like “a pyramid of state monopoly”, with CCTV at the top of 
prestige and privilege. All stations at lower levels have to replay one or more CCTV channels as 
a compulsory political task rather than being economically compensated. The CCTV monopoly 
guarantees both its political influences and economic returns. In 1996, CCTV’s advertising 
revenues alone reached 3.5 billion RMB, an awesome figure that no station at a lower level can 
compete with. “CCTV’s monopoly in fact goes hand in hand with political centralism in China. 
                                                
22 It subsequently became the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) in 1998. 
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It is quite understandable that the central government has been lending massive support to 
CCTV over the years, initially in finance and now in terms of equable policies” (Zhao, 1998: 
249). 
However, market reform during the 1980s caused drastic changes in this monopolistic 
system, giving rise to a trend of decentralization. Although the Party implied state ownership of 
all TV stations, the operation of TV stations was no longer able to depend on state subsidies or 
license fees since the onset of economic reforms. CCTV, for instance, received only a quarter of 
its operational expenses from the central government. In the late 1980s, advertising and other 
commercial activities, instead, funded about 40 to 70 percent of Chinese TV stations (Yan, 2000: 
515). It thus became increasingly reluctant for lower-level stations to freely relay the CCTV 
official programs without any economic returns. Because of the shortage of revenue and talent 
for programming, lower-level stations could not guarantee a state-imposed proportion of self-
made programs, but had turned to cheaper alternatives, showing imported drama series or soap 
operas to fill up the required transmission time, or sometimes illegally beyond official limit to 
attract more audiences for higher economic returns (Zhao, 1998: 248) (Guo, 2003). This had 
resulted in an increase of difficulty for the central authority to control what appears on local 
television screens. Local stations were growingly pursuing the market success rather than 
fulfilling the central directives. 
3.2.2 Rapid commercial development and the Chinese television in transition (1992-till 
present) 
Since the leadership was passed to President Jiang Zemin and subsequently to Hu Jintao, 
China’s television has continued its high-speed commercial development. By November 1998, 
the number of broadcast, cable and education TV stations has already exceeded more than 3,000. 
Almost each TV station at provincial-level offer satellite services and the total coverage of 
China’s television reached 90 percent throughout the whole country (People's Daily, 1998). Data 
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from UNESCO (UNESCO, 1999) showed that there were almost 32.1 per hundred people, with 
the number of 400 million, had TV receivers in 1997. Two years later, almost 90 percent of 
households possessed at least one TV receiver, with the number more than 1.1 billion in 1999. 
By the end of this century, China has become one of the world’s largest television markets and 
television has been the most influential medium and a major source of information in China.   
The regulatory characteristic during the post-reform period lies on the importance raised by 
the leadership to enhance China’s soft power as well as the work of “external publicity” (duiwai 
xuanchuan). With the Party’s unreserved embrace of the market economy in the globalized era, 
Chinese leadership not only notes an increase of challenges over its monopolistic control but 
also opportunities to bring China itself into the core of world’s economy and politics. A series of 
important events that took place in the past few years, such as the establishment of the world’s 
No. one project “Three Gorges Dam”; the Hong Kong’s and Macao’s return to the mainland 
China in 1997 and 1999 respectively; the China’s accession into WTO which signifies its 
acceptance by the world; the success of China’s Bid for and staging of the Olympic Games in 
2008; the successful launch of Shenzhou 5, the first human spaceflight mission from the PRC; 
and even the new record of hurdler Liu Xiang in Athens Olympics, have all contributed to 
strengthen the sense of national confidence that it becomes increasingly possible for China to be 
an effective and powerful player in the cultural dimension of globalization. On the National 
External Publicity Work Conference in 2001, Zhao Qizheng, the director of International 
Communication Office of CCP Central Committee, stressed that constructing favorable 
international “public opinions” (yulun) had become one of the most crucial tasks for Chinese 
media officials in the new century (China, 2001). He re-raised the importance of external 
publicity on another speech in Tsinghua University in 2004, and pointed out that the work of 
improving China’s television international power should be the critical part of raising ‘soft 
power’ for China (Zhao, 2005).  
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In order to make Chinese television appear more “international”, media officials 
continuously reinforced the market-oriented media reforms to facilitate the integration of 
Chinese television into the global system. 1) China had plans to increase its television 
exportations by means of doubling its domestic production and boosting the international media 
sales in the decade 1990-2000 (Chan, 1996: 145); 2) It also planned to extend the global reach of 
Chinese television through launching satellite television services over more countries, such as 
transmitting CCTV 4 and CCTV 9 for targeting both overseas Chinese and foreign audiences in 
USA, Europe, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and other areas in South-East Asia; 3) China has 
also realized the importance of upgrading the quality of its programs by providing more 
commercialized television services. For instance, live broadcasting of news programs, talk 
shows, games shows, fashion shows, cooking programs, and soap operas, have been the 
significant changes of television genres within the post-reform age (Zhao, 1998: 249). However, 
the desire of making Chinese television as one of the world’s leading broadcasters seems to be 
undermined by the “cultural trade deficit” that China has suffered for decades. Chinese programs 
attract only a small number of audiences in overseas market while foreign imports have took 
away a large proportion of local viewership from that of Chinese television.  
Although the regulatory policies had been oriented to stressing the external publicity, the 
gate-keeping policies which aimed at screening out unfavorable foreign contents had still 
remained rigorous. From the early to late period of Jiang’s governance, the rigorous media 
policies have been manifested by the ‘Six Nos’ stipulated by the Chinese Propaganda 
Department in late 1994, namely, no private media ownership; no shareholding of media 
organization; no discussion of a press law; no discussion of the commodity nature of news; no 
joint ventures with foreign companies; and no openness for foreign satellite televisions (Chadha 
and Kavoori, 2000). Though these prohibitions were gradually relaxed afterward, television in 
China was still under strict ideological control by the authorities. Since then, foreign satellite 
channels had been forbidden to be relayed by local services, all foreign contents must undergo a 
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strict political clearance, and the importation of foreign programs should be limited to less than 
30 percent of the total programming, sometimes 20 percent as an informal quota for fear of 
provoking government interference (Chan, 1996: 143).   
 Overall, based on the above historical analysis, the operation of Chinese television varies 
accordingly as the Chinese leadership and its regulatory emphasis changed, With commercial 
considerations are becoming more important in the post-reform period, television in China 
which traditionally serves as a royal Party mouthpiece finds itself caught between the logic of 
state and market, struggling to keep a balance between the ideological and entertainment 
functions. As China is increasingly integrated into the world’s market economy in the new 
century, Chinese television faces an increase of competition from the outside and needs to 
upgrade its operation more effectively to attract international audiences. Under these pressures, 
Chinese television is, very difficultly but still, transmitting itself from an old party-state 
propaganda machine into a business-like industry, which possesses numerous features and 
complexities in its transitional period, waiting for academic investigation and theoretical 
analysis. From this aspect, television in China can hardly fit in with any of the standard existing 
models, such as the public service, commercial, authoritarian or liberal model. It is experiencing 
a process of drastic transformation.  
3.3 Contemporary Regulatory Structure and Hierarchy 
The Chinese television system has been set up with all the ownership of TV stations keeps state-
owned. The system is under direct leadership of two agencies at national level: the party’s 
Central Propaganda Department (CPD) and the State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television (SARFT)23. The CPD is under the supervision of the Secretariat and the Political 
Bureau of the party’s Central Committee. Local supervision is fulfilled by local party-
                                                
23 In 1982, the Ministry of Radio and Television (MRT) was established to take over the leadership of the National Broadcasting 
Bureau which had exercised since 1949. In 1986, MRT was changed to Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT) when 




propaganda departments from provincial, municipal and local levels. The CPD is responsible for 
setting media policies, determining program content and themes, and issuing operational 
directives. The SARFT is under the supervision of the State Council, but receives direction from 
the CPD as well. It is primarily responsible for licensing and censoring content on broadcast 
networks and supervising the management of television throughout the country. SARFT is also 
in charge of running the CCTV and external broadcasting. The management of lower-level 
broadcast networks is supervised by its local administrations. It is important to note that the 
CPD and SARFT overlapped in the organizational structure of Chinese television stations which 
means that a station director will be responsible to the SARFT and there will be a designated 
propaganda representative to oversee program content (Hong, 1998;Yan, 2000;Keane, 2003). 
All TV stations in China are strictly state-owned and party-controlled. There is a pyramid of 
state monopoly over the whole country’s television. A four-tiered television system in China 
stays closely with the hierarchy of political regime so that the central directives can be more 
easily passed down through the hierarchical system. It becomes more centralized when the 
authorities decide to cut off the lowest-level TV stations in 2002, which are required to relay the 
programs from the above henceforth. The CCTV, at the top of this pyramid, has long enjoyed 
the highest degree of coverage, prestige and privilege. The central government gives massive 
support to CCTV in terms of both finance and lopsided policies. Its monopoly guarantees both 
its political influences and economic returns. All stations at the lower level can hardly compete 
with the CCTV in advertising revenue. In 2005, CCTV’s annual income from advertising alone 
reached 8.6 billion RMB, an awesome figure that no station at a lower level can achieve 
(SARFT, 2006: 182). 
However, media commercialization since the mid-1980s has shaken the monopoly of CCTV. 
Commercial competition engendered regional cooperation and protectionism that aimed at 
preventing local audience from receiving outside signals. Inter-provincial and inter-city stations 
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each formed an organization to facilitate regional program exchanges among member stations. 
More than 30 stations have joined the China Provincial-Level TV Stations Shareholding Co., 
and more than 200 stations have joined the City Stations’ Cooperative (To, 1998: 276). Other 
types of organizations, such as Broadcasting Group, have also been established in some 
provinces and municipalities like Shanghai, Hunan, Sichuan, Chongqing, Nanjing, etc…Today 
the entire nation has a total number of 56 satellite television channels, including 16 channels of 
CCTV, 3 education channels at national level, and 37 come from provincial level (SARFT, 2006: 
118). The provincial TV stations constitute the major challenge toward CCTV’s monopoly and 
the competition between provincial televisions becomes more and more severe (Figure 3-1).  
 
 
(Source: CSM Media Research, cited from SARFT (2006) Report on development of China’s radio, film and television. 












Figure 3-1: 2005 Market Share of Chinese TV Stations at all level  
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3.4 Debates on Cultural Security 
Since having taken the market-oriented reforms in 1978, Chinese television has been 
experiencing significant transformations, evolving from a party’s propaganda machine into a 
quasi-commercial broadcaster. A growing body of literature has captured a trend of de-
ideologicalization of mass media in the post-reform China (Lee, 1990;Yu, 1990;Lull, 
1991;Chang, Chen and Zhang, 1993). They widely note that television is quickly moving away 
from Party’s political indoctrination, gradually taking off the ideological straitjacket imposed by 
the CCP. Lee Chin-Chuan (1990) persuasively documented such changes from three aspects: 
First, the state’s ideological influence became less intrusive; Second, a relative de-emphasis of 
ideology has made it possible for various cultural genres, like entertainment shows and other 
less ideological materials to flourish; Third, television was manipulated to promote economic 
modernization instead of class struggle, leaving China “far less totalistic in the ideological arena” 
( (Lee, 1990) cited from (Zhao, 1998: 4)).  
In addition, some studies have also documented that the post-reform China has witnessed an 
increasing Western or especially American dominance of domestic television schedules. In 2001, 
the year of China’s accession into WTO, there were 255 pieces of imported foreign television 
programs aired on CCTV, among which 116 pieces, about an half of the imports, were from the 
U.S. products (Zhang, 2006: 90). These studies claimed that “poisonous” western values 
invaded into Socialist China by means of their widely diffused cultural products which utilize a 
superficial ‘happy therapy’---known as satisfying audience with illusory happiness in terms of 
heroic success or Cinderella’s stories---to make the mass audiences addicted to the hedonism, 
money worship and individualism (Meng, 2001;Zeng, 2005). Moreover, the young Chinese 
audiences tended to be too unprepared to expose to the violent foreign television. The drama 
Kidnapped, for example, was imported from the U.S. and 4 Chinese students aged 12-17 were 
surprisingly found to kidnap their classmates after watching it. An online survey also showed 
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that more than 20 percent of the Chinese interviewees agreed that “globalization will result in 
the decline and even disappearance of traditional values in China”, and more than 37 percent of 
them agreed that “Chinese cultural traditions is vanishing” (Zhang, 2006: 77,80). With such 
“convincing” phenomenon observed, the studies  thus asserted that the superior resources of the 
West as well as its advocacy to a free flow of information posed a threat to the cultural security 
in China, undermining the formation of national consciousness and the preservation of cultural 
uniqueness. They alerted that it would be a cultural disaster for post-WTO China if the state 
continued to encourage rampant growth of television commercialization instead of tightening its 
political control. Due to China’s accession into WTO, the possible weakening of state’s cultural 
sovereignty, the relaxation of entry barriers toward foreign programs, and the privatization of 
advertisement area were very likely to exacerbate the situation of cultural imperialism in China, 
setting off alarm bells for the cultural security of Chinese television.   
Zhang (2006) offers a detailed analysis regarding how following WTO’s principles have 
seriously affected China’s cultural security in terms of weakening legislation, jurisdiction and 
administration. As he documented, by the end of 2004, SARFT has abolished 127 regulation 
policies inconsistent with WTO principles to grant more access for foreign broadcasting 
organizations. For example, the old regulation No.16 issued in 1995, which forbids foreign 
organizations to participate in television production and management, has been abolished since 
it conflicts with WTO ‘Citizen Treatment Principle’ which enfranchises foreigners the same 
rights as national citizens. Whereas newly-enacted policies, such as No.34 and No. 44 issued in 
200424 clearly state that foreign broadcasters are valid to participate in television production area, 
as well as set up Joint Venture Company with domestic broadcasters. Zhang (2006) claimed that 
the relaxed regulation which can result in the expansion of Western television programs is very 
likely to intensifying the existing unevenness of cultural flow between the West and China. In 
the service of advertisement which China’s government has made commitment for most direct 
                                                
24 Details of new policies can be viewed on Xinhua Online http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-11/30/content_2275821.htm 
(accessed on Sep 27, 2009). 
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foreign competition, the privatization of advertisement sector very possibly results in the 
monopoly of advantaged Western companies that can easily marginalize local competitors and 
force local broadcasters to air their preferred content since the survive of local broadcasters are 
heavily depending upon advertisement revenues. Zhang thus suggests that it is necessary for 
China’s government to set up a ‘television cultural security alarming system’ to prevent from 
being culturally homogenized by the West.  
According to these documented evidences above, it seems reasonable to assume that 
Chinese television is undergoing a process of drastic commercial transformation, evolving itself 
from a party-controlled propaganda apparatus into a fully-independent commercial broadcaster. 
Deregulation, commercialization and reliance on foreign direct investment largely removed the 
state from participating in economic activities and media policies. The market-oriented reforms 
have resulted in the decentralization and diversification of production and distribution processes 
which in turn weakened state’s ideological control and reinforced operational autonomy of 
media actors. Plenty of evidences have shown that market forces provided much more 
opportunities for expression freedom during the 1990s than the authoritarian rule of past decades 
(Lee, 2000). It appears to be persuasive for some to conjecture that the gradual liberalization of 
Chinese television has reached a certain “end of ideology” (Fukuyama, 1992) and the national 
exposure to a large volume of compelling foreign communication have initiated a process of 
peaceful evolution in Socialist China from which the media has closed themselves with the 
liberal media models in Western capitalist societies.  
Although these documented evidences are certainly significant, argued by some studies, 
they do not signify an end of ideology and a shift toward liberal state in China (Zhao, 2008;Lee, 
He and Huang, 2006;Ma, 2000;Zhao, 1998). “There is no hint that the Chinese state is 
peacefully evolving into a liberal state because of the ‘liberating force’ of the market” (Ma, 2000: 
27). Instead, the Chinese state has been recasting itself into a modern authority---something akin 
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to a “bureaucratic-authoritarian state”---with a seemingly decreasing authoritarian character, but 
still maintaining its political power more and more by regulatory and administrative means than 
by strong coercive orders With major state institutions being bureaucratized to regulate, official 
Chinese media have transformed themselves from being propaganda instruments to being what 
He (2000: 143) called ‘Party Publicity Inc.’ which operate as large-scale enterprises to continue 
their job of ideological delivery on behalf of the party-sate. These “Incs” have been found to be 
capable of attracting audiences by softening their publicity messages and providing a wide range 
of information to respond to market demands (Lee, He and Huang, 2006). These studies argued 
that market actually limits social discourses and reinforces dominant ideologies in a Chinese 
media forum though market forces grant relative autonomy to media actors in the midst of 
marketization. The state still remains the center and exerts control over national media. Neither 
traditional “Authoritarian Model” nor “Liberal Model” can adequately address the fundamental 
changes of the contemporary Chinese media as China sustains its domestic reform and opening 
to the West. 
3.5 Summary  
Chinese national television had long enjoyed secure privileges in political, cultural and 
economic area. But commercialization, or say de-monopolization, seems to undermine these 
privileges and sense of security. Economic autonomy has gradually driven and reinforced the 
alienation of commercial actors from the state, especially when the state’s political interference 
prevents the former from high market returns. Market-oriented reforms of Chinese broadcasting 
systems since 1978 have not only resulted in the increased economic autonomy of media actors, 
but also allowed more commercial considerations come into the television operations, giving 
predominance to entertainment values and forcing the traditional concerns to step aside. 
National culture, which has always been given privileged status by the state authorities due to 
their representative and the social functions, now seems to be overpowered by entertainment 
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values, as the viewership of national television programs continues dropping drastically. 
Whether the state is still capable of exerting political control over its broadcasting system and 
protecting the integrity of national has attracted a lot of academic attentions.   
Some argue for the eclipse of national culture in the post-reform China while others argue 
against the “end of ideology”. Although these arguments provide us a good opportunity to 
examine the situation of “state vs. market” through the lens of Chinese media, there are still 
some points need to be updated with careful examinations. First, the definition of cultural 
security tends to be too general and ambiguous in those studies that argue for raising cultural 
barriers toward foreign communication. Both (Zeng, 2005) and (Zhang, 2006) tend to take an 
assumed position for Chinese state that it has priority to present “what is Chinese culture” on 
behalf of all Chinese population. They seem to overlook or undervalue the potential differences 
between the official and grassroots’ perspectives of “what is Chinese culture” so that they talk in 
generalities. Their arguments thus become easily to assist an internal cultural hegemony of 
Chinese authorities when they criticize the Western hegemony on the Chinese society. Since 
culture has been so widely consumed by a large population in China, it thus becomes crucial for 
scholars to clarify the potential distinctiveness among diverse groups of people and indicate the 
“subject” of cultural security before moving on, such as the security of “official version” of 
Chinese culture. It is not the intention of this thesis to provide universally acceptable definition 
for cultural security though this concept has been so frequently used in the Chinese literature. 
However, some clarifications are necessarily to be mentioned in order to conduct a meaningful 
discussion. In this thesis the term cultural security has been defined to indicate the security of 
national culture which has been defined and promoted by Chinese authorities and those related 
activities that contribute to securing the national culture in China as well.  
Moreover, the evidences used by those studies which argue against the liberal 
transformation of Chinese state are primarily coming from the press sectors in China and, 
69 
 
unfortunately, are unable to provide fresh data of Chinese television. Although Chinese press 
and cinema have been extensively studied, very limited amount of research has devoted to 
Chinese television25. The works of Chinese television hence become necessary to be up-to-dated 
and offer fresh examination regarding the evolution of Chinese regime.    
                                                
25 However, after 2007, there are some studies devoted to the research of Chinese television sector, including the books TV China 
(ed.) by Zhu, Y. and Berry, C and TV Drama in China (ed.) by Zhu, Y., Keane, M., and Bai. R.;  
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4 Chinese TV Regulation in the Era of Globalization 
4.1 The WTO and Chinese Television 
The commercialization of the Chinese broadcasting system took place as part of a more general 
process of economic liberalization fostered by the Chinese government for economic growth and 
as a response to external pressure from the West (Hong and Hsu, 1999). The West, especially 
the U.S., has highly supported the privatization of public sectors in developing countries in Asia, 
including the media. They have employed various means of putting pressure on Asian 
governments to privatize and open their domestic markets up to foreign capital. Specific 
international organizations have been set up to facilitate the expansion of the Western free 
market economy, aimed at removing trade barriers among nations. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO), one of these international organizations, was created in 1995 to replace 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to fulfill such responsibilities. For China, 
which is attempting to be integrated into the global market economy, joining the WTO means, 
first and foremost, joining an international framework of market rules initiated and dominated 
by Western countries. Its broadcasting system is therefore required to transform and be in line 
with international standards, and especially communicable and negotiable with those of the West. 
Both Chinese state and television operators cannot avoid making adjustments to withstand the 
test of growing commercialism (Guo, 2003). 
With an incredible number of television viewers and their potential purchasing power, 
today’s China will most likely become the largest media market in the world. As China’s 
economy has been increasingly melting into the global system, the future of its broadcasting 
system, which has always been portrayed as an authoritarian model that seems to be inconsistent 
with the current international environment, is attracting a lot of attention and leaves questions 
for us about whether the Chinese broadcasting system will be transformed from a traditional 
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monopolistic state-owned institution into a privately-owned enterprise (or at least become partly 
privatized), and whether the state’s control power over the broadcasting system will finally give 
way to the forces of the market economy during the process of intensified commercialization in 
its post-WTO period. 
WTO accession has been widely regarded as a crisis for the once stable and heavily 
regulated Chinese broadcasting industry, signifying intensified commercialism as well as the 
possible intrusion of foreign competitors (Redl and Simons, 2002;Keane and Donald, 2002). 
Before China’s accession to the WTO, private and foreign investments were restricted in the 
Chinese broadcasting system. In addition, in the past, connections with foreign media were 
primarily based on small-scale cooperation, and far from direct competition. Even though its 
economic reforms have brought about fundamental changes to the media scene, China has still 
been rated as one of the Asian countries with a relatively lower degree of commercialization yet 
with a higher degree of political supervision (Gunaratne, 2000). After joining the WTO, with the 
practice of new policies issued to be in line with WTO principles, foreign-funded and privately-
owned broadcasting companies have been granted equal treatment to state-run ones (See Table 
4-1). According to the data provided by Zhang (2006: 66), 127 pieces of state policy were 
abolished by SARFT in order to accommodate the WTO’s requirements. More than 30 
transnational television channels were permitted to broadcast in higher than 3-star hotels and 
some specific organizations (see Table 4-2). WTO accession stipulates that China needs to open 
its markets to foreign media interests and thus, the growing challenge of direct foreign 
competition to the Chinese broadcasting industry can be foreseen in the near future. 
  Different arguments have been made when scholars start to discuss the impact of WTO 
accession on the Chinese television industry. Some argue that it seems inevitable for Chinese 
television to experience the rampant growth of commercialization as China has become more 
and more involved in the trend of economic liberalization. Adopting intensive market-oriented 
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policies that can help Chinese television become stronger in order to compete with foreign 
broadcasters tends to be imperative in the era of globalization. It has been time for Chinese 
television to transform from a politically-oriented propaganda apparatus into a market-oriented 
commercialized enterprise (Huang and Ding, 1997;Huang and Ding, 2001;Zhang, 2001;Gan, 
Xiong and Li, 2002). Holding different viewpoints, others worry about the negative effects of 
media deregulation and do not encourage the growing distance of Chinese television from the 
state’s control. They assert that it would be a cultural disaster if an overwhelming number of 
Western media content is shown on domestic screen with fewer restrictions. Retaining the 
state’s strict control rather than encouraging the rampant growth of commercialization can help 
Chinese television get through the tough times, especially when China has been entering a very 
dangerous period full of cultural threats coming from Western capitalist values and ideologies 
(Meng, 2001;Zeng, 2005;Zhang, 2006). As such debates continue, Chinese television continues 






Table 4-1: China’s WTO Accession Commitments on the Mass Media 
(1) Distribution of books, newspapers and magazines: 
(a) At the moment of China’s accession, foreign invested retailing enterprises are allowed, 
but restricted to certain numbers and within certain regions, such as five economic zones 
and cities like Beijing and Shanghai. The maximum number of joint-ventures within 
Beijing and Shanghai is four and no more than two in other regions; 
(b) Within two years after accession, foreign majority ownership will be permitted and all 
provincial capitals including Chongqing and Ningbo will be open to foreign investment; 
(c) Within three years after accession, foreign service providers will be allowed to engage in 
the distribution of books, newspapers and magazines.  
(d) However, foreign investors cannot take majority ownership of a chain-store that has over 
30 outlets within the first five years after accession. 
(2) Advertising Services:  
(a) Foreign invested advertising agencies are allowed at the moment of accession. The 
proportion of foreign investment shall not exceed 49%26; 
(b) Foreign majority ownership will be allowed within two years after accession; 
(c) Wholly foreign owned enterprises shall be permitted within the four years after 
accession. 
(3) Audio-visual Services: 
(a) Subject to China’s right of content censorship of audiovisual products, foreign service 
providers are permitted to set joint ventures (they must comply with the relevant 
Chinese regulations) and engage in the distribution and sale of audiovisual products 
(excluding movies). 
(b) Foreign service providers are permitted to set and (or) renovate cinemas. The proportion 
of foreign investment shall not exceed 49%; 
(c) 20 foreign movies per year can be imported for theatrical release on a revenue-sharing 
basis (they must comply with the relevant Chinese film regulations). 
 
Note: General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides mechanisms for member 
countries to retain their right on monitor content. 
  
Source:  
The majority of information is cited from (Pan, 2007: 211); 
The English explanation is partly cited from the website of “The Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China” (CECC-US, 2004) 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=60438  
& the website of (HKTDC, 2002) http://info.hktdc.com/alert/cba-e0206sp1.htm  
(Both accessed on 30 March, 2009)  
                                                
26 This number should be 49% other than 40% as what Pan writes on his book (Pan, 2007: 212). 
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Table 4-2: List of Transnational TV Channels permitted by SARFT (Year 2009) 
No. Name of Channel Company   Country/Territory 
1 Cable News Network (CNN) AOL Time Warner American 
2 Home Box Office (HBO) AOL Time Warner American 
3 CINEMAX AOL Time Warner American 
4 CNBC Asia Pacific NBC (GE) American 
5 MTV Mandarin Viacom American 
6 NGC Asia News Corp. American 
7 STAR MOVIE INT’L News Corp. American 
8 Channel [V] News Corp. American 
9 AXN Sony Pictures Entertainment American 
10 DISCOVERY Tele-Communications Inc American 
11 HALLMARK NBC (GE) American 
12 BBC World News BBC British 
13 NHK WORLD PREMIUM NHK Japan 
14 Phoenix Movie Phoenix Satellite Television 
Holdings Limited (PST) 
Hong Kong 
15 Phoenix Chinese PST Hong Kong 
16 TVB8 Television Broadcasts Limited 
(TVB) 
Hong Kong 
17 TVB GALAX TVB Hong Kong 
18 NOW PCCW Hong Kong 
19 MASTV (Chinese) MASTV Macro 
20 TV5 French State TV (translation) 
27 
France 
21 Phoenix INFONEWS Channel PST Hong Kong 
22 BLOOMBERG Bloomberg American 
23 STAR TV Xing Kong Wei Shi News Corp. American 
24 EUROSPORTSNEWS Bouygues France 
25 CETV AOL Time Warner American 
26 HORIZON CHANNEL WHARF /CATV Hong Kong 
27 SUN TV Sun Television Cybernetworks 
Holdings Limited 
Hong Kong 
28 CELESTIAL MOVIES ASTRO Malaysia 
29 CHANNEL NEWSASIA MediaCorp Singapore 
30 Cuba Vision International CVI Cuba 
31 KBS World KBS Korea 
32 ESPN ESPN/News Corp American 
33 Star Sports ESPN/News Corp American 
Source: SARFT Website (accessed on 30 March, 2009) 
http://www.chinasarft.gov.cn/articles/2009/02/16/20090216145200740240.html 
                                                
27 It is translated from the Chinese version provided on SARFT website.  
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4.2 Regulation Environment with Chinese Characteristics 
4.2.1 Marketization v.s. Political Control 
In order to examine the regulatory transformation in post-WTO China, some important features 
of Chinese TV regulation are briefly summarized here. Overall, the current regulation 
environment of Chinese television can be featured as the dilemma over whether ‘to let television 
serve as a political mouthpiece’ or ‘to let television operate as a marketized enterprise’. This 
regulatory dilemma has always been reflected by the fact that the Chinese government adopts 
politics-first and market-promoting policies at the same time. Influenced by such contradictory 
regulation policies, Chinese television operators have always been requested to consider 
“political-correctness” as their most important mission while they are also forced to pursue 
market revenues that are not closely related to their “political propaganda works”.  This 
regulatory dilemma tends to be the result of Chinese officials’ contradictory attitudes toward the 
use of the television medium. As television contains both political/cultural (shiye) and 
commercial attributes (chanye), how to exploit television and achieve a balance between these 
two attributes has heavily influenced the policy-making process. 
The Political (Cultural) Attribute:  As mentioned in the Chapter 1, TV programs are 
special products that are inevitably embedded with political and cultural meanings. Some 
cultural conflicts among nation-states may emerge when TV programs become a sort of 
transnational economic commodity, posing serious difficulties for governments’ political and 
cultural regulation. The proponents of media protectionism hold the assumption that television 
programs can neither be treated as pure economic products nor can they be left solely to the 
hand of the free market. Having realized the importance of the ideological nature of cultural 
products, China is growing increasingly sensitive towards Western political and cultural 




In China, the political usage of television has been accentuated ever since television has 
been launched. Chinese television was born and developed as a party tool from the very 
beginning. Chairman Mao Zedong often spoke of the importance of the mass media and 
regarded it as a weapon for class struggle. Based on his ideas, television in China has become a 
loyal servant of the Party-state (Hong, 1998). The national broadcasting system has also been 
built with a hierarchy that is compatible with that of political administration, from which central 
directives are easily delivered and passed down from a central authority to the local arena. 
Moreover, China employs rather strict censorship to ensure the “political correctness” of 
programs in order to protect its political stability. The first few statements of the policy entitled 
“Examination Procedures for Television Dramas” issued by the State Administration of Radio, 
Film and Television (SARFT) note: “The competent authorities must improve their political 
consciousness…strictly examine the political standards of television dramas…to protect 
television dramas against a wrong political orientation…let them offer a better service for the 
Socialist Reform, Opening-up and Modernization” (SARFT, 2007).  
The Commercial Attribute: This appears to be an opposing tendency to the first attribute, 
as the commercial attribute of television requires it to be operated and regulated by market 
discipline. The business of television, such as the launch of satellite television channels, seeking 
out overseas advertisements, producing, circulating and exchanging television programs, is 
dependent on market rules rather than political demands. Moreover, influenced by this attribute, 
the economic value of television programs tends to be of more concern compared to the 
traditional political or cultural concerns when the television industry becomes increasingly 
commercialized. 
The commercial attribute of Chinese television has gradually gained importance after Deng 
Xiaoping ushered in market reforms starting in 1978. Television in China has entered a new 
stage of rapid development and consumption. There is a rapidly increasing demand for highly or 
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fully commercialized television services. A total of 676 TV stations were established in 1992, 
with one national broadcaster, - CCTV (China Central Television), 30 provincial stations, 295 
municipal stations and 350 county stations (People's Daily, 1992). Data from UNESCO (1999) 
shows that almost 32.1% of the population, approximately 400 million people, had TV receivers 
in 1997. Two years later in 1999, almost 90% of households, numbering more than 1.1 billion, 
possessed at least one TV receiver. In 2007, TV Coverage already exceeded more than 96% of 
the population (SARFT, 2008). Since it became impossible to continue providing financial 
support to so many television stations, the government began to cut its budget during the reform 
period. Since then, state broadcasters have increasingly begun to rely on advertising revenues 
and subscription fees. Once excessive political interventions now seem to be more and more 
incompatible with the marketable operation of television. Commercialized broadcasters have 
gradually begun to pursue their own economic interests rather than working together with the 
government to meet the same objective. Local broadcasters, for instance, have often been found 
to illegally air foreign programs beyond their limits in order to attract more audiences (Guo, 
2003). 
Faced with the non-cooperation of local broadcasters, the government has found it 
increasingly difficult to request for them to closely ensure political correctness without 
providing sufficient financial support. As the media market becomes increasingly liberalized, the 
Chinese government still wants to maintain political control over television. Although the 
commercial attribute has been widely acknowledged by television operators, the Chinese 
government is reluctant to grant it official acceptance and continues to stress the political and 
cultural nature of television. As a result, the two contradictory positions held by the Chinese 
government have formed a situation in which the television system in China generally does not 
operate with a purely commercial or market-driven mechanism, but has to reconcile between the 
market rules and political supervision, in other words between two contradictory value systems--
the market and the planned system. It is no wonder then that the Chinese government’s policies 
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have swung between promoting economic deregulation and preserving political and cultural 
regulation. These contradictory policies are evidence of the hesitant attitude of the Chinese 
government to loosen its control over the television medium. 
4.2.2 Television Chanye Hua v.s. Commercialization  
The situation has changed when China is prepared to meet the foreseen growth of 
commercialism after its accession into the WTO. It has been a difficult step for Chinese officials 
to finally affirm the commercial attribute of television. Chinese officials have been sensitive 
about the use of such terms as “media commercialization” to indicate the ongoing market-
orientated television reform. Instead, the term “Chanye Hua” (marketization)28 has been used 
more frequently. The former term tends to fit with the occurrences of deregulation, privatization 
and liberalization of television which the Chinese state is reluctant to see, while the latter tends 
to stress the necessity of providing commercialized television services other than the private 
ownership and liberalized operation of television. Guo (2004: 9) has commented that 
“commercialization” is a word that is condemned by the officials in China, as it places too much 
emphasis on the profit-seeking incentives of television and weakens its traditional function---to 
serve as the Party’s mouthpiece. In finding a rather political inoffensive and neutral word in 
Chinese, “Chanye Hua” provides the proper balance between the political and commercial 
attributes of television, and was finally accepted by the new generation in the Chinese 
leadershipwho face the increasing challenges that have been brought about by China’s entry into 
the WTO.  
                                                
28 “Marketization” has been used here to indicate “Chanye Hua” since it seems to be more appropriate than the words mentioned 
above, like “industrialization” or “commercialization”. Marketization not only distinguishes itself from commercialization as it 
does not necessarily or naturally link itself to private ownership of television but also highlights the implicit official attitude 
toward television that “shiye danwei, qiye hua guanli”, which means that television ownership remains state-owned, the 
ideological function of television remains foremost, and the operation of television responds to market disciplines. Unique 
Chinese characteristics have yielded the situation that Chinese TV regulation transits from a political-oriented pattern into a 
market-oriented one, but must proceed with these mentioned-above preconditions imposed. 
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The creation of the concept of Chanye Hua has reflected the typical characteristics of 
Chinese TV history. From the moment that Huang and Ding (1997) put forward this concept29 to 
its final acceptance of use by the Chinese media authorities, the bumpy formation process has 
endowed the term Chanye Hua with meanings beyond what its literal translation can deliver. So 
far there has been no agreement on the most appropriate English translation of the term, as the 
literal translation to “industrialization” does not seem to accurately indicate the potential 
meaning associated with the Chinese term. Guo (2004) has pointed out that the original meaning 
of “Chanye Hua” actually gives voice to Chinese television actors who pursue a break from the 
state’s ideological control for their relative independence in a highly marketized environment. 
However, these statements have touched a sensitive nerve among the Chinese authorities since 
this poses a challenge to the political attribute of television that it should be a Party mouthpiece. 
In order to guarantee the political harmlessness of the concept, in a series of later modifications 
to the term Chanye Hua, Chinese scholars have avoided mentioning any information that might 
undermine the ideological function of television but instead, highlight the fact that Chanye Hua 
refers to the transition process of Chinese television from operating like a non-profit institution 
into a business-like state industry. In the meantime, the new generation of Chinese leadership is 
faced with intensified commercialism due to its accession to the WTO and has therefore 
gradually become “desensitized” to such words. In 2000, the term Chanye Hua first appeared in 
the Party’s highest level official documents and has now become the mainstream and orthodox 
concept in Chinese television30. 
These unique Chinese characteristics have yielded a situation where the market-oriented 
Chanye Hua reform of Chinese television must proceed with some preconditions imposed, 
                                                
29 Actually, the term ‘chanye’ was recognized in internal Party documents as early as 1992 (Keane, 2007: 81). 
30 During the Fifth Session of the Fifteenth Party Congress in October 2000, “Wenhua Chanye” (cultural industry) was formally 
proposed as part of the recommendations document for the national Tenth Five-Year Plan. In 2001, the fourth session of the 
Ninth People’s Congress ratified this concept (Zhang, Hu and Zhang, 2004).  During the Sixteenth Plenary Session of the CCP in 
November 2002, the term “Wenhua Chanye” (cultural industry) appeared again in a report by Jiang Zemin. During the same 
month, Jiang said to an international group attending a broadcasting conference that Chinese television has been continuously 
undergoing a process of “Chanye Hua” (Guo, 2004:11) cited from (Liang, 2003). After this, state leaders legitimated the concept 
of “Chanye Hua” and its related discourse, and confirmed the “Chanye” attribute, namely the marketable attribute, of television. 
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which are that: 1) the ownership of television remains state-controlled and 2) the ideological 
function of television remains the foremost priority. Under such circumstances, Chinese 
television reform has to proceed with the consideration of both political and market interests. 
This thesis argues that such dual-interest reform measures are less likely to bring Chinese 
television into a free-competition mechanism in which various types of media capital are 
provided with fair opportunities. On the contrary, the state-owned capital in the broadcasting 
market can achieve rapid growth with a lopsided policy-orientation. 
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1. In Singapore, “Block” refers to no private reception of transnational television except for specified hotels and 
organizations, in order to block out unwelcome foreign contents, like erotic, violent themes and those harmful to the 
harmony of Asia. “Permit” refers to encouragement of selectively importing foreign programs because of that “why 
people want to cause trouble by installing private receptor if they can watch a lot on local television” (said by 
Brigadier-General Yong-Boon Yeo, previous Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts). It is cited 
from Zhang (2006:145). 
2. Source: Information of Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan is cited from both Zhang (2006: 
145) and the Chapter 4 of Thomas (2005). For China, it is the main argument from my thesis.  
 
4.3 Chanye Hua Reform Measures of Television Industry 
To some extent, China’s WTO accession has in fact constituted an external driving force that has 
hastened the Chanye Hua (marketization) reform of Chinese television. There are many 
fundamental inconsistencies between WTO principles and Chinese media policies, such as the 
inconsistency between the WTO’s rule-oriented regulatory principle and the existing Chinese 
politically-oriented system, the WTO’s free market-centered regulatory rules and the Chinese 
state-centered regulatory policies, the free flow of information advocated by the WTO and the 
communication sovereignty accentuated by the Chinese state. All these inconsistencies have 
created pressure for the Chinese state to adjust itself to be in line with international standards. 
The traditional regulation system with a high level of political intervention is gradually 
becoming incompatible with the globalized context. Directly or largely due to the pressure of its 
accession to the WTO, the commercial attribute (Chanye Shuxing) of television has finally been 
affirmed by the new generation of the Chinese authority and since then, the state has decided to 
adopt a series of Chanye Hua reform measures. 
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In an interview with the Xinhua News Agency, Zhu Hong, Director of the Policy, Law and 
Regulation Department of SARFT, declared that:  
… (China’s accession into the WTO) has actually increased the amount of pressure to adopt Chanye Hua 
reform of Chinese television…our existing policies and regulations place more emphasis on the political attribute of 
television under the traditional planned system (but under-evaluate the importance of the marketable attribute)…we 
are short of research on Chanye Hua and lack a clear regulatory direction toward Chanye Hua. To a large extent, 
this prevents the development of the Chinese television industry…a great disparity with foreign broadcasters has 
arisen…therefore we have decided to solve the problems caused by the old planned system and modify the relevant 
policies and regulations…meanwhile Chinese TV workers should pay attention to Western imports… and prevent 
the ill culture and ideologies from invading Chinese society…because Chanye Hua reform seriously relates to the 
nation’s security and political stability (SARFT, 2004)31. 
Taking China’s accession into the WTO as a turning point, this thesis attempts to investigate 
the manner in which Chanye Hua reform measures have been adopted in China. In addition, it 
attempts to examine how these market-oriented policies have been implemented with specific 
Chinese characteristics and how they have influenced the operation of the Chinese broadcasting 
market.  
Chanye Hua reform is mainly covered by the following four aspects: 1) Separation of TV 
program Production and Broadcasting (STVPB); 2) Broadcasting Consolidation and 
Reorganization (BCR); 3) Channel Specialization; and 4) the Going-out Project. 
4.3.1 Separation of TV program Production and Broadcasting (STVPB) 
       Shortly before China’s accession into the WTO, the Separation of TV program Production 
and Broadcasting (STVPB) was adopted as an important Chanye Hua reform measure for the 
Chinese television system. The STVPB refers to the transfer of responsibility for producing 
television programs, which was traditionally taken on by state-owned TV stations, to privately-
owned independent TV production companies. In the traditional television system, TV stations 
                                                
31 This interview was originally conducted in Mandarin and has been translated by the author. All other interviews in the rest of 
this thesis conducted in the Chinese language have also been translated by the author.  
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took charge of not only the assignment of program production but also that of broadcasting. 
They operated as both producers and broadcasters in the television market. However, they have 
now become mainly responsible for purchasing television programs from independent 
production companies, except for news programs, and arranging them for broadcasting32.  
4.3.1.1 The Formation of STVPB 
The STVPB has been officially implemented after the No.82 Document was issued in 
199933. In order to get rid of some of the maladies of the television industry caused by the old 
planned economic system, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), the 
government agency in charge of the country’s broadcasting industry, decided to transfer part of 
the production responsibility of national broadcasters to the market. Under the traditional 
planned economic system, TV stations were primarily dependent on government financial 
support. What they produced had to be consistent with the requirements of national “propaganda 
work” rather than responsive to market demand. Ensuring that all the broadcasted programs 
were politically safe was the most important job for television operators and there was no 
incentive for them to find out what audiences preferred. As time passed, the wastage of public 
resources, a lack of motivation and low production efficiency have become chronic maladies of 
state-owned TV stations. After the implementation of the STVPB, a large number of non-
government investments have entered into TV production and the market has become 
immediately activated. A lot of independent producers who are quite in tune with market 
demand have begun to participate in this area and therefore, a lot of market-desirable television 
programs have begun to be produced. 
                                                
32 Although the main responsibility of program production has been transferred into the hands of the labor market, this does not 
mean that TV stations will no longer produce programs by themselves. In a later period of STVPB, TV stations sometimes 
produce low-cost programs by themselves in order to ensure that these programs have a better fit with the channel’s features. 
33 The key issues of the No.82 Document stipulated that (1) TV stations and TV networks (content suppliers) should be separated; 
(2) the Chinese television system should stop following an old four-tiered system; (3) Local-level TV stations, such as at the 
municipal and county level, should be combined into TV stations at higher levels. For more detailed information, refer to 
SARFT “The Opinions on Strengthening Construction and Management of Radio and Television Cable Networks” published in 
Chinese Cable Television (2006) Vol. (1) P6-7. 
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The STVPB is not a unique phenomenon in China. During the 1950s, the US TV production 
was contracted out to the independent sector. Some in-house (studio) system was reorganized to 
allow the farming-out of production to independent producers. The independent production 
occurred much later in Europe in the late 1980s. The privatization of public channels and the 
licensing of new commercial channels promoted the role of independent producers (Keane, Fung 
and Moran, 2007: 194). In learning from the experiences of Western countries, it has been 
widely regarded by many Chinese researchers that the STVPB emerged as an outcome of a 
rather high degree of commercialized media operations, and that China is now also developing 
in a similar manner. The practice of STVPB becomes an imperative in this situation. It has been 
a step forward on the part of the Chinese government to move towards television marketization 
(Guo, 2001;Xiong and Liu, 2002). 
 However, the implementation of STVPB in China does not serve as a simple outcome of 
the rapid commercial development of the television industry. Although economic factors have 
influenced its formation to some extent, the STVPB acts more as a temporary expedient that has 
been adopted by the Chinese government as a way of coping with globalization and the relevant 
WTO principles. 
China’s entry into the WTO was effective starting in 2001, but the STVPB was 
implemented in 1999. According to the WTO ‘National Treatment Principle’34, foreigners are 
given with the same treatment as one’s own nationals in the service area which government has 
made a commitment to this. This means that some old television policies, such as No.16 which 
was issued in 199535, conflict with this principle as in this example it forbade both domestic 
private and foreign organizations from engaging in the area of television production. Such 
policies thus have to be abolished since China has made commitments in the Audio-visual 
                                                
34 This principle is formulated in GATT Article 3. It is also found in the other two main WTO agreements (GATS Article 17 and    
TRIPS Article 3). Details can be red from WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm.  




service that “Subject to China’s right of content censorship of audiovisual products, foreign 
service providers are permitted to set joint ventures (they must comply with relevant Chinese 
regulations) and engage in distributing and selling of audiovisual products (excluding movies)” 
(State Council, 2002). As a result, in 2004, new policies, including No. 34 and No. 44, were 
enacted to allow foreign broadcasters to participate in the area of television production and to set 
up joint venture companies with domestic broadcasters36. At the same time, the old policy No. 
16 was abolished. Since it is inevitable that foreign competitors will enter the market, it is 
understandable that the STVPB was adopted by the Chinese government as a temporary 
expedient to allow domestic private investments to join in first and the foreign ones later. In 
1999, the STVPB was put into practice just before China’s accession to the WTO. Before 
foreign capital entered the domestic market, local privately-owned independent TV production 
companies were encouraged to grow quickly.  
Xu Guangchun, the vice minister of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central 
Committee and director of SARFT, then revealed that:  
We need to utilize the WTO’s relevant regulations well in order to protect our national culture and 
broadcasting industry…we should carefully examine these regulations, such as the Citizen Treatment Principle, to 
protect ourselves…we should first open up to local participants any area that will inevitably be opened up to 
foreigners; we should first permit domestic private investment in any sector that will inevitably be permitted foreign 
investment (Xu, 2002). 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, some studies pointed out that the conditions of the 
television market in China had already been sophisticated enough to call for the practice of 
STVPB (Guo, 2001). However, new reform measures were not adopted at the time, and were 
only issued when the Chinese government was pushed by external pressures. The hesitance of 
the Chinese government to permit the entrance of domestic private capital is evidenced by its 
                                                
36 No. 34 Document can be viewed on http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2004/08/20/20070924095834880560.html (accessed on 
20 Oct, 2009); No. 44 Document and ‘Notice of No.44’ can be viewed on http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2005-




postponement of the practice of STVPB. Even though local and foreign private capital have now 
been granted accession, it cannot be concluded that the Chinese state has made much progress in 
the process of television marketization.  
The sudden change in the official attitude towards the STVPB in 2000 also indicates the 
state’s hesitance to loosen its control over private capital. Xu Guangchun again publicly 
commented that “The broadcasting medium is the mouthpiece for the Party, government and its 
people…the right of propaganda should be tightly controlled by the Party. It includes the rights 
of broadcasting, production and coverage. These three types of rights cannot be separated. The 
right of propaganda can only be fulfilled until the Party possesses all of them” (Xu, 2000). This 
sudden change in the official attitude has resulted in the stagnation of the STVPB policy. 
Some scholars argue that the STVPB is a result of the fact that market forces continue to 
compel the government to step aside. However, these scholars have always underestimated the 
political expediency of the STVPB. They tend to overstress the theoretical significance of the 
STVPB but undervalue its complicated background and empirical results. In theory, it cannot be 
denied that the STVPB does indeed provide a break from the tradition of the planned-economic 
television system and brings the Chinese television industry into a more market-oriented 
mechanism. However, it also cannot be neglected that the Chanye Hua reform measure for 
Chinese television proceeds under both political and market pressures all the time. Such a 
squeezed-by-dual-interest reform measure lacks a well-formed basis of upholding commercial 
development from the beginning, and results in an unbalanced competition environment in the 
end.  
4.3.1.2 Implications of STVPB 
The STVPB has not been carried out under purely commercial conditions in China since 
this reform measure is not able to reach the deeper layers of the television system. The two most 
important parts of the industrial chain---the right to broadcasting and censorship---are still 
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tightly controlled by the state. This means that only a part of program production has been 
opened up to private capital. Meanwhile, a direct result of the STVPB is a transfer of production 
risks from TV stations to independent TV production companies, as the latter lacks sufficient 
support from the authorities. Independent producers have to resort to strict self-censorship since 
they are uncertain how far they can go and would rather self-consciously follow the state’s 
ideological guidelines than incur the risk of having to pay a political penalty.  
(a) Risk Transition 
Independent TV production companies, which include domestic private production houses 
and joint ventures with partial investments by foreign media, have been placed at a disadvantage 
due to the absence of equal policy protection as that offered to TV stations. Domestic private 
producers lack sufficient and stable funding due to the uncertainty of whether their programs 
will pass the state’s censorship and be selected to be aired by TV stations. Foreign producers 
face a greater hurdle because they are regulated by more restricted policies in various aspects, 
such as market permission conditions, the percentage of a joint venture’s shareholdings, 
personnel structures, the content of program manuscripts and application procedures for 
obtaining a Television Program Production License. State-owned TV stations, however, have 
been authorized by the government to continue possessing a monopoly over broadcasting 
channels, which places them in a dominant position when collaborating with private companies. 
An interview with a marketing manager in the Guanhua Company provides a vivid 
description of the difficulties that domestic private producers are faced with:  
We have several topics to choose in the beginning, such as the stock market, housing prices, law cases, a 
policeman’s story, entertainment shows and children’s games. These topics are salable because audiences would be 
interested in them. We need to negotiate with the TV stations first…to discuss which topic they like and then we 
can start to produce the program…but they (the TV stations) don’t want to sign a contract with us first because they 
are not sure whether the program can pass the SARFT censorship…(As such) we have to put some money in to 
produce a sample and give it to them to see how…you know, we have put a lot of money into preparing these 
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samples, it is not a small amount of money, we need to pay for the studio, shooting staff, a host, audiences…TV 
stations won’t invest until they are sure our samples can be accepted by the SARFT…if it can’t pass the censorship, 
the losses have to be incurred by us! Every year, we have spent a lot on this37.  
Another interview with a marketing manager in the Beijing branch of STAR TV highlights 
a similar situation among foreign producers. He revealed: “STAR TV has been restricted in 
many aspects, like the topics, we can’t talk too much about the news and related critical 
comments…maybe the producers in TV stations and independent production companies, they 
enjoy more freedom than us…we prefer entertainment themes”. When I asked him whether 
STAR TV would prefer to choose independent production companies as partners, such as the 
Guanhua Company, he confessed that “Er…we know Guanhua is a good company, of course 
there are a lot of good independent production companies in Beijing…but we still prefer to work 
with TV stations, like CCTV. Everybody knows CCTV is the boss (laugh)…it has strong links 
with officials, I think that cooperation with it can help us very much, for example, it may 
broadcast our programs to a large audiences, but independent production companies…they 
can’t…we need to choose the one that makes us stronger”.  He added that, “STAR TV is 
currently still restricted in the area of Guangdong, our marketing staff, you know, we stay in 
Beijing, as it is more convenient for us to keep in touch with important persons. Certainly we are 
not satisfied with only staying in Guangdong. We hope to broaden the reception of STAR TV 
among Chinese households, like Phoenix. We need to work with someone like CCTV to help 
us”38.  
Compared to the words of private producers, my interview with a producer in CCTV belied 
much more confidence. When I asked why this producer chooses to stay in CCTV rather than 
work for an independent production company, he said: 
                                                
37 Field notes: Interview on 9 Oct and 15 Nov 2007, Beijing. Since such information about censorship is sensitive in China’s 
media, all the producers asked for an anonymous interview. Moreover, such information was not easily gained initially, but 
collected after two or more interviews, after I had built up their trust.  
38 Field notes: Interview on 22 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
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Yes, there are some of my colleagues (who once worked for CCTV) who have moved out and now work for 
independent production companies. I would like to stay because what I do is not very different from them. We all 
work for CCTV (the programs made by his colleagues are also sold to CCTV)…I don’t see any reason why I need 
to move. We still always see each other. Sometimes I ask them how life is over there. They told me it is not good. 
You see, besides work, they still need to worry about whether their programs will be accepted by TV stations. 
Sometimes, they have no job to do because no TV station will invest…Compared to them, I have a stable job and 
have no need to worry. What I should do is to pass most of the assignments to them (his colleagues) and see if it is 
ok.39   
In fact, in most cases of cooperation between TV stations and private producers, the 
agreements that are signed unequally restrict the program suppliers more so than the buyers. TV 
stations can always arbitrarily depress the selling price of the ready-made programs of private 
producers and cancel contracts through blunt excuses like a political ban from the Party censors.  
One program produced by the Guanhua Company encountered such problems. The chief 
producer of this program40 told me that he had already provided this program to a provincial TV 
station for more than a year. During the period of time before the Seventh National CCP 
congress from September to November 2007, SARFT began to tighten its censorship of 
television programs and criticized his program for containing too many entertainment scenarios 
that were harmful to younger audiences. In response to the SARFT’s criticisms, the chief 
producer revised parts of the program and even almost decided to rename it in order to reduce 
the “harm”. Nevertheless, the provincial TV station refused to continue their contract due to the 
political ban from the SARFT and instead, broadcasted other “politically correct” programs to 
get through this sensitive period. Even worse, this program was not able to be resold to other TV 
stations because the provincial TV station had reserved its copyright. As a result, the chief 
producer had to cease production and undertake the expenses that had been incurred so far. All 
                                                
39 Field notes: Interview 20 Oct 2007 and 17 Nov 2007, Beijing.   
40 As this program has already been banned by the SARFT with an internal order, the chief producer did not allow me to reveal 
the name of this program as the publication of this information would invite trouble for him. 
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the workers for this program were dismissed and some left Guanhua to look for other kinds of 
jobs. 
Besides the program copyright, TV stations even reserve the right to the profits of re-
broadcasting, which are not distributed to the producers. I was informed by a producer in the 
Guangxian Chuanmei Company41 that the withdrawal of its program Entertainment Live (Yule 
Xianchang42 ) from Beijing TV4 in 2005 was a typical example due to this reason. Their 
producers could not accept the unfair conditions imposed by the Beijing TV station, so they 
sought out other TV stations to sell this program to. The fact that the same program can be 
shown on different TV stations or suddenly disappear provides a clear indication of the 
disadvantageous situation that private producers are in and that they are too weak to negotiate 
with TV stations because they lack broadcasting resources.  
Some informal discussions with people working in these private production companies have 
also provided a vivid picture for understanding their tough lives. I found that many workers in 
private companies once worked in the state-owned TV stations. They decided to leave as they 
had encountered too many restrictions in these TV stations and thought that they would be freer 
and have more space if they did it by themselves. However, what awaited them was a much 
narrower path and a tougher situation of survival. Previously, they had only been responsible 
and worked for one TV station. The leaders of the TV station would help them to negotiate with 
the television officials if the program produced by them was refused by the censors. However, 
when they moved to private companies, the traditional employers now became potential buyers. 
“If the program is refused by the censors again, no one will stand up to help you. If you refuse to 
revise it according to the official requirements, no one will buy your program and you lose 
                                                
41 Field notes: Interview on 7 Nov, 2007, Beijing.  
42 Chinese title: 娱乐现场 
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everything. Independent production is really tough!” These are the comments of one of my 
interviewees from Guangxian Chuanmei43. 
Consequently, the practice of STVPB has transferred the production risk, mainly caused by 
poor topic selection, poor program quality and unfavorable censorship feedback, from TV 
stations to independent production companies. It may seem like an exciting development that 
private producers are now granted admission into the area of television production which has all 
along been monopolized by state workers. However, private producers have to choose to 
cooperate or even rely upon the TV stations because they need to ensure the possibility of 
broadcasting their programs in order to minimize their production risks. As a result, independent 
production companies have to be much more cautious in their relationships with TV stations and 
tend to become more and more passive. Currently in China, the most common manner of 
producing TV programs for independent producers is not independent production, but rather, 
cooperation with TV stations or with semi-government bodies, such as the China Media Group 
(CMG) and Shanghai Media Group (SMG).   
(b) Political Self-consciousness 
The content creation of independent TV production companies has thus become more 
subject to official ideological requirements due to their disadvantaged position. If the frequency 
of the program that is refused is high, the cost of production increases as well. Independent 
production companies have to choose topics that are the most unlikely to be refused by censors. 
A Socialist Mainstream Melody highly recommended by television officials has consequently 
been the one that independent producers find hard to avoid, or that they feel is the safest choice 
for them.  
                                                
43 Field notes: Informal discussion, Dec 2007, Beijing. Similar phenomena have also been documented by Zhong Dafeng (2001), 
Wang and Li (2004) and Xia and Guo (2006). Their studies were conducted in other private production houses and their 
interviewees had similar complaints.  
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Socialist Mainstream Melody (shehui zhuyi zhuxuanlv)44 has been defined as a genre to 
promote the social benefits of television programs over economic profit, superior education and 
orientation over enjoyment, serious drama over farce, products that use local actors over those 
that use foreigners (Yin, 2002). It was first used in 1987 and highly encouraged by the 
contemporary Chinese leadership (Zhang, 1994: 2). Because of the excessive political usage of 
television by the Chinese government, mainstream programs that predominantly promote 
socialism, collectivism and nationalism always appear to be ideologically overbearing and 
sermonic to Chinese audiences. On the contrary, as Yang (2003) has pointed out, the 
commercial genrepursues emotional involvement and value consistency with audiences in order 
to seek high market responses and economic returns.   
While the central authority imposes its own content preferences upon independent 
commercial producers, it is a great expense for them to follow the official requirements as this 
may lead to a loss in ratings. A special narrative strategy featured as political self-consciousness, 
which I conceptualize as “juxtaposition”, has been creatively and widely employed by 
independent producers to negotiate with official censors. This narrative strategy is discussed in 
the next chapter in more detail.  
Overall, undertaking a higher degree of production risk has consequently forced 
independent producers to closely follow the ideological guidelines. During the programming 
process, private producers tend to be more sensitive about topic selection, narrative strategies 
and the values revealed by their programs. For example, normally, independent producers have 
to go through a more complicated censorship procedure than state broadcasters. First, 
independent producers submit their selected topics to a buyer TV station for filtration. The TV 
                                                
44 “Socialist Mainstream Melody” (社会主义主旋律) is not a specifically-defined term in the extant Chinese literature. It has 
always been used by the Chinese to generally indicate cultural products that promote nationalism, collectivism and socialism. I 
have widely researched the extant literature for its specific definition. However, very few studies, especially in English have 
provided a concrete idea to it. Yin Hong (2002) is one who has provided a specific definition in English. Since this term has a 
very wide range of meanings, it may be explained in different ways by different people. The criteria of how to gauge “Socialist 




station sends its feedback on which topic is feasible and these producers then begin production. 
After this, the program is re-censored by the chief producer in the independent production 
company and sent to the TV station for a third-round examination. After all these procedures, 
the final version is sent to the SARFT for a final round of censorship. Compared to independent 
producers, the programs produced in the TV stations themselves do not have to go through such 
a complicated process of scrutiny. For the most part, the topic, content, narrative strategy and 
even guests who are invited onto the program are pre-determined by the officials. What state 
producers need to do is to follow the official requirements.  
The producers in the Yinhan Chuanbo Company told me that: 
It is interesting that our programs always tend to be more conservative than those produced by TV stations 
since we cannot afford to lose funds if our programs are refused by the official censors...We have produced a lot of 
mainstream programs, much more than the TV stations. You can have a look at what they (the TV stations) produce. 
They call it mainstream, but our programs are more ‘mainstream’ than their mainstream…Even our entertainment 
programs contain a lot of politically correct components since we need to get an easier pass of censorship, 
especially during this period45…For example, Jacky Chan calls on patriotic feelings among adolescents, and Jay 
Chou tells his fans to love their parents and to be good children46.  
Since such a high production risk often results in a large amount of losses, many 
independent production companies face serious financial problems and have to cut down the size 
of their companies to focus on producing safe programs. In early 2008, Guanhua begun to 
reorganize its company and kept only a few programs that it constantly provided to certain TV 
stations. Those programs that had temporary and unstable contracts with TV stations had to be 
cancelled and some workers for these programs were dismissed. The rest of the personnel were 
reassigned to a new department that was combined with the old Marketing and Programming 
                                                
45 This period was from September to November 2007, shortly before the seventh national congress of the CCP. SARFT issued 
an internally circulated policy that all producers should pay more attention to the “political correctness” of their programs during 
this period. This policy highly recommended that producers create programs to promote socialism and the achievements of the 
CCP.  
46 Field notes: Interview on 11 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
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departments. This new department was named the Production Department and was primarily 
responsible for self-censoring programs and building a good relationship with the TV stations. 
In theory, the STVPB can be simply understood as the separation of the program production 
and broadcasting. However, its implementation has become complex when it has been put into 
practice. TV stations build unfair cooperative relationships with private producers and the latter 
appear to be too weak to negotiate with the former. What is ironic about this phenomenon is that 
TV stations are still running under a planned economy regulatory system, but production 
companies are forced to operate according to the market rules. After the STVPB was enacted in 
1999, there have been no new related policies issued to manage the unequal relationship 
between the TV stations and private companies. Thus, the inconsistency continues to exist and 
the state has not made any progress in solving this problem. Private producers continue to 
depend on TV stations and have to resort to strict self-censorship to prevent the financial losses.  
4.3.2 Television Industry Broadcasting Consolidation and Reorganization (BCR) 
Broadcasting consolidation and reorganization (BCR) is another significant Chanye Hua reform 
measure that has been adopted by the SARFT. As stipulated by the No.82 Document, the four-
tiered national TV network linking the central, provincial, municipal and county levels was 
ordered to cease operations. A two-tiered network serving TV stations at the central and 
provincial levels was instituted as a substitute. Meanwhile, TV stations in a region, including 
terrestrial, cable and educational TV stations as well as other types of broadcast media such as 
radio stations, film companies and internet service providers, are now required to combine 
forces and reorganize as large broadcasting groups. From 1997 to 1998, the number of TV 
stations was drastically reduced from 923 to 347, with an acute decrease of 576 in just one year 
(Huang, 2001). In addition, the number of consolidated broadcasting groups rapidly increased 




4.3.2.1 The Formation of Broadcasting Consolidation and Reorganization (BCR) 
BCR was adopted by SARFT as a defensive strategy to cope with the giant transnational 
broadcasters that may enter China after its accession into the WTO. Chinese academics feared 
that the entry of transnational media giants would pose a huge challenge to China by 
monopolizing the Chinese domestic media market and replacing Chinese traditional cultures 
with Western ones (Wu, 2003;Zhang, 2006;Zeng, 2005). As Chinese television seems to be too 
vulnerable to resist these kinds of challenges, building its own broadcasting “aircraft carriers”47 
seems to be a reasonable measure for coping with these competitors.  
 The entry of foreign media into China has been rapid since the beginning of this century. 
From 2001 to the present, more than 30 foreign channels have been granted access into Chinese 
above 3-star hotels and foreign affairs departments, including the Chinese Entertainment TV, 
Phoenix Chinese, CNN Finance, STAR TV and MTV. More than 200 satellite television 
companies are still awaiting the opportunity to exploit the huge Chinese market. According to 
the data collected by SARFT, Star TV has opened nine channels in China so far and its joint-
stock company Phoenix Satellite TV has enjoyed an increasing influence among Chinese 
audiences; Viacom’s MTV subscribers in Guangdong have been reported to have reached 10 
million by mid-2005. In the same year, Time Warner’s HBO began to provide 5-hour programs 
for 78 pay-TV channels throughout China (SARFT, 2006). Chinese television appears to be too 
weak to compete with these companies. The annual income of the largest broadcasting group in 
China, China Media Group (CMG), is just about 11 billion RMB while the annual revenue of 
AOL-Time Warner has already reached as high as 27 billion US dollars, almost 18 times higher 
than that of CMG (Liu, 2007: 111). Such data has prompted a common belief that if the 
expansion of the media giants is going to be intensified, the vulnerable television industry in 
China cannot withstand such an onslaught.  
                                                
47 The term “aircraft carrier” has been widely used in the Chinese literature.  
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In learning from overseas experiences, the idea of forming its own broadcasting “aircraft 
carriers” has emerged as a way for the Chinese government to make Chinese television larger 
and stronger. As many Chinese scholars have pointed out, the most important reason why these 
foreign media giants appear to be so competitive is that they operate as conglomerates rather 
than as individual skirmishers. In a global wave of consolidation in the 1990s, which was a 
process of absorption of small competitors and the integration of all means of media circulation, 
some broadcasters had grown quickly to control the majority of the global media market. AOL-
Time Warner, Viacom and News Corp are some of the best-known cases. On the other hand, 
Chinese television has all along been manipulated as a political propaganda tool rather than 
treated as a commercial enterprise. Excessive political usage of television has prevented it from 
developing into a large-scale competitive industry. Now there is an urgent need to build 
broadcasting groups to resist the “foreign invasion”. China’s entry into the WTO serves as an 
opportunity as well as an external pressure for boosting the broadcast consolidation.  
Moreover, the non-cooperation of local power is another impetus for SAFRT to reorganize 
the national television system. SARFT has attempted to retrieve its centralized power by 
dismantling local forces of resistance. For a long time, the Chinese television system has been 
segmented into four levels in order to coordinate its political administration. TV stations at each 
level are regulated by the corresponding local authorities and the SARFT is supposed to be the 
highest level supervisor. However, due to the sheer size of the television industry in China, the 
local authorities are always concerned about regional economic interests rather than closely 
following the central guidelines. Their non-cooperation and the conflicts of local protection have 
made it extremely difficult for SARFT to maintain its centralized power. Cutting down on 
redundant TV stations has thus been considered to be an immediately effective measure for 
retrieving its power. 
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Within the traditional four-tired television system, the large number of TV stations has 
caused many problems. Regional officials tend to excessively utilize local TV stations as their 
personal propaganda tools. They praise their political achievements and magnify their local 
influence, but rarely fulfill their assignments to deliver central directives. Allured by huge 
market revenues, local TV stations often illegally transmit foreign satellite TV signals and insert 
their own advertisements regardless of central regulations. The case of illegally transmitting 
Hong Kong television programs in Guangdong province was once a major problem for SARFT. 
Besides, as Xu (2000) has pointed out, in order to benefit from the support of regional political 
interests, local TV stations even employ a large number of family members of regional leaders 
in spite of their professional incapacities. As a result, a drastically increased number of local TV 
stations during the period from the 1980s to the mid-1990s made it more and more difficult for 
the central government to control the situation, and malpractices emerged and spiraled more and 
more out of control.  
The politically segmented television system in China and the intense tensions between the 
political power of various districts have finally resulted in the problematic linkage between the 
central and the local. Television operators have been restricted from cooperating across 
administrative boundaries. The whole Chinese television industry has always appeared to be 
dispersive, small-scale and rough-and-tumble. In contrast, the Western media giants have 
already become remarkably strong through media consolidation few decades ago. Faced with 
external intimidation, the dismantling of local forces of resistance can help the central 
government to re-centralize its control power, to reduce the excessive number of TV stations as 
well as to pave a smooth path for the future plan of building its own broadcasting groups.    
4.3.2.2 Implications of Broadcasting Consolidation and Reorganization (BCR) 
The BCR of Chinese television has been subjected to political factors more than to economic 
ones. It is better to regard the BCR as an “administrative consolidation” rather than a market-
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determined combination. The central government is so anxious to maximize the scale of its 
broadcasting system in order to quickly catch up with Western media giants, but it neglects the 
fact that “larger” does not necessarily mean “stronger” and that it should be prepared with 
sophisticated market conditions. As a result, this market-oriented but politically-pushed reform 
measure has heavily restricted the commercial operation of Chinese television workers and the 
implementation process has proceeded with many problems.  
First, BCR causes a disordered distribution of interests and resources. The consolidation is 
not negotiated by the members within a broadcasting group but rather, commanded by political 
orders from above. As the lower level TV stations are absorbed into higher level TV stations, the 
relevant interests and resources are difficult to reallocate because the business of higher level TV 
stations has not changed much while unwanted personnel have been forcibly added to them.  
A channel manager at the Hubei TV station complained that: 
Around July 2002, we (Hubei TV station) were commanded to combine the Hubei Economic TV station and 
the Hubei Broadcasting TV station. I was surprised at the time because I did not know why and how. Each TV 
station had its own resources and it would be a big problem for us to reassign jobs to the workers transferred from 
these two TV stations…It is quite simple to understand. We already had 9-10 people in the Programming 
Department and 7 in the Editorial Department. Each had their own work to do. Suddenly there came an additional 
15 people, where to place them? ...They (Hubei Economic TV station and Hubei Broadcasting TV station) had 
already sent away many workers, but the rest were difficult to fire because some of them were the relatives of the 
leaders or had good relationships (guanxi) with someone important.48 
A marketing staff member at the Hubei TV station also complained that: 
I once worked at Hubei Economic TV station. Its business was much better than that of Hubei TV station and 
Hubei Broadcasting TV station. My salary was fairly good at the time. Now I have been assigned here and earn 
less…Many of my previous colleagues working at Hubei Economic TV station have such questions like ‘Why were 
                                                
48 Field notes: Interview on 5 Dec 2007, Wuhan.  
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we ordered to be combined into Hubei TV station? Why was it not combined with us? Our business was better, why 
did we need to be placed under its administrative control and all the resources were passed to it? It was unfair!49 
Another producer in the Editorial Department at the Hubei TV station was faced with many 
difficulties at work after she left the Hubei Broadcasting TV station. She said:  
I have many problems getting along with the colleagues here. They worry that I will take their jobs…they just 
ignore me…I have very little work here…yes it might be good because I have a kid to take care of, but I feel 
isolated and unhappy here.50  
As the above interviews show, a bigger Hubei TV station was not formed out of a 
willingness shared by these three organizations. Workers at the Hubei TV station were 
somewhat reluctant to absorb and pay for a large number of unwanted personnel; workers at the 
Hubei Economic TV station were not satisfied to be consolidated because they thought that their 
business achievements were better and that they therefore did not deserve this; workers at the 
Hubei Broadcasting TV station were unhappy as well because the reassigned jobs and resources 
were primarily taken up by workers from the Hubei TV station and they felt underutilized at 
work. Under such working conditions, although the personnel and resources were combined by 
an administrative order from the SARFT, such a politically-pushed but disorderly reallocation of 
interests seriously undermined the enthusiasm of the workers.  
Second, BCR is aimed at increasing the marketized operation of these broadcasting groups, 
but it in fact results in heavier political intervention than before. With the vast reduction in the 
number of TV stations, it is now easier for the government to exercise its regulatory power on 
local commercial media workers. This change has resulted in local commercial producers 
becoming so closely supervised that they now pay more attention to the “political correctness” 
of their programs.   
                                                
49 Field notes: Interview on 6 Dec 2007, Wuhan.  
50 Field notes: Interview on 6 Dec 2007, Wuhan 
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A channel manager at the Hunan TV station described his situation as follows: “I am 
famous for being rather active during the process of programming entertainment shows…I used 
to criticize those who make entertainment shows just like holding a hotpot51…At present (eight 
years after BCR52), I would rather be careful…Our programs are aimed at younger audiences. If 
we do not pay enough attention, the leaders (of Hunan TV and SARFT) will talk to me”53. This 
phenomenon can also be observed at the Hubei TV station. The producers of Communication 
shared their opinion with me that “making no mistake” was a precondition for them. It was a 
form of survival. One of them said that “BCR has actually brought us back to the planned 
economy. I do not see any advantage of it”54.  
This phenomenon clearly indicates the fact that a clear official attitude to detaching the 
political and commercial attributes of television has yet to be confirmed within these 
broadcasting groups. The authorities are attempting to learn from the experiences of Western 
media giants. However, they have placed too much emphasis on the political attribute and still 
maintain the “state-owned” nature of television organizations. A reallocation of interests and 
resources pushed by administrative orders has broken the normal operation of TV stations. An 
increased level of intervention from the authorities within these broadcasting groups has also 
seriously impeded the optimization of market resources. As Hu (2003) has pointed out, until 
now, most broadcasting groups have not yet been authorized with the right to independent 
management by the correspondent authorities. They remain under the direct control of the 
government, far from operating according to the market discipline. Too much political 
supervision not only limits cross-provincial cooperation but also the profit-distribution between 
these broadcasting groups. As Shi Tongyu commented at a 2005 City Television Development 
Forum, “the failure of broadcasting consolidation is largely due to the authorities’ unrealistic 
                                                
51 This is a metaphor used by this interviewee to indicate that some commercial producers are too careful to express their 
opinions. They worry too much about saying something politically wrong that would irritate the official censors and invite 
trouble for them.  
52 The consolidated broadcasting group in Hunan was created in Dec 2000. It was named the “Golden Eagle Broadcasting 
System”. 
53 Field notes: Interview on 13 Jan 2008, Changsha.  
54 Field notes: Interview on 7 Dec 2007, Wuhan. 
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desires…it is a revisiting of “the Big Leap Forward Movement”. Such a market-oriented reform 
measure is hard to be successful” (Liu, 2007: 115). 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the excessive administrative interference has 
facilitated the rapid growth and re-monopolization of state-owned media resources. With the 
practice of BCR, broadcasting groups have quickly centralized the media resources from the 
hands of a large amount of local power, and have absorbed huge non-media investments by 
setting up their own listed companies. For example, in 1992, the Shanghai broadcasting industry 
invested 370 million RMB to list its company, Shanghai Oriental Pearl Co. Ltd., on the stock 
market. The capital of the company increased incredibly to 3,600 million RMB in 2000, 
although it was not at all successful in its business (Sun, 2002). Another three poorly operated 
listed companies created by CCTV, Beijing TV and Hunan TV are also very profitable despite 
having a lot of potential problems, such as idle capital, a high rate of raising loans and poor debt 
solvency. This is mainly due to the “monopoly operation” and “special protection through state 
policies”, as noted by Gao (2002).   
4.3.3 Channel Specialization 
Channel specialization indicates a shift of channel content arrangements from a pan-audience 
style into a focused one that targets specific groups of receivers. This new reform measure, 
which has been advocated since the early 2000s, does not refer to a simple collection of similar 
programs broadcasted to whichever audiences who may be interested, as it was first 
experimented on by CCTV and some local TV stations during the mid 1990s. Instead, channel 
specialization, in the context of the Chanye Hua of Chinese TV, implies a more complicated 
process of the marketable operation of TV actors, from which the whole circulation of TV 
programs, including the marketing, production, distribution, advertising and reinvestment, 
should be closely linked in order to ensure an accurate market targeting and thereby a high 
audience rating and economic returns. Taking CCTV as an example, with the adoption of a new 
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round of channel specialization policies in early 2005, the regulatory system has begun to shift 
from a multi-layered pattern into a channel-orientated one in which each channel is no longer 
regulated by several departments but rather, is placed under the direct supervision of the chief 
inspector, and the main responsibility of the chief inspector is to guarantee a certain quota for 
both the audience ratings and advertising revenues.  
There is actually an echo of channel specialization in the STVPB and BCR formation 
process. The old regulation system of Chinese television featured as a type of extensive 
management, employing much more resources than necessary. The four-tired TV network once 
resulted in an extremely large number of TV stations in China and was a great anomie in 
broadcasting professionalism, causing the malpractice of repeated construction, resources waste 
and disordered competition among TV practitioners. To some extent, the measure of channel 
specialization can help to resolve such problems by means of optimizing market resources while 
the BCR has been put into effect simultaneously. Redundant TV organizations have been cut off, 
large-scale broadcasting groups have been established, and thus it seems necessary to make the 
best use of labor resources and the segmented market in order to fulfill the demands of the new 
specially-designed channels.  
More specialized TV channels means an increased demand for more specific programs. 
Judging from the huge number of Chinese audiences, Chinese TV stations have not been able to 
take over the responsibility of producing enough programs for a whole specialized TV channel 
from the aspects of both quality and quantity. Making use of the labor power outside TV stations 
has subsequently been a better choice and the practice of STVPB has echoed the need for 
channel specialization. Channel specialization has been a good opportunity for independent TV 
production companies as well, because their highly commercialized operations can help them to 
quickly obtain consumer feedback and then accurately target favorable specialized channels.  
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Channel specialization has now become a popular topic for Chinese academics and TV 
practitioners. Although there have debates about whether it is appropriate timing for China to be 
implementing specialized channels at present, it has been widely regarded that the existing 
diversification and segmentation of audiences’ demands have called for the practice of channel 
specialization (Zhang, 2002;Yu, 2002;Chen, 2008;Zhao, 2009). It cannot be denied that the 
market has been one of the main driving forces behind this. This thesis, however, attempts to 
argue that the underlying reason for the Chinese authority to issue the reform measure of 
channel specialization after its accession to the WTO lies primarily in the possibility that 
channel specialization can help solve an essential problem of the Chinese TV regulation system, 
namely the fundamental conflict between public and commercial TV services that exist within 
state-owned TV stations. Due to the state’s particular emphasis on the political attribute of 
television, state-owned but marketized TV stations in China have to struggle to survive under 
the interests of both politics and the market. The commercial-orientated TV services that give 
prominence to the value of entertainment have always proceeded with political fetters. With the 
practice of specialized channels, however, it can largely mitigate the increasing amount of non-
cooperation and resistance coming from local commercial TV practitioners by diverging 
different types of producers and programs into different channel resources. 
4.3.3.1 The Formation of Channel Specialization 
The key problem with the Chanye Hua reform that Chinese media officials have to face is the 
incompatibility of the Chinese TV system with international standards. In response to the 
competition brought about by transnational satellite television channels, there has been a 
stronger attempt on the part of the Chinese state to commercialize its television services in order 
to effectively compete with them. However, as mentioned earlier, commercialization has been a 
condemned word in China as it tends to be associated with private media ownership, something 
the Chinese government is reluctant to see. Having placed too much emphasis on the political 
(cultural) attribute of the television medium, it seems reasonable to assume that Chinese TV 
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stations are actually supposed to run as something like public TV stations according to Western 
standards, or at least to have a division between public TV and commercial TV stations in China 
so that state-owned but marketized Chinese TV will not have to face this dilemma of fulfilling 
the interests of both politics and the market. Unfortunately, there seems to be no sign that the 
Chinese state will allow the Chanye Hua reform to proceed in this way.  
At present, it can be observed that the Chinese government still has a strong grasp on the 
television medium while it adopts market-oriented reform measures. Permission for privatized 
TV stations and private investments in the broadcasting channels are too sensitive to be 
discussed. Certainly Chanye Hua reform has barely touched the core of the TV system due to 
the state’s conservative attitude towards commercialization. On the one hand, state broadcasters 
have to broadcast programs of “socialist mainstream melody” (shehui zhuyi zhuxuanlv) in order 
to fulfill a certain required quota that constitutes the major proportion of their total broadcasting 
schedule. Nevertheless, as these programs tend to be too ideological, pedagogical, stiff and 
boring for audiences, socialist mainstream programs are gradually losing their market share and 
are undergoing a dark period as a result of severe competition from entertainment programs. On 
the other hand, declining government subsidies have forced state broadcasters to search for more 
commercial programs that can bring in higher advertising revenues, but unfavorable policies 
impose restrictions on them, such as strict censorship, a limited broadcasting quota as well as 
rude administrative interference. Moreover, in order to provide coverage for as many viewers as 
possible, state broadcasters have to place as much information as they can into one 
comprehensive TV channel, such as information for the old, for the young, for the rich, for the 
poor, for professionals and for the masses, in order to fulfill the “social responsibility” that the 
state imposes on TV stations. However, such requirements make it increasingly difficult for state 
broadcasters to provide high-quality programs within one specific area, and gradually lose 
audiences who tend to refer to other kinds of information resources, such as the Internet, from 
which they can choose whatever they like to watch.  
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CCTV, the one TV station that is under the most direct control of the government, has faced 
such problems all along. An entertainment channel manager at CCTV stated that: 
CCTV has been subjected to many restrictions from media officials. We need to be concerned about all kinds 
of viewers, such as the young, the old, those with high-level or low-level cultural tastes.  Besides, as the 
representative of the nation, we (CCTV) still need to be concerned about the minorities, the soldiers, the peasants 
and the migrant workers. The SARFT always warns us not to ignore these kinds of people, otherwise someone will 
put forward a criticism that China and CCTV do not care about them and only pursue economic revenues by 
showing commercial programs to the young and middle-aged viewers who may be the majority of consumers…the 
annual Spring Festival Gala (Chunjie Lianhuan Wanhui 55) is a typical example. It looks like a hotchpotch, 
satisfying the diverse needs of people. But it is gradually losing audiences primarily because the young people, 
especially those in the South, do not like to watch it.56  
The tricky problem lies in the fact that the state cannot accept wholesale commercialization 
while expecting TV practitioners to feed themselves. A marketing staff member in the CCTV 
Art Department told me: “The government gives so few subsidies. We need to ask for 
advertising revenues to maintain the operations of the TV station. But they do not allow this, do 
not allow that. They also ask the TV station to consider the peasants, soldiers and migrant 
workers. You can see a lot of programs (on CCTV) made for them. But advertisers know that 
these kinds of people do not watch TV often. They are not the major consumers of their 
products”57.  
What is even more unrealistic is the attempt to divide public and commercial TV stations in 
order to mitigate these contradictions, although there have already been some voices calling for 
this. However, an ex-producer at CCTV told me that, “it is too sensitive to discuss. We 
sometimes talk about it privately. The government will never allow it. The political nature of 
Chinese television is always the most important”58. Therefore, both the Chinese state and the so-
                                                
55 Chinese title: 春节联欢晚会 
56 Field notes: Interview on 12 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
57 Field notes: Interview on 11 Nov 2007, Beijing. 
58 Field notes: Interview on 6 Dec 2007, Beijing. 
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called “economically self-dependent but politically dependent” TV practitioners find themselves 
boxed up in an awkward predicament. 
 
When China joined the WTO, the tricky question was again put forward in front of 
everyone: How to introduce a market mechanism into Chinese television while still maintaining 
the state’s monopolistic control over it? The practice of channel specialization has provided a 
way of reducing the fundamental contradiction to some degree. CCTV first attempted channel 
specialization as early as in 1999.  
 The current CCTV network is composed with one comprehensive channel, CCTV 1, and 17 
specialized channels to provide diverse types of programs to different audiences, such as 
CCTV2-Economy and Finance; CCTV3-Arts; CCTV4-International Mandarin; CCTV5-Sports; 
CCTV6-Movie; CCTV7-Military and Agriculture; CCTV8-Drama; CCTV9-International 
English; CCTV10-Science and Education; CCTV11-Opera; CCTV12-Society and Law; 
CCTVNews-24 hour News; CCTV Children-Children's channel; CCTV Music-Music; CCTV E-
International Spanish; CCTV F-International French; CCTV HD- High-definition programming. 
With the specialization of channels, it now becomes possible to reduce the overlap among 
the old comprehensive channels which may result in audience diffluence. By diverging different 
types of audiences into different channels, those who like entertainment programs can tune in to 
CCTV 3 or CCTV 8; those who enjoy a military and technology focus can view CCTV 7 or 
CCTV 12; those who dislike news with a strong ideological slant can move to other CCTV 
channels instead of watching CCTV 1 or CCTV News. Moreover, channel specialization also 
offers a relatively clearer division of labor between public and commercial services within one 
TV station so that each type of program can be produced with the optimum labor force. The 
producers of CCTV 5 or CCTV 3 can pursue more commercialized services and popular culture 
to attract mass audiences with less restrictions while CCTV 10 and CCTV children can continue 
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to spread high culture and stress the social benefits of TV programs; CCTV 4 can specifically 
target the oversea Chinese-speaking audience, especially the Taiwanese, and spread the Party’s 
‘propaganda work’ and reinforce its ideological education without boring Chinese mainland 
audiences by allowing them to watch other CCTV channels. CCTV International channels can 
also aim to spread China’s voice to different language-speaking viewers and the content can be 
particularly designed to improve China’s international image and exploit its soft power. Such a 
division of labor through channel specialization can best be described with a traditional Chinese 
phrase “ge jin qi zhi, ge qu suo xu” 59, which means that each does what he needs to do 
according to his responsibility and each takes what he likes according to his needs.  
It can be clearly observed that the Party’s guideline for Chanye Hua reform has shifted from 
a traditional planned system that features intense political doctrinism into a new market-
orientated pattern in which a moderate degree of commercial competition based on market rules 
is encouraged and a relatively rational segmentation of market interests can be tolerated. As long 
as “all programs should be under correct guidance of public opinion (yulun60)”, such a transition 
is an affordable expense for the Chinese state. Moreover, a moderate division of public and 
commercial television services within TV stations can improve the competency of Chinese 
television and help to change this awkward situation. From the perspective of TV practitioners, 
channel specialization is more than welcome, since this releases them from their political 
shackles and they can be relatively freer to focus on producing specialized programs. One 
producer at CCTV 2 stated, “I have more pressure in my work now. But I feel much freer than 
before. I know that I have to roll up my sleeves”61. 
In fact, for media officials, channel specialization acts more as a division of labor between 
public and commercial producers than a division of channels targeted at specific audiences. 
Rather than dividing public and commercial TV stations in China, channel specialization moves 
                                                
59 Chinese title: 各尽其职,各取所需 
60 Chinese title: 舆论 
61 Field notes: Interview on 20 Nov 2007, Beijing. 
108 
 
to divide public and commercial channels within a TV station in order to guarantee the foremost 
precondition for the ruling Party that the ownership of TV stations should be state-monopolized 
all the time. However, it is quite possible for public and commercial channels to have many 
imbalances in audience ratings and advertising revenues. One of my interviewees who worked 
as a chief inspector of a public education channel complained to me that “Comparisons are 
odious…he (the chief inspector of the entertainment channel) drives a BMW. Look at us, we 
drive Fu Kang62! ...It is not bad, we can still survive. Nothing to complain about since the TV 
station has to feed us”63. In reality, a lot of public service channels are currently making losses. 
Even if some can achieve a balance in their revenue and expenditure, it is difficult to maintain a 
satisfactory amount of profit. In contrast, entertainment and sports channels are always able to 
attain high audience ratings and thus high advertising revenues. In order to minimize such 
inequalities, TV stations have to provide financial support to those working in public service 
channels and set up a lower profit quota for them. Although this seems to create a situation of 
“robbing the wealthy to aid the needy”, it still looks better for Chinese TV officials than to 
permit the existence of commercial TV stations. Channel specialization can encourage 
commercial producers by granting them a moderate amount of freedom and appeasing those 
working in public service channels by balancing the inequalities between these two types of 
television services.  
4.3.3.2 Implications of Channel Specialization 
Although there are many so-called specialized channels run by local TV stations, they are in 
actual fact short of resources to produce enough specialized programs to meet the demands of a 
whole channel. The practice of channel specialization has tended to enlarge the gap between 
CCTV and local TV stations, and this is primarily caused by an inequality of resources. As 
                                                
62 Fu Kang is a local automobile brand in China. It is cheap and affordable for many Chinese salaried workers. 
63 Field notes: Interview on 18 Dec 2007, Wuhan. These words were uttered by the chief inspector of the public education 
channel while he was chatting with the chief inspector of the entertainment channel. I was with them and listening to their 




many producers of the specialized channels have stated, the precondition for running a 
specialized channel has two aspects: the first is quantity; it needs a sufficient provision of 
specialized programs. The second is quality; it needs a relatively more specialized process of 
programming than that for a comprehensive channel.  
In terms of quantity, the example of a sports channel can be used. In some less economically 
developed provinces, it is difficult to organize a sports competition and even to obtain sufficient 
funding to pay for the broadcasting rights. A journalist working in the sports channel at Hubei 
TV station told me: 
Big cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong, are the places in which various sports competition are 
concentrated. China’s National Games, World Championship, East Asia Games and Asian Games are always 
conducted in these three big cities. Therefore, it is fairly convenient for them (sports journalists) to report from 
these places… (Moreover), the TV stations in these places are capable of buying the broadcasting rights. Their 
sports channels have plenty of programs to fill in their broadcasting schedules. However, Hubei TV sports channel 
lacks such resources. We have to relay the sports news and events from CCTV 5. For example, during the Olympic 
Games, the broadcasting right was monopolized by CCTV5. We had nothing to do.64  
The same problem arises with educational and technology channels of local TV stations. 
Producers in the Hubei TV educational channel revealed that there were not enough programs of 
this genre that could be bought from the market as the independent production companies had all 
shifted to producing highly profitable soap opera dramas. Even if there were such programs, 
they were limited in number as most of them had been bought out by the powerful CCTV rather 
than the weaker local TV stations. Worse still, documentaries such as “Exploration and 
Discovery” (Tansuo yu Faxian65) could only be produced by wealthy stations such as CCTV 
which possesses the necessary resources, such as funding, technology, experts, permission to 
access national museums, access to valuable historical data and the support of relevant national 
                                                
64 Field notes: Interview on 13 Dec 2007, Wuhan.  
65 Chinese title: 探索与发现 
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organizations66. As Zhou (2002) has pointed out, a similar phenomenon has been observed with 
the specialized channels of other local TV stations. All of them face the problems of insufficient 
program provision and thus insufficient advertising revenues. It is becoming more and more 
difficult for local TV stations to continue the operation of specialized channels.  
In terms of the quality of specialized programs, it is more difficult for local TV stations to 
produce such programs by themselves. Talk show programs, which serve as the main sources for 
educational and entertainment channels, are typical examples of this. “The two most important 
factors that determine the quality of talk show programs are the invited guests and the expertise 
of the host”, explained by a famous talk show producer of Beijing TV’s Five Star Evening Talk 
(Wuxing Yehua67). He said: “If you look at the popular programs such as “Artistic Life” (Yishu 
Rensheng68) produced by CCTV and “Tiger Talk” (Yihu Yixitan69) of Phoenix, you will find 
that all of their programming centers are located in Beijing. This is also why a lot of independent 
production houses are located in Beijing. Beijing has plentiful cultural resources”. He further 
explained that “it is easier for their producers to invite a lot of important people for shooting, 
such as experts in top Chinese universities like Peking and Tsinghua University, which are 
located in Beijing. These experts are important not only because they are from top Chinese 
universities, but also because some of them are always invited to participate in writing important 
documents for the government. For example, the Peking University’s professor Ye Jingqi has 
often been invited by the government to assist in writing the “Labor Law”. If we can invite him 
to attend our talk show program, the audiences would like to watch it because they think that his 
words are convincing. Others like professors from less famous universities would not have the 
same effect (of raising the audience rating)”70. As this producer pointed out, important guests 
also include researchers from famous Chinese research institutes, such as the Chinese Academy 
                                                
66 Field notes: Informal discussion on 14 Dec 2007, Wuhan.  
67 Chinese title: 五星夜话 
68 Chinese title: 艺术人生 
69 Chinese title: 一虎一席谈 
70 Field notes: Interview on 30 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
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of Social Sciences located in Beijing, as well as national leaders and superstars who often work 
in the city of Beijing. No doubt these important guests can attract more viewers and can 
contribute to a higher quality of talk show programs due to their prestige, fame, experience and 
popularity.  
In contrast, the talk show programs imitated by local TV stations have been cast into the 
shade and attract very few viewers because these programs either repeat what others have 
already discussed or because their discussions remain at a superficial level due to poor 
programming skills. For instance, a program called “Communication” (Gou Tong71) produced 
by the Hubei TV station imitates the genre of “Tiger Talk” but it has a pretty low program 
quality because of its boring topic and bad interactions between the official guests and 
participants. A producer of Communication confessed during a regular meeting that “We also 
want to select some important topics, such as “New Labor Law” and “Abolishment of National 
Holiday” as that of Tiger Talk, but we have to give up because it is difficult for us to invite 
important people who are involved in these issues. First, the guest needs to agree to come. But 
this kind of important person is always too busy to attend; second, if the guest comes, we need 
to pay for his travel, living expenses and attendance at our program. But we don’t have enough 
funding to do this. At the beginning of this season, we are already out of money”.72 Under such 
circumstances, the producers have to choose local issues for discussion but this is a loss as 
audiences from other places do not care so much what happens in Wuhan or Hubei. Besides the 
fact that the producers cannot invite many important guests, the inadequate expertise of the 
Communication host is another factor that results in the bad quality of this program. In fact, the 
discussion process between the guests and participants in a talk show program is so flexible and 
fast-changing that the programs cannot proceed in a pre-designed manner. Therefore, the 
discussion process is largely determined by the controlling capacity of the host. However, 
                                                
71 Chinese title: 沟通 
72 Field notes: Interview on 29 Dec 2007, Wuhan.  
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compared to the famous hosts in Beijing, the host of Communication appears to be incapable of 
controlling the development of discussion. The whole program looks boring because the host is 
not able to raising the activity of participants to ask critical questions, which ultimately results in 
rigid interactions between the guests and the participants. Compared this to the exciting 
arguments raised by experienced hosts, local audiences would hence rather switch channels to 
CCTV and Phoenix rather than sticking it out with such “tedious” programs shot by local TV 
stations. Consequently, many specialized programs have been unable to survive and have had to 
shut down for the reasons mentioned above. CCTV subsequently gains the competitive 
advantage, achieving quick growth and a monopoly of viewership by means of both the quantity 
and quality of its specialized programs.  
4.3.4 Going-out Project 
Much of the literature has been concerned about the ‘blocking’ strategy in China, whereas the 
“Going-out” strategy has not yet been thoroughly examined. As one aspect of the Chanye Hua 
reform of Chinese TV, the Chinese government has now realized the importance of cultural 
exports. While it now grants more access to foreign broadcasters since its accession to the WTO, 
the Chinese government simultaneously encourages the “going-out” of Chinese TV as well. By 
means of “borrowing a boat to go to the sea”, the Chinese government utilizes foreign media as 
an effective “boat” to allow Chinese programs to make their way out of the country more rapidly. 
The metaphor used here vividly describes the situation of how the Chinese government actively 
prompts the circulation of Chinese TV programs in the international market through some 
reciprocal trading agreements with foreign broadcasters.  
At the moment of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, the Chinese government granted 
permission for the entry of three foreign satellite channels in Guangdong province, including 
AOL/Time Warner’s CETV (China Entertainment Television), Phoenix’s Chinese Channel and 
News Corp.’s STAR TV. This was the first time the Chinese government allowed the “landing” 
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of foreign satellite TV channels within the cable system in mainland China. Before this, foreign 
satellite TV channels were only allowed to appear in hotels above 3-stars and in other specific 
sectors. However, what is more worth noting is that, as a precondition to entry these businesses, 
both AOL/Time Warner and News Corp., had to promise to air the CCTV 9 channel within their 
television networks in North America, including Time Warner’s cable network in New York, 
LA, Huston and News Corp.’s network of FOX News (BBC, 2001). CCTV 9 is an English 
language official Chinese TV channel that focuses its programming on world news, Chinese 
affairs, Chinese language lessons, political documentaries and Chinese cultural introduction 
programs. It is a typical mainstream TV channel, designed for passing on to audiences 
information from the official Chinese perspective. As BBC has commented, Chinese television 
officials wish to shape American’s positive attitude toward China by broadcasting official 
Chinese television programs on U.S. television networks.  
4.3.4.1 The Formation of Going-out Project 
In the past few decades, the immature television industry in China could only defend itself 
against the West passively rather than compete actively. With less financial resources and poorer 
quality of programming, China-produced media products have attracted far fewer international 
audiences than American products. The monopoly of the global media market by American 
audiovisual products has thus resulted in the hegemony of American culture which constitutes a 
very important part of the so-called American soft power in the world. Although some academic 
ideas have emerged to argue against the effects of “cultural imperialism” (Tomlinson, 
1997a;Tomlinson, 1997b;Indrajit, 2002;Chadha and Kavoori, 2000), the Chinese government 
continues to take such theories seriously and has a strong fear of being culturally Westernized, 
and even of people’s minds being conquered (a more ideological expression) by the West. The 
recent ‘going out’ project was launched very likely as a result of such concerns. As China’s hard 
power, which mainly refers to its economic and military force, has increased rapidly over the 
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last few decades, the Chinese government regards its accession to the WTO in the 21st century 
not only as a challenge, but also an opportunity to increase its soft power. 
Xu Guangchun, the vice minister of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central 
Committee and director of SARFT, has pointed out that “the basic principle of Chanye hua 
reform which took effect after China’s entry into the WTO has taken into account the necessity 
of China’s integration into the world market…we have build up a professional team to work on 
overseas marketing for Chinese TV export and have upgraded the research on external publicity 
(Wai Xuan73)” (Xu, 2002). In fact, its effort to promote TV’s “going-out” is part of a more 
general project of “external publicity” launched by the Chinese state. In 2008, President Hu 
Jintao commanded that “to make the best effort to build CCTV as one of the top-ranking 
International media. It should possess advanced communication technology, a huge amount of 
information, extensive coverage and a strong media influence”. Meanwhile, Liu Yunshan, head 
of the Publicity Department of the CCP, has also stated that “the ability of communication 
determines the ability of media influence. Those who possess more advanced communication 
technology and a stronger communication ability are more capable of extensively spreading their 
cultural values and influence on the world”. Li Changchun, a member of the Political Bureau of 
the CCP, has added that “Chinese TV should change its traditional guideline which is aimed 
solely at domestic audiences into a new one in which international audiences are included” (Asia 
Times, 2009).  
Learning from the experiences of Al-Jazeera, CCTV plans to enlarge its international 
“territory” by opening up English, French and Spanish International channels. Along with the 
practice of ‘Channel Specialization’ policy, these international channels specifically focuse their 
programming on promoting China’s soft power by spreading the Chinese culture, language and 
political perspectives. By mitigating the conflict between the public and commercial services, 
                                                
73 Chinese title: 外宣 
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Channel Specialization has resulted in the CCTV9, CCTV4, CCTV-E and CCTV-F are able to 
concentrate on doing the Party-state’s propaganda work toward foreign audiences without 
considering too much pressures caused by commercial concerns, such as audience rating and ad 
revenues because the government spends a considerable amount of funding to support them. 
According to the report of The Asia Times (2009), the other two international channels---
‘Arabic’ and ‘Russian’ channels--- will be set up in the near future in order to reach more 
international viewers. In late 2008, CCTV first tried a synchronized broadcast of the “Spring 
Festival Gala” by CCTV4 (International Chinese), CCTV9 (International English), CCTVE 
(International Spanish) and CCTVF (International French) in the different languages. In addition, 
the Xinhua News Agency reports on world news in seven languages - Chinese, English, French, 
Spanish, Russian, Arabic and Portuguese. Other types of cultural activities and Confucius 
institutes have also been encouraged to set up overseas in order to assist the spread of Chinese 
cultural influences. As a whole, the Chinese state has gradually completed the “deployment” of 
its overseas media system for external publicity and as attempts to shape a positive international 
image of China.   
4.3.4.2 Implications of Going-out Project 
Although the Chinese state has made many efforts to push the “going-out” project, there are 
some voices that are suspicious of its effects. At the current stage, it is undeniable that Chinese 
media products, particularly TV programs, remain weak in overseas markets. In order to rapidly 
increase its TV exports, especially the mainstream programs that are preferred by Chinese 
officials but are found to be boring by overseas viewers, the state has offered unreserved 
assistance to spread mainstream programs through satellite TV channels set up overseas. As the 
state has intervened in the process of the going-out project, CCTV has successfully occupied the 
largest share of the overseas market compared to other domestic rivals. In this way, the state has 
also been able to effectively control the export of its preferred content.  
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 (a) Monopoly of CCTV 
There are mainly three ways of exporting Chinese TV programs. One is through the sale of the 
programs’ copyright via the China International Television Corporation (CITVC), a subsidiary 
of CCTV; the second is through the sale of the program’s copyright to international TV festivals 
organized by either the Chinese state or Chinese TV stations; the third is through the 
transmission of transnational satellite television channels set up overseas. Among these methods, 
the third way, a channel-based export, is the easiest because of the assistance offered by the 
Chinese state. This is powerfully demonstrated by observing the business cooperation between 
CCTV and Viacom in 2001.  
After negotiations with the leaders of SARFT and CCTV who visited him in mid-2001, 
Sumner Redstone, the CEO of Viacom, had promised that “Viacom will help Chinese TV 
programs enter into the American market without any hesitance” as an exchange condition for 
the entry of MTV into the Guangdong cable network in China (21st Century Economic Report, 
2003). Ms. Li Yifei, the Viacom China Chief, revealed that “we had closely communicated with 
SARFT and CCTV staff to decide the city list that CCTV9 was likely to ‘land on’. The list was 
up to them…They preferred those big cities in the U.S. with a condensed population and 
advances in terms of economic, political and cultural development, such as New York, 
Washington, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Detroit, Chicago, Boston and Miami…They preferred the 
accession into top-grade hotels rather than to common American families because hotel clients 
are mostly businessmen and politicians, and could be potential viewers of CCTV 9 who are 
more concerned with international news… In fact, it was more difficult to enter hotels than to 
broadcast to common families. We had to persuade hotels one by one”. Viacom set up a specific 
marketing team for CCTV9, and hence manipulated a lot of “relationships” (guanxi) to help the 
“landing” for CCTV9. For example, Bob Johnson, the Black Entertainment TV (BET owned by 
Viacom) CEO who has been on the board of directors of Hilton Hotels, got involved in this 
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affair personally. In addition, Viacom took on the fees for marketing and setting up satellite 
dishes in hotels to receive the CCTV9 signal. By 2003, CCTV9 had already become available in 
30 top-grade business hotels in 10 cities in America.  
Certainly, this “overseas expansion” cannot be achieved solely through the efforts of CCTV 
itself. CCTV officials have confessed that the entry of CCTV9 into the U.S. has been largely 
assisted by the SARFT. A manager at CCTV9 said that:  
This channel (CCTV9) is not aimed at profit-seeking in the overseas market. It is an important part of the 
state’s project of ‘external publicity’. The main objective is for foreigners to hear China’s voice…It would be 
difficult to export CCTV9’s mainstream programs through the free-trade market. The government needs to help 
it.74 
Indeed, due to the assistance of the Chinese government, CCTV has successfully occupied 
the largest share of the overseas market compared to other domestic rivals. A chief channel 
manager at Hubei TV station said: “Currently, we do not have such a plan of going-out as we 
still do not possess sophisticated conditions…the sufficient funding that could support us in 
maintaining a specialized channel targeted towards foreign viewers…the severe competition in 
the domestic market has already made our hands full…besides, most of the Chinese programs 
are not popular in overseas markets. Going-out is not a realistic objective for us now”75. The 
market manager of the independent production company Guanhua added: “The most serious 
problem that we have now is how to build a good relationship with TV stations and ensure that 
our programs can be broadcasted…we don’t have funding for that….Going-out is not our 
business. It is the business of TV stations”76. Liu Tingting, a journalist from Beijing News who 
has reported on Chinese television for more than eight years, told me that in actual fact, only a 
                                                
74 Field notes: Interview on 19 Nov 2007, Beijing. In the “research methodology” section in Chapter 1, I have mentioned the 
difficulty of interviewing officials. It was difficult to interview officials in order to find proof that the government has done 
business with Viacom as stated in the news. In order to confirm if this story really happened, I asked one of the managers at 
CCTV 9 out through the introduction of my friend working in CCTV. Since it is sensitive or inappropriate to conduct an 
interview about such issues in CCTV’s office, we met at a McDonald’s outlet where this informant proved that this story was 
true. 
75 Field notes: Interview on 27 Dec 2007, Wuhan. 
76 Field notes: Interview on 5 Nov 2007, Beijing. 
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few TV stations and independent production houses in China are able to export their programs. 
In the last four years, China’s TV exports have declined rapidly, especially in the regional 
market (including Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia), in which it has dropped by almost 
50%. Zhang Jizhong, perhaps one of China’s best known producers who has produced many 
popular TV series, sold each episode of his TV dramas at 15,000 US$ to Taiwan in 2006 , but 
this amount quickly dropped to much lower than 10,000 US$ in 2007. Essentially, the current 
situation of the Chinese TV programs exported through the free-trade market is not optimistic77.  
Compared to the situation where many Chinese producers worry about the decreasing sales 
of their programs in overseas markets, CCTV officials frequently announce that there are more 
and more CCTV channels to expand their worldwide coverage. Government assistance has 
undeniably played an important role in the spread of CCTV programs despite the situation that, 
overall, Chinese TV programs are not popular in overseas markets. From 2001 to the present, 
another CCTV channel, the Chinese-speaking CCTV4, has also successfully expanded its 
coverage in many foreign countries, such as the U.S., Canada, France, Australia and Singapore. 
Moreover, the state helped to organize and open a Great Wall TV platform78 in 2004 which has 
brought most of the CCTV channels and some leading provincial TV channels into a package 
and transmits this package to a large number of foreign viewers. The Great wall has already 
built its base in many areas, such as North America, Canada, Europe and Southeast Asia. By 
November 2008, it had 73,000 subscribers in North America and quickly accumulated 15,000 
subscribers within 10 months after it joined the Qilin Cable Network in Jan 2008 (Wei, 2008).  
 (b) Filtering of Negative Content 
The trade of Chinese TV programs is always carried out through the sale of programs’ 
copyright via the China International Television Corporation (CITVC). CITVC is a CCTV-
invested state-owned TV company. It is currently the only authorized copyright agency in China 
                                                
77 Field notes: Interview on 19 Nov 2007, Beijing. 
78 All channels are under the broad leadership of CCTV. 
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that is in charge of the overseas trade for Chinese TV programs. Most of the programs produced 
by independent producers are sent to overseas markets through the supervision of CITVC. 
Unlike the channel-based exports, independent producers need to explore their own methods of 
export. For example, marketing staff at Guanxian Chuanmei connect directly with foreign 
broadcasters and send them samples of their programs in order to promote the sale of their 
products. 
Although the state has recently begun to encourage free trade to boost Chinese TV exports, 
it has also imposed severe content limitations upon independent producers. After the No, 41 and 
42 policies 79  were issued in 2004, local producers have been encouraged to ‘facilitate 
international cultural exchange between Chinese and foreign TV drama production’. 
Nevertheless, not all TV programs produced by independent producers are encouraged to be 
exported. Due to the ideological coloring of the socialist mainstream, most Chinese TV 
programs are not popular among foreign viewers. In most cases, with major investments coming 
from foreign partners, Chinese independent producers would give up the themes that are aimed 
toward domestic viewers and choose those that cater to overseas audiences. With the prevailing 
sense of superiority that “The West” views “Asia”, Western audiences have a preference for 
portrayals of China as a culturally and politically unenlightened Far East country. Those 
producers who are eager to achieve success in the global market have realized that the 
acceptance of Chinese programs by the Western mainstream are often achieved at the expense of 
criticizing the ‘negative’ aspects of China. Understandably, media officials who are eager to 
shape a positive international image by pushing the “going-out” project would refuse to allow 
such programs to be a part of the work of external publicity.  
In 2007, SARFT issued a new policy to tighten its censorship on “exported” programs. 
CITVC thus suspended its export plan for some TV dramas, as revealed by a producer working 
                                                
79 No 41 Document is viewed on SARFT website http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2004/10/21/20070924102503420551.html 
(accessed on 28 Oct, 2009). No 42 Document is viewed on SARFT website 
http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2004/10/23/20070924102314110383.html (accessed on 28 Oct, 2009).  
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at Guanxian Chuanmei. 80  This new policy re-asserted the “political correctness” that “the 
competent authorities must improve their political consciousness…strictly examine the political 
standards of television dramas…to prevent television dramas against a wrong political 
orientation…let television dramas offer a better service for the Socialist Reform, Opening-up 
and Modernization” (SARFT, 2007). Meanwhile, SARFT punished non-cooperative producers 
for depicting China “negatively”. For instance, the government revoked the distribution rights of 
a movie called “Lost in Beijing” (Chinese Title: Apple, Ping Guo81) which was released at the 
February 2007 Berlin International Film Festival without having obtained SARFT’s permission. 
Lost in Beijing depicts the story of Liu Pingguo, a female migrant worker at the Foot Massage 
Salon who was raped by her boss after a drinking binge. She moved to Beijing from an 
impoverished village in the countryside and succumbed to her boss because of his irresistible 
financial offer. This movie explores the lives of the thousands of Chinese migrant workers who 
have moved to prosperous Beijing to make their fortunes and to experience the modern lifestyle. 
By telling the story of Liu Pingguo, the movie attempts to investigate how these migrant 
workers deal with such great changes that are happening in their new lives. But, “as a Chinese 
citizen, I cannot accept such a humiliating portrayal of China!” This was the criticism put 
forward by Zhang Hongsen, the deputy director of SARFT’s film bureau, at a conference in 
Nanjing. He added that, “This movie chases international awards. It caters for the Western 
prejudice against China. Our media actors should consciously defend the honor of the 
motherland” (Xinhua, 2007). Consequently, the producer, Li Fang, and his studio, Beijing 
Laurel Films, were barred from any involvement in the Chinese film industry for two years and 
this movie was banned from screens in China and from distribution on the Internet (Lau, 2008). 
Television producers have to learn from the experiences of filmmakers. A common 
perception shared by Chinese producers is that, “no one knows what the censorship standards or 
                                                
80 Field notes: Interview on 29 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
81 Chinese title: 苹果 
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the limits are” as an independent producer working for Beijing TV station has said 82 . 
Unpredictable bans have forced them to resort to “self-censorship”. Political topics, including 
the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Student Movement in Tiananmen Square, are too sensitive 
to broach. “Costume drama” has thus become the safest choice since it not only caters to 
overseas audiences but also does not offend official censors due to “the ideological significance” 
delivered by such dramas, which always provide a lopsided rendering of emperors as positive 
symbols (Dai, 2005). Fortunately for Chinese producers, the mainstream costume drama has 
been encouraged for export by the Chinese government as it assists in the spread of Chinese 
culture, as part of the Party’s work of “external publicity”. Among the exported television 
programs, costume dramas have already achieved a stable overseas market. For example, The 
Great Revival (Chinese title: wo xin chang dan) sold at quite a high price in Korea, at 
US$40,000 for each episode, a record price for Chinese TV dramas. Other TV series such as 
Yong Zheng Dynasty (Yongzheng wangchao), Kang Xi Dynastry (Kangxi wangchao), The 
Grand Mansion Gate (da zhai men) and The Country's Granary (Tian Xia Liang Cang) are also 
selling well in overseas markets  (Fu, 2007). 
Unfortunately, related studies regarding to the consumption of Chinese TV programs by 
foreign audiences are limited83. This may be due to the fact that the large-scale launch of 
Chinese TV exports has just taken place a few years ago and has not yet attracted enough 
attention. However, it is worth noting that the export of Chinese mainstream programs which are 
positively served to spread Chinese official ideology have more of an advantage than other 
genres due to the support of the Chinese state. Under the same protection, CCTV monopolizes 
the share of the overseas market compared to other domestic rivals by launching TV channels 
                                                
82 Field notes: Interview on 12 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
83 Sun Wanning’s book Leaving China (2002) and her forthcoming paper “Motherland Calling: China’s Rise and Diasporic 
Responses” at Cinema Journal (2010), 49 (3) provides valuable information about how Chinese TV programs are consumed in 
overseas market. Besides, Olling (2005) also provides information about the consumption of Chinese TV programs in the 
Germany market.  
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overseas to ceaselessly send out official Chinese programs, and launching CITVC to ensure that 
“positive” content is screened during the export.  
4.4 Summary  
Many arguments about the impact of the Chanye Hua reform on cultural security have 
been triggered by China’s accession to the WTO in late 2001. As the Chinese state has 
committed an “unprecedented” level of openness to foreign media services, it has become a 
widespread belief among academics that China’s accession to the WTO suggests a significant 
historical point for intensified commercialism and a regulatory transformation for Chinese TV. 
Seeing a seemingly loosened state’s grip over the television industry, the primary concerns of 
communication researchers have shifted to the possible risks brought about by Chanye Hua 
reform on cultural security in China. The discourse of cultural imperialism has thus been raised 
again to emphasize the damaging influence of Western imports. Fear of losing control and 
cultural stability have been engendered and magnified. 
However, empirical findings of Chanye Hua reform have shown that there are no signs 
that the amount of political control is easing, despite the increased number of permitted foreign 
satellite TV channels, the wider geographical coverage given to some of them, and more types 
of cooperative partnerships with mainland TV practitioners. “Unprecedented” openness does not 
mean unreserved acceptance of the free market by the Chinese state. Instead, the Chinese state 
has continued to exercise strict control over market access as well as to scrutinize TV content 
and its release. The state’s control power over the TV industry has not been weakened as some 
studies have expected, but has been strengthened instead, with the ongoing Chanye Hua reform. 
Such reform measures not only result in the continued monopolization of resources in the hands 




Chanye Hua reform proceeds within unique Chinese characteristics that have yielded the 
fact that the reform has not been able to touch the core of the Chinese TV system. Excessive 
political intervention other than market principle plays a dominant role during the reforms. 
Political intervention restricts the commercial development of Chinese television in some ways. 
However, it also provides favorable conditions for state-owned broadcasters to achieve market 
dominant positions.  
In particular, the formation of STVPB has been hastened by the anxiety of the Chinese 
state to cope with the challenges after it has become a member of the WTO, rather than having 
been called for by sophisticated market conditions. Even when the production area was initially 
opened up to domestic private investments, independent production organizations were still 
unable to operate independently. With biased policy protection, state-owned TV stations set up 
unequal business relationships with the independent production organizations via the former’s 
monopolistic control of broadcasting resources. Undergoing strict censorship from SARFT as 
well, private producers have to undertake higher production risks than state TV stations and 
have to resort to strict self-censorship to follow the state’s ideological guidelines more closely.  
Meanwhile, the monopoly of the state media has been reinforced through a nation-wide 
recomposition of the television system., The BCR reform policy was hastened by administrative 
commands and created a situation that the national media resources have been redistributed and 
recentralized into a few hands of some large-scale broadcasting groups which are purposely 
consolidated by the Chinese broadcasting authorities to compete with foreign media giants, 
although they are short of sophisticated market conditions as well as independent operational 
power.  
Moreover, having echoed the needs of the STVPB and BCR policies, channel 
specialization has been pushed by the state despite the immature market. With a lack of well-
formed audiences for specialized channels and sufficient resources to shoot specialized 
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programs, the gap between CCTV and local TV stations has been enlarged and the unequal 
competition between them has again resulted in the monopolization of CCTV since the 1980s. 
Channel specialization has effectively mitigated the potential conflict within the Chinese TV 
system, namely, the incompatibility between political and commercial interests, by serving as 
more of a division of labor between public and commercial TV services than a division of 
channels that are targeted at specific audiences. As long as TV ownership remains state-owned, 
it is tolerable for the Chinese authority to allow a division of public and commercial services 
within the state TV stations and it avoids hitting the sensitive nerve of the Chinese authority as it 
has always been impossible to divide commercial and public TV stations in China.  
Furthermore, the Chinese state has increasingly begun to realize the importance of media 
exports and has made its best effort to assist the spread of Chinese programs overseas. As an 
important part of CCP’s “external publicity”, the “going-out” project assists with the spread of 
socialist mainstream programs in a channel-based manner and positive content that promotes a 
positive image of China has gained predominance over other formats due to regulatory prejudice. 
CCTV hence successfully occupies the largest share of the overseas market with the unreserved 
assistance offered to it by the Chinese authorities, which is what domestic rivals cannot achieve. 
The removal of unconditional protection in overseas markets has also forced Chinese state 
broadcasters to produce higher quality programs through which their improved professionalism 
has not only enhanced the attraction of Chinese culture for foreign viewers but has also 
enhanced the acceptability of “ideological education” for domestic viewers.  
Under such circumstances, the market-oriented Chanye Hua reform has not weakened but 
instead, has reinforced the effectiveness of the state’s control over the nation’s television system. 
It is less likely to bring Chinese television into a free competition mechanism in the future, but 
more likely to bring it into a new stage in which state-owned media resources have been quickly 
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centralized and strengthened, and the private media have to choose to collaborate with and even 






5 Chinese TV Operation in the Era of Globalization 
5.1 TV Practitioner---Dancing With Fetters 
China has opened up TV production for non-state investment, granting domestic private and 
foreign capital access into this area. Currently, market resources primarily come from three 
types of investment: state, domestic private and foreign investment. State-invested TV 
production organizations refer to departments in TV stations which are in charge of programs’ 
production, such as the Production Sector in CCTV’s Art Department, and production centers 
which enjoy relative independence but are owned by TV stations or state-owned film studios, 
such as the CCTV-invested production center CITVC. Undoubtedly, these state-invested TV 
production organizations have a fairly close relationship with the state and TV stations, and are 
heavily protected by the latter.  
Domestic private-invested organizations refer to independent production companies such 
as Guangxian Chuanmei and Guanhua. Domestic independent producers ask private companies 
for investment or ask banks for loans. But they often lack of sufficient funding due to the high 
risk of program production, especially for the TV drama. According to SARFT (2008), the 
production organization is qualified for a higher-rank License for shooting TV drama only if it 
has already filmed more than six single-episode TV programs or more than three TV serials in 
two years84. Most of the domestic private production companies are not qualified. Consequently, 
cooperating with TV stations becomes the most common way to produce TV programs for 
independent producers. There are mainly three types of cooperative partnership with TV stations. 
One is “pre-purchase responsibility.” Here, independent producers are responsible for the whole 
process of shooting while the TV stations that act as their partners provide funds and reserve 
program’s copyright in advance; the second type is “investment responsibility,” from which TV 
                                                
84 Higher rank License for shooting TV drama (in Chinese Jia Zhong) is valid for two years. But lower rank License (in Chinese 
Yi Zhong) is only valid for 6 months and restrictedly valid for the program that SARFT approved. 
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stations act as shareholders and receive a share of profit after a program has been distributed. In 
most cases, these two types of partnership are mixed up since the station buyers often want to 
reserve the program’s copyright while they decide to invest it. The third partnership is 
“relationship responsibility,” from which independent producers shoot programs first and find 
broadcasting channels after that. These independent producers can usually find a broadcasting 
channel because most of them have worked in TV stations before and they have built a good 
relationship with someone inside the system. Overall, independent producers choosing to work 
with TV stations is common. Such cooperation not only ensures the funds for program shooting, 
but also guarantees the broadcasting of programs.  
Foreign-invested organizations refer to joint ventures that foreign broadcasters invested 
in. For example, in December 2002, Hunan Radio, Film and Television Group signed an 
agreement of strategic alliance with Rupert Murdoch’s Star TV. Similarly, Shanghai Media 
Group has also established a collaborative partnership with CNBC in April 2003 (Ouyang, 
Wang and Huang, 2004: 26) cited from (Guo, 2004: 21). Joint ventures are regulated by more 
restrictive policies than domestic companies. For instance, it is not easy for joint ventures to get 
the production license from SARFT. The programs are limited to genres such as variety shows 
and children cartoons. Moreover, no less than two thirds of a program should revolve around 
themes that deal with China. The number of Chinese and foreign actors involved in production 
are restricted as well85. Due to such restrictive regulations, foreign practitioners would rather 
pass the production assignment to Chinese TV stations or independent production companies 
that receive fewer limitations. Foreign practitioners set branches in big cities to supervise the 
quality of programs, such as Phoenix Hall and Star TV’s office located in Beijing. These 
branches are mainly responsible for programs’ topic selection and self-censorship and building 
good relationships with media officials to get a wider coverage for their channels.  
                                                
85 Details can refer to No. 44 Document. http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/705336.htm (accessed 2 Nov 2009).  
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However, a regulatory protection given to state broadcasters does not necessarily imply 
an unreserved acceptance of programs’ content by official censors. In some aspects, state 
broadcasters undergo an even stricter censorship process. This is because their most important 
job as defined by the state is to fulfill the Party’s propaganda work other than to pursue market 
returns. The Chinese authority has a higher expectation of state broadcasters compared to 
domestic private and foreign producers because the state has given more political support to 
them. “There is no such a thing as a free lunch”, said by a producer in CCTV, “more assistance 
means higher expectation” 86. It hence has been a tougher job for state broadcasters. Not only do 
they have to produce mainstream programs that fulfill the state’s propaganda requirement, these 
broadcasters also have to make them attractive enough to ensure advertising revenues. State 
broadcasters have encountered more political pressure than the other two types of practitioners 
although they enjoy an advantageous position of market competition. 
Overall, TV practitioners in Chinese market have to face diverse difficulties from central 
regulatory policies. How do they negotiate with official censors? What strategies they have 
adopted to negotiate? What could be the effect of these negotiation processes? I will discuss 
about such issues in the next section.  
5.2 Patterns of Negotiation Strategy of Domestic TV Practitioner 
The State and practitioners prefer different types of content due to their different concerns. The 
media officials prefer the Socialist Mainstream Melody while domestic TV practitioners prefer a 
more commercial style.  
The Socialist Mainstream Melody (Shehui Zhuyi Zhuxuanlv87) has been defined by the 
Chinese media officials as a genre to promote social benefits of television programs over 
economic profits. It does not specifically refer to programs that promote Socialism. It includes 
                                                
86 Field notes: Interview on 20 Nov 2007, Beijing. 
87 Chinese title: 社会主义主旋律 
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those which are consistent with mainstream ideologies and aesthetic standards. It primarily 
includes three types of programs: those that eulogize the great achievements of China’s leaders, 
those that represent the hardship of CCP revolutionary histories, and those that facilitate the 
fulfillment of Party’s political works. However, because of the excessive political usage of 
television by the Chinese government, mainstream programs always appear too ideological and 
sermonic to Chinese audiences.  
On the other hand, what commercial programs pursue, as opposed to those of the Socialist 
Mainstream Melody genre, are not educational effects or social benefits. They are made to evoke 
emotions, and are often imbued with values that are consistent with that of audiences (Yang, 
2003). Commercial producers primarily seek novelty and popularity for their television 
programs. How the demands of the audiences affect social stability is not that important for 
commercial operators. Seeking high economic returns is their foremost concern. 
Although the central authority imposes its preferences with regard to content on commercial 
operators, following official requirements strictly may result in a loss in ratings and it would be 
a great expense for commercial operators. The tension between commercial producers and 
central officials is revealed during the censorship process. The tension is neither marked by 
complete compliance nor rejection from either interest party, but is a process of mutual 
negotiation. This is reflected in the following four strategies that domestic producers generally 
adopt: 
5.2.1 Juxtaposition 
Juxtaposition is a way that combines the spirit of the Socialist Mainstream Melody with the 
expressive techniques of the commercial style. It has been proven that juxtaposition is an 
effective way for commercial operators to fulfill political requirements and achieve economic 
profits at the same time. Programs that portray heroes, CCP members, policemen and soldiers 
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illustrate this well. Take Drawing Sword (Liang Jian88) for instance. It was a top-rated and 
popular Chinese TV drama in 2005 produced by a well known private production company in 
China Hairun Movies & TV Production Company. This drama uses a lot of commercial 
presentation skills to depict a traditional mainstream theme - that of the altruistic spirit and 
positive image of CCP members.  
Drawing Sword depicts the legendary life of Li Yunlong, a general of The Eighth Route 
Army of Communist Party who fights in the anti-Japanese War and China’s civil war. Li 
Yunlong becomes an orphan after his parents are killed by the Japanese soon after he is born. Li 
is adopted by kind people who live in a poor village. Thus, he receives little education and is 
unable to read. Nevertheless, Li is a smart soldier and is very talented in utilizing military 
strategies. Based on a farmer-like wisdom, he never acts according to regular military rules and 
defeats his enemies with shrewd ideas. Attracted by his talents, Tian Yu, a beautiful nurse 
working in the Communist Army, falls in love with Li and marries him after the CCP wins in 
China’s civil war.  
Unlike traditional mainstream dramas in which CCP members are depicted as unrealistic 
ideal heroes and as such, are not accepted by audiences, the leading character in Drawing Sword 
Li Yunlong, is portrayed as a normal and adorable person who simultaneously possesses 
strengths as well as shortcomings. Traditional mainstream dramas tend to adopt a “Gao Da 
Quan”89  portrayal of CCP heroes who behave flawlessly and sacrifice themselves to fulfill 
national tasks without hesitation. Such a “God-like” image attributed to CCP heroes always 
seem unreal and out of reach to audiences. Examples include the mainstream drama Kong 
Fansen, where Kong90 frequently goes to remote Tibet for the Party’s work but leaves his aged 
                                                
88 Chinese title: 亮剑 
89 Chinese title: 高, 大, 全. Gao Da Quan refers to a traditional image of CCP member portrayed by the mainstream program 
who is depicted to be too perfect to be a real man and too unrealistic to be accepted by ordinary audiences. 
90 Kong Fansen was a CCP member who devoted all his life to the construction and development of Tibet. He died in the line of 
duty in 1994 when he was just 50 years old.  
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mother alone and uncared for; in the drama The World of Jiang Shuqin, Jiang91 decides to assist 
another woman in childbirth in the middle of the night despite the fact that she herself is going 
to give birth as well; in the drama Dang Guan, the leading character Wang Yuyang92 leaves 
home to investigate coal mine corruption despite the plight of his sick and dying wife. Being 
unbelievable, audiences stay away from the programs that portray these ‘selfless’ behaviors of 
CCP heroes. Compared to these traditional mainstream dramas, Drawing Sword is attractive to 
audiences as Li Yunlong’s personality is somewhat “common” or “secular”. He is not a perfect 
hero, but he is a righteous and fearless soldier with some ‘blemishes’. Although Li is depicted as 
an uncouth soldier who likes to curse and swear, he is accommodating to his wife and comrades; 
although a little egoistic with his personal desires, he is duteous and loyal to the nation. He is not 
a soldier with self discipline and violates army rules from time to time, but he robs advanced 
weapons and leather coats from Japanese enemy and shares these booties with his poor soldiers 
who suffer from hunger and cold.  
For instance, in the 3rd episode, Li violates army rules again to silently send a group of his 
soldiers to rob war horses from Japanese army. Commissar Zhao, an official sent by the central 
Communist Party to Li’s troop which is in charge of political indoctrination, argues with Li 
about his unauthorized action. Zhao is an intellectual, lacks actual combat experience and 
sometimes moves in a groove. He argues that Li’s action is violating CCP army rules and his 
unauthorized action is very dangerous because the Japanese army is much stronger than the 
Eighth Route Army. Zhao insists that he should be informed of any military movement and he 
has the right to command. Li, provoked by Zhao’s words, begins to talk smut and criticizes Zhao 
as a bookworm. Li shouts angrily that his soldiers are actually incapable of fighting with the 
Japanese due to poor equipment. The only way to improve their condition is to steal from the 
wealthy Japanese enemy. His leaders have not provided the Eighth Route Army with weapons. 
                                                
91 Jiang Shuqin is a CCP member who engages in the state’s work of Birth Control (ji hua sheng yu) for more than 30 years. She 
has always been honored as an excellent CCP member and model worker at the city, provincial and national levels. 
92 Wang Yuyang is a fictional character who works in the Commission for Discipline Inspection of CCP (jilv jiancha weiyuanhui).  
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Li keeps shouting at Zhao that “our soldiers are brave, but weapons are more important! If my 
troops behave like good boys who comply with every rigid rule, their courage becomes useless. I 
would rather go home and take care of babies than fight with enemies at the front”. Indeed, by 
robbing weapons from the Japanese, Li’s troops improve their condition within a year and Li 
successfully defeats a large group of enemies, even killing a famous Japanese general.  
After hearing Li’s words, Commissar Zhao is persuaded. He finds Li to be a very 
experienced and smart soldier despite his impoliteness and low education level. After hearing 
such conversations between an uncouth soldier and a scholarly official, audiences can perceive 
that a lowly educated but courageous and flexible soldier is respectable. Liu Chen, a mid-age 
male engineer working in Lucent Technologies Company in Beijing, says: 
At that time when no one can have a stable life, the low education level of Li Yunlong is understandable and 
realistic. I really respect such tough CCP soldiers because they are fearless to fight against Japanese enemies. They 
(Tu Ba Lu)93 are smart and flexible enough that the well-equipped Japanese cannot win the war. It is because of 
these fearless soldiers that our ordinary people can have happy lives and receive higher education in the new era.94  
This drama also utilizes an interesting narrative manner to introduce the wisdom of Li 
Yunlong that audiences love to watch. Li is so good at utilizing irregular military tactics that the 
Japanese Army feels frightened when they hear his name. In the 12th episode, once again, Li 
disobeys the order from the higher authority and turns to attack the back of the Japanese army. 
More Japanese reinforcements are sent to the front and the battle soon expands. On one hand, 
the Japanese generals are surprised at the audacity of the attack and send soldiers to find out who 
initiated it; on the other hand, the Communist leaders are surprised as to who dares to launch 
such an attack without permission as well. Finally, the result is uncovered. As one Communist 
general says, “Undoubtedly, it must be Li Yunlong!” As a result, Li’s unusual attack breaks the 
deployment of Japanese Army and the Eighth Route Army has had a brilliant triumph.  
                                                
93 “Tu Ba Lu” means that if compared to KMT and Japanese Army, most of the CCP soldiers in the Eighth Route Army are 
poorer and lower-educated. Most of them come from the peasants, workers and even beggars in the old China. They are 
struggling on the verge of death and then turn to revolution against the Japanese invaders.   
94 Field notes: Interview on Oct 30 2007, Beijing.  
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By showing the reactions of these two groups of people, Li’s fame is manifested in this 
program, and an impressive image of him is depicted to audiences. “I am impressed by the way 
of portraying Li’s talents. It is exciting for me to see how afraid the Japanese devils (Riben 
Guizi95) are when hearing about Li’s name. The words said by the Communist general can 
vividly demonstrate how naughty Li Yunlong is. Li looks like an intractable but talented and 
adorable big boy. His image is fresh,” says Ding Yahui, a lecturer working in Wuhan 
University96.  
Overall, Drawing Sword appears interesting to audiences because it gives a vivid portrayal 
of CCP heroes who have anxieties, fears, desires and passions just like ordinary persons. “He 
never wears the army cap rightly. He sometimes looks like a bandit and he is pugnacious. But in 
the battlefield, he is crude to enemies; in the camp, he is kind to comrades; in front of the leaders, 
he pretends to be humble. He cherishes the talents. He feels deeply grateful to those who raise 
him up. Yes he has quite a lot bad habits, but he is charming,” said a housewife who is in her 
late 40s97. “Completely different from the heroes depicted by old mainstream dramas that are 
totally empty and ideal, Li Yunlong is a cute soldier. He is very ‘man’. If I can have a boyfriend 
like him, I will feel happy” says a school girl who is 17 years old98. 
Li Youbin, who plays the role of Li Yunlong, says he is deeply moved by this character. “I 
had played other roles of soldiers before, but this one is different. He is so real. You can see 
many facets of his personality. When I played this role, I think his passion towards life deeply 
affected me” (CRI.com, 2009). 
Indeed, unlike CCP members who are usually portrayed as perfect citizens who are thus 
non-reflective to the ordinary lives of audiences, Drawing Sword redefines the “CCP hero” and 
successfully enables audiences to sympathize with him easily and accept what the Mainstream 
                                                
95 Chinese title: 日本鬼子 
96 Field notes: Interview on 29 Dec 2007, Wuhan.  
97 Field notes: Interview on 20 Jan 2008, Changsha. 
98 Field notes: Interview on 20 Jan 2008, Changsha. 
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Melody wants the former to know. It does this by making use of the Juxtaposition strategy to 
employ the commercial expression techniques---giving a humanizing image to CCP members.  
5.2.1.1 Negotiation Process 
In recent years, the authority realizes that the ‘propaganda work’ is hardly effective if it 
continues to lose audiences. Juxtaposition has been widely adopted by independent producers 
since it is not only easier to pass the censorship process with it, but also regulators hope to use 
juxtaposition as an effective method to promote political ideology. Since the success of Drawing 
Sword, it can be apparently observed that a lot of private production companies have become 
interested in shooting the ‘Red Classics’ TV dramas. Examples are Soldiers Sortie (Shibing 
Tuji99) and My Colonel and My Corps (Wo De Tuanzhang Wo De Tuan100), gaining huge 
popularity in the last two years. In order to pass the censorship process more easily, independent 
producers have even started designing entertainment programs with politically-right topics. A 
director in Guanhua Company explains:  
We always combine the commercial skills and mainstream sprits together. For example, our entertainment 
reports cannot only focus on the news like where the super stars go and who fall in love recently. The SARFT will 
not let us do like this. We hence put in some stories, such as the super stars’ activities to show support to Beijing 
Olympic Games and their words to call on nationalism and collectivism among the adolescent. It works!101  
The content creation of independent TV production companies is increasingly subjected to 
official ideological requirements due to their disadvantaged positions. “As the number of times 
that programs are refused increases, the cost of production increases as well. We have to choose 
topics that are the most unlikely to be refused by censors”102said by a producer in Guangxian 
Chuanmei. The Socialist Mainstream Melody highly recommended by television officials has 
consequently been a genre that independent producers find it hard to avoid. Juxtaposition has 
                                                
99 Chinese title: 士兵突击 
100 Chinese title: 我的团长我的团 
101 Field notes: Interview on 28 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
102 Field notes: Interview on 27 Nov 2007, Beijing. 
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been creatively applied by independent producers to achieve popularity and political-correctness 
for their programs at the same time.  
Juxtaposition allows for a smooth negotiation process between the commercial producer and 
the central regulator. Proving itself to be an effective way both to promote socialist spirits and 
achieve high ratings, juxtaposition has also been a method that state broadcasters are encouraged 
to utilize. There are numerous examples to illustrate that state-invested production organizations 
have begun to utilize this strategy. As early as in the early 1990s, state TV stations had tried to 
test-shooting so-called commercial TV dramas, such as A Native of Beijing in New York (Beijing 
Ren Zai Niuyue 103). It employed commercial narrative skills to satisfy Chinese audiences’ 
anxieties to seek novelty by showing exotic scenarios in the US, and promoted ideological 
values by presenting a complex official sentiment toward the West featured as ‘xenophobia + 
patriotism + patriarchy + anti-imperialism + anti-capitalism’ through emphasizing the economic 
success of a Chinese man over his western rivals (Zha, 1994) cited from (Lu, 2007). As 
commercial components become more tolerable for official censors, state TV stations start 
cooperating with independent producers to shoot more commercially expressed but ideologically 
mainstream masterpieces, such as Yong Zheng Dynasty (Yongzheng Wangchao104). This drama 
releases the secret stories, even artificial ones in the Forbidden City and reinforces a public 
conformity to the central authority through shaping a positive image of an ancient emperor who 
resembles a strong and upright central government nowadays. Tang Guoqiang, the veteran actor 
who portrays Yongzheng, commented that: “Anti-corruption and good economic policy is at the 
heart of the drama and is also the most touching topic among the public” (Zhu, 2008: 31). This 
drama was produced to call on social justice. It not only is consistent with the central 
requirement to strengthen social equality but also satisfied people’s desires to raise a hero who 
                                                
103 Chinese title: 北京人在纽约 
104 Chinese title: 雍正王朝 
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can protect them from chaos that are caused by huge social transformation happening in China 
currently.   
Socialist mainstream programs appear no longer boring and sermonic to Chinese audiences. 
Diverse types of mainstream programs, such as Red Classics, dynasty serials, anti-corruption 
serials, family dramas and even youth dramas have gained success by utilizing the juxtaposition 
strategy. The huge success and popularity of such mainstream programs among Chinese 
audiences in recent years has created a strong wave of nationalism and heroism, a reversion of 
Confucian family values and the cohesion of cultural identities105.  
In order to encourage the widespread of mainstream programs, the State sets up official 
awards, such as “Flying Apsaras Award” (Feitian Jiang106), “Golden Eagle Award” (Jinying 
Jiang107), “Golden Rooster Award” (Jinji Jiang108) and “Five Ones Project Prize” (Wugeyi 
Gongcheng Jiang109), to reward outstanding producers. In the mean time, it still maintains its 
tight control on censorship, particularly on programs with perceived anti-mainstream or anti-
ideology content. Besides, it also prioritizes mainstream programs, like airing them on prime 
time and reserving the whole broadcasting schedule for them during special periods such as the 
dates of important CCP conferences, like the 17th Party Congress in 2007, and national 
ceremonies, like the celebration of the 60th National Day in 2009. Overall, there are still a large 
number of domestic producers striving to shoot mainstream programs since this type of 
programs is salable due to the biased protection of Chinese state.  
5.2.2 De-Politicalization 
De-politicalization is another strategy adopted by commercial producers. It is a form of 
avoidance, neither actively promoting nor criticizing official guidelines. In order to avoid 
                                                
105 Relevant studies can be found in the book TV Drama in China ed. by Zhu, Keane and Bai (Zhu, Keane and Bai, 2008) . 
106 Chinese title: 飞天奖 
107 Chinese title: 金鹰奖 
108 Chinese title: 金鸡奖 
109 Chinese title: 五个一工程奖 
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touching on sensitive political issues which may invite strict censorship, commercial producers 
turn to making de-politicalized entertainment programs which can attract more audiences and 
less political interference. ‘No sex, no violence, no news, just entertainment’ is thus the slogan 
for majority of domestic producers as well as foreign incomers.  
Entertainment programs primarily include variety shows, love-story dramas and family 
soap-operas. Such programs step away from the State’s ideology and politics, and are full of 
commercial components like beautiful girls, handsome boys, romantic stories and amazing 
pictures to attract masses. Entertainment content pursues hundred percent pleasure for audiences 
and let audiences get away from a real world by fabricating a huge beautiful dream for them. 
Less likely to offend official censors, de-politicalized entertainment programs thus become the 
most welcomed genre for both domestic and foreign content providers.  
Entertainment programs, however, sometimes get into trouble because of the producers’ 
wholehearted efforts to “catch the eye”. Stories of sex, violence, objection to social moralities 
and taboos, individual freedoms and money worship have always been involved in entertainment 
programs to release the viewers’ potential desires. As more and more young audiences who are 
the major consumers of entertainment programs tend to be individualistic and unpatriotic, such 
commercial components begin to draw more attention from official censors. 
The current popularity of Talent Show is an example. Talent Show itself emerges as a 
response to the growing interactivity of audiences with TV operators. Inevitably, in such 
entertainment format, more emphasis has been given to individual rights and audiences are 
granted more power to determine the process of program. It first came into being as a Britain 
television program, and then was successfully adapted by the widely-known U.S American Idol. 
Afterwards, Talent Show becomes unbelievably popular in many countries. This entertainment 
format is copied, borrowed and adapted by many producers. China’s Hunan Satellite TV’s Super 
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Voice Girl in 2005 is inspired by American Idol and provokes a huge debate about democracy in 
China.  
Super Voice Girl is an elimination singing contest. It starts by inviting a huge number of 
young women participants from five provinces in China, including Hunan, Sichuan, Guangdong, 
Henan and Zhejiang. The producer of Super Voice Girl calls the process of preliminary selection 
“han xuan” which means “to pick up from the sea”.  After five rounds of regional competitions, 
the selected participants compete in the finals and their rankings are determined by nationwide 
citizens who vote through SMS messages. This is a big party for all Chinese young girls. 
Everyone is qualified to participate and gets a chance to perform on TV. Due to the low criterion 
of participants, Super Voice Girl thus attracts not only young school students, but also numerous 
mid-age workers and even old grandmas to join this game.  
What makes Super Voice Girl particularly popular is that thousands of viewers have 
witnessed an instant fame of these female participants. After winning the national contest, 
finalists are interviewed by the media, invited to participate in commercial activities and engage 
in online chat. Their faces frequently appear in diverse types of media, such as the TV, the press, 
the internet and fashion magazines. After seeing the instant fame achieved by these super girls, 
millions of Chinese school students are crazy about them. Many of school students queue in a 
long line for a whole day for sign up and some even play truant for joining the contest. They 
dream of becoming one of the super stars by joining such talent TV shows. In the mean time, 
other audiences can also realize his or her dream by watching and experiencing life change of 
these young girls.  
Furthermore, audience participation is another crucial factor making this television show 
successful. The selection process appears to be fairly democratic. The process is determined by 
audiences. Even there are some experts are hired as judges, the fate of participants is largely left 
to the hands of ordinary citizens. “It raises an euphoria of voting for millions of Chinese people. 
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That is why Super Voice Girl has triggered powerful enthusiasm from the public”, said by Lu Di, 
a professor in the communication department of Tsinghua University110. Kang Li, a retired male 
accountant, commented that:  
The talent shows of CCTV often put too much emphasis on collectivism and nationalism. No one like such 
boring shows, say CCTV’s Young Singer Contest (qing ge sai). But this contest (Super Voice Girl) provides an 
opportunity for every ordinary people to realize his or her own values, no matter how old you are or what job you 
have. It is not like an elite-aesthetics of CCTV shows. It (Super Voice Girl) is our ordinary people’s shows.111 
Nevertheless, China’s censors became concerned about the giant popularity of Super Voice 
Girl. They criticize that a nationwide mania for selecting superstars could stir trouble. These TV 
singing contests are products of a commercial culture that only caters to the needs of consumers. 
They do not care about social benefits and lack social responsibility. Talent shows harm 
teenagers because they mislead the young people to vulgar values and unrealistic pursuit of 
short-term profits. After seeing a normal school girl instantly becoming a famous super star who 
is able to earn much more money than before, young viewers may be misled by the promising 
fortune of players. Some of them even step on an “incorrect” road, deciding to give up their 
studies to participate in such talent shows. In addition, adult viewers are also criticized by 
China’s officials to be addicted to hedonism and individualism. Super Voice Girl is “‘too 
democratic’ for China’s censors”, commented by a journalist from The Times (Macartney, 2005). 
Voting for their favorable participants raises strong self-awareness of Chinese audiences. And 
this has raised new types of internet “civil societies” which upset Chinese authorities.  
5.2.2.1 Negotiation Process 
With regard to the perception that Talent Show has magnified individual concerns and money 
worship among Chinese people, authorities adopted a series of policies to regulate these 
entertainment programs. This includes restricting the minimum age of players, the number of 
                                                
110 Field notes: Interview on 24 Dec 2007, Beijing. 
111 Field notes: Interview on 30 Jan 2008, Changsha. 
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selecting cities, the broadcasting period of program, the number of foreign songs selected by 
players, the content that may embarrass younger players, the dialects used in such talent shows 
and the broadcast of foreign programs with similar formats. After being publicly criticized as 
lacking social responsibility by TV officials, commercial producers dare not offend them. They 
follow the official restrictions and add in elements that promote Socialist mainstream in their 
content to please the authority.  
In the next season of Super Voice Girl in 2006, Hunan Satellite TV invited a soldier to write 
a song named Eight Dos and Eight Don’ts for younger players to perform in an opening show. 
Eight Dos and Eight Don’ts were well known as an official version of Socialist concepts of 
honor and disgrace. The lyrics were written like this: 
 “Love, do no harm the motherland; Serve, do not disserve the people; Work hard, don’t be 
lazy and hate work; Be united and help each other, don’t gain benefits at the expense of others; 
Be honest and trustworthy, don’t chase profit at the expense of your values; Be disciplined and 
law-abiding, don’t break laws and violate disciplines; Know plain living and hard struggle; do 
not wallow in luxuries and pleasures”.  
Although the lyrics sound a bit unfit to certain entertainment shows, such mainstream 
slogan in fact pleased the central officials. Hunan Satellite TV invited less interference afterward 
and was allowed to conduct a similar talent show called Happy Boy in 2007. “Undeniably, the 
creativity of our producers has been restricted to some extent at the expense of catering 
mainstream taste. But it is the way that we can survive…On one hand, we try to pay more 
attention to include mainstream content in our entertainment shows. On the other hand, we try to 
increase the attractiveness of our programs with such restrictions. We Hunan TV operators are 
famous of ‘dancing with fetters’”, an ex-producer of Super Voice Girl said honestly. 112 In fact, it 
can be observed that Hunan Satellite TV merges more mainstream content in its entertainment 
                                                
112 Field notes: Interview on 15 Feb 2008, Changsha.  
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shows nowadays, such as in Day Day Up (Tiantian Xiangshang113). It is no longer a “naughty 
boy” for SARFT after its success of Super Voice Girl.  
As lots of entertainment programs turn to juxtaposition strategy, it becomes increasingly 
infeasible for them to be purely de-politicalized. Besides Super Voice Girl, other types of 
entertainment shows, such as the entertainment reports in 2008, were full of news about movie 
stars who show support for the Beijing Olympic Games and called for nationalism among 
teenagers. This is to cater to the demands of the authority. Some of my interviewees from 
independent production companies, who worked as the producers of entertainment shows, told 
me that “officials have silent regulation upon entertainment programs, especially the talent 
shows. We need to put inside such news to make them happy, otherwise our programs will be in 
danger of being banned.” These producers often joked privately with one another that their 
entertainment news were more left than social news! De-politicalized programs thus become 
more difficult to distinguish themselves from juxtaposed mainstream ones. It is now common 
for Chinese producers to combine the mainstream and commercial TV services to please the 
China’s authorities.  
5.2.3 Playing in the Margin 
Playing in the margin is a typical strategy used by domestic producers to negotiate with central 
regulators about the ‘degree’ of censorship. By trying different ways to express themselves, 
producers attempt to feel out the bottom line. Sometimes trying to produce in this way, if 
censors allow, they keep on. Sometimes trying to produce in that way, if censors reject, they 
bypass, till they find a way accepted by both. 
A number of movie cases will be discussed later because movie producers tend to adopt the 
strategy of playing in the margin more frequently than television actors. As movie producers 
always target the international market that provides more opportunities than that of television 
                                                
113 Chinese title: 天天向上 
142 
 
programs, they would not find it fatal if their movies are banned by SARFT. Instead, television 
actors cannot afford such a risk since they are relying heavily on domestic markets. It would be a 
great blow to their careers if the programs they are involved in are barred by officials. Therefore, 
there are very few TV cases of playing in the margin and most of them have already been killed 
before they appear on the screen.  
Movie producers, however, provide valuable experience for TV practitioners because the 
latter knows how to avoid untouchable issues according to the cases of banned movies. “No one 
knows what the censorship standards or the limits are”. This is a common perception shared by 
Chinese producers. Unpredictable bans have forced them to resort to “self-censorship” which is 
heavily dependent upon experiences. Consequently, everyone has to “wade across the stream by 
feeling the way,” as it is said by Mr. Sui, a producer in Beijing TV station114.  
The film Balzac and the Little Chinese Seamstress released in 2002 is a good example. With 
major investments coming from French companies, this film chooses a story that can not only 
cater for overseas audiences but also un-offend central regulators. This movie tells a story that 
took place in the early 1970s during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  Cultural Revolution 
has been commonly treated by western viewers as a Chinese political chaos. The leading 
characters are two city boys named Luo and Ma, who were sent to a remote village in Sichuan 
province for three years of re-education, as their doctor parents were accused of “reactionaries of 
the bourgeoise” (Zichan Jieji Fandongpai115) by the Communist state. The two boys were 
immediately assigned to join locals in their hard menial works. During the difficult time in a 
remote village, they both fell in love with the granddaughter of a local tailor, who is called “little 
seamstress”. To please this beautiful little seamstress, they borrowed books from “Four Eyes”, a 
teenager who was also sent to this remote village for re-education. “Four Eyes” was hiding 
many forbidden Western books at his private place, such as the novels written by Flaubert, Hugo 
                                                
114 Field notes: Interview on 8 Nov 2007, Beijing. 
115 Chinese title: 资产阶级反动派 
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and Balzac. From time to time, the two boys borrowed different books from him and read the 
novels to the uneducated little seamstress every day. This movie tries to explore the themes of 
oppression, modernity and freedom in those dark times in China. The Little Seamstress, a poor 
and illiterate Chinese peasant woman who did not know what happened in the outside world is 
depicted as a victim of feudal oppression in this story and the two educated young men from big 
cities act as the beneficiary of western modernity. Encouraged by Luo and Ma who both loved 
her, the little seamstress began to read Balzac’s novel, her favorite, and was deeply influenced 
by these books. In the end, the little seamstress decided to leave this poor village and bravely 
seek her dream outside. 
5.2.3.1 Negotiation Process 
The story ended at the scenario that the little seamstress left her village and did not continue 
discussing what would happen to her. It left a space for audiences, letting them to judge by 
themselves what would happen and whether it was right or wrong for her to do so. This space, 
on the other hand, also left a space for censor and producer to negotiate. In the Socialist 
mainstream, China’s censors always refuse such portrayals of Chinese people being lured by 
Capitalist values, such as money worship, and hence, rejecting the career of building Socialism. 
In this film, although it implied that this seamstress was deeply influenced by Balzac’s books, it 
did not make a conclusion or judgment that how capitalist ideas affected her future life after she 
left the village. Her destiny was left for viewers’ further imagination. The producer’s careful 
dealing with the selection of content as well as the techniques of narrative prevented the 
situation of offending official guidelines from happening. Censors were placed into a flexible 
situation in which the ‘degree’ of censorship was left to be judged on a case by case basis.  
Moreover, a brief introduction, at the end of this film, about the later successful lives of the 
two young men who left village after Cultural Revolution served as another “buffer” to reduce 
its criticism upon the historical event. It mentioned that one of the two young men finally 
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became a successful professor in a University and built a happy family. The other became a 
successful pianist in the US. The end of story adopted a narrative technique of flashback. The 
story that took place in a small village was driven as a memory of boyhood by these two 
successful mid-age men in China. Such narrative technique, employed by the producer, 
lightened the negative colors of what the political event brought to Chinese individuals. It also 
provided the possibility for this product to be tolerated by official censors. As a result of 
negotiation, this film was allowed to be shot in China and screened in foreign countries.  
Although Balzac and the little Chinese Seamstress cautiously felt its way, playing in the 
margin, however, invites trouble easily because of producers’ immoderate testing the degree of 
censorship. Marching Toward The Republic (Zouxiang Gonghe116) offers a valuable example for 
us to analyze over-tested TV serials because it is one of the few banned TV contents that 
audiences can rarely access. It was not banned until the last few episodes screened on CCTV. 
The producers are the same people who shot Yong Zheng Dynasty, a show which was welcomed 
by the SARFT as a masterpiece of mainstream TV drama. Very probably due to the success of 
Yong Zheng Dynasty, they gained more experience and confidence to criticize current social 
reality by manipulating historical drama. Nevertheless, it over-tested China’s censorship and 
brought itself a fate of being blocked for a long time. Walking Toward the Republic tells a very 
broad history from the late period of Qing Dynasty to the early period of Sun Yat-sen’s 
Revolution. While looking back some important historical events, such as Opium War, 
Westernization Movement, Wu Xu Reform, and Xinhai Revolution, the producers of this TV 
serial employed a very different point of view from that of the mainstream to analyze historical 
figures. The queen mother Ci Xi and her minister Li Hongzhang who have been traditionally 
accused by the mainstream as national traitors, however, were explained as pitiful persons in this 
drama who struggled between foreigner’s invasion and internal rebellion. What they could do, as 
interpreted by the producers, was to maintain Qing Dynasty and it was understandable that Ci Xi 
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and Li Hongzhang were not capable of possessing the foresight to build a new republic social 
system. As many critics pointed out afterward, it “glorified” Ci Xi and Li Hongzhang, and even 
gave too much praise to KMT (Kuo Min Tang117) while this drama discussed how Sun Yat-sen 
experienced a tough path to carry out his ‘three principles of democracy’. Nevertheless, it was 
worthy of noting that the state relaxed its prohibition on this TV series afterward. Its DVD was 
allowed to circulate overseas and the related producers were not punished as well. More or less, 
it reflected that the new generation of Chinese leadership is becoming more and more tolerable 
of moderate critics about its political system and the bottom line is becoming negotiable as these 
producers keep on testing it. 
Learning from the experiences of filmmakers and those banned TV serials, some TV actors 
tend to adopt “tender” narrative techniques to play in the margin. Xi Shuo Historical dramas 
offer favorable opportunities for them because historical events not only allow rooms for literary 
inventions but are also much safer to criticize current social realities by means of innuendo. Xi 
Shuo History dramas is a certain genre of non-orthodox interpretations of history. It is strongly 
featured as humorous and amusing narratives. It is less likely to invite strict censorship due to its 
creational “appearance”. The Eloquent Ji Xiaolan (Tiechi Tongya Ji Xiaolan118) is a kind of Xi 
Shuo History Drama. It tells a series of stories that took place between three persons in the Qing 
Dynasty. One was the Emperor Qian Long and the other two were his ministers, Ji Xiaolan who 
was an upright scholar and He Shen who was a corrupt official. One day Qian Long decided to 
leave the Forbidden City to investigate outside realities. Ji Xiaolan and He Shen accompanied 
him in his journey. Qian Long appreciated Ji because he was a genius scholar. But he could not 
resist He because He was quite good at pleasing him. During their adventures to South China, 
numerous interesting stories took place and some beautiful women eventually joined their group. 
In this story, Qian Long faced similar social problems with those of Yong Zheng regime, such as 
                                                
117 Chinese title: 国民党 
118 Chinese title: 铁齿铜牙纪晓岚 
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official corruptions and political struggles. But different from the orthodox mainstream drama 
Yong Zheng Dynasty, The Eloquent Ji Xiaolan is full of unofficial historical stories, folk rumors 
and untold mysteries about Qian Long. The producers smartly created a series of short stories 
and added a lot of fashionable elements, such as social hot topics in the dialogues between Ji and 
He so as to criticize social realities.  
For example, in the 26th episode, Ji and He were arguing about official corruption in Gan Su 
province in front of Qian Long. Ji suggested that Qian Long should kill all the corrupt officials 
because they had illegally embezzled the money that should be used for disaster relief. 
Nevertheless, He Shen tried to persuade the emperor to minimize this problem because he 
thought that corrupt officials could be penalized but they did not deserve death. Ji was very 
angry that He tried to protect such corrupt officials like him. Ji quoted a lot of past law cases to 
argue against and he was so brilliant at arguing that no one in the court had ever managed to 
refute him. Finally the corrupt officials were sent to execution ground. At the moment of 
execution, He Shen showed his mercy to a corrupt official. Ironically, this corrupt official said 
“It is too early to be happy, Master He. You will deserve a worse fate than me. How about I 
reserve a place for you in the hell, Master He!...aha aha aha….” The official was then smiling 
very weirdly, just like a ghost. The picture immediately turned dark and was accompanied by 
eerie music. He Shen was so threatened by this scenario that he trembled with fear. 
Zhang Lili, an office lady in Wuhan, said that: 
I enjoy the end of this story very much. It does not tell stories in an orthodox way, but in a very interesting and 
relaxed manner. In fact, I prefer watching a frightened, pale face of He Shen than a virtuous face of Qian Long at 
the end…Giving a fictional but funny portrayal to historical figures is better than serious depiction.119  
Zhang Zhiyun, a taxi driver in Beijing, pointed out that: 
                                                
119 Field notes: Interview on 29 Dec 2007, Wuhan. 
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The language in this drama is modern and funny. The Facetious dialogues between characters often remind me 
of thinking about our current society… Ji Xiaolan resembles an excellent representative for the poor. Ji is so brave 
to plead for the people. Our society needs such a person. Ji makes me remind of Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao, (the 
ex- and current premier in China) who really works for the welfare of our ordinary people. I feel piquant when I see 
the death fate of corrupt officials.120  
As one of the producers of The Eloquent Ji Xiaolan said, “History is a basket and reality is 
the filling…We producers smartly created these fake historical stories from which current social 
realities were put inside. Audiences love to watch because they can read out such information 
and obtain resonance.”121 Moreover, the criticisms were “spoken out” by these historic figures 
and they sounded like jokes other than serious condemnation toward current politics. As a result 
of these humorous dialogues, the program did not offend censorship committee members. 
Besides, these unorthodox stories of Qing Dynasty tend to be safe because they eventually call 
on mainstream values among viewers such as patriotism, righteousness, responsibility, loyalty 
and justice.  
5.2.4 Rejection 
Although most producers choose to compromise or negotiate, there are those who choose to 
reject censor’s requirements. They are dissatisfied with the authorities’ content regulation 
regarding sensitive issues and refuse to modify their products.  
For example, a film Summer Palace (Yi He Yuan122) directed by Lou Ye told a love story 
among three young university students. Part of this story mentioned the Student Movement in 
1989. It has a twenty-minutes-long speech of student leaders, and involved scenes of democratic 
movements, news pictures and sex. It was not surprising to hear that the “politics + sex” film 
was banned by SARFT. Since these forbidden products were not publicly aired, it is hard for 
outsiders to know which parts of content were considered offensive. At least, the results show 
                                                
120 Field notes: Interview on 19 Nov 2007, Beijing. 
121 Field notes: Interview on 15 Nov 2007, Beijing. 
122 Chinese title: 颐和园 
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that criticizing sensitive political issues, other than interpreting in a relatively moderate way, like 
in the case of Balzac and the little Chinese Seamstress and The Eloquent Ji Xiaolan, will 
absolutely be banned by censors.  
5.2.4.1 Negotiation Process 
Summer Palace tends to criticize sensitive political issues too directly. Those playing in the 
margin choose to play an edge ball (cabian qiu) and feel out the bottom line in order to find out a 
degree that can be both accepted by censor and producer. Instead, those who reject this method 
choose to challenge the mainstream ideology and criticize current affairs directly, showing 
neither compromise nor avoidance. Their products are consequently frozen by regulators in both 
domestic and foreign markets. Lou Ye was eventually penalized and banned from making 
movies in China for five years because several of his films were sent to international film 
festivals before getting the censorship allowance. He replied: “It’s an unfair treatment to forbid 
me to make movies. Sending my products to the international festival is a kind of right that any 
artistic worker should possess…China’s censorship is totally inappropriate for the current 
situation. Unfortunately I haven’t seen any improvement after my several attempts of 
negotiation” (Deutsche, 2006). 
The movie Lost in Beijing (Apple 123) was also rigorously punished by SARFT as its 
producers have released an uncut version at the February 2007 Berlin International Film 
Festival without SARFT’s permission. This case has already been mentioned in the third chapter. 
As a result of rejection, the producer Li Fang and his studio Beijing Laurel Films received a 
two-year suspension from any involvement in Chinese film industry and the screening license of 
this movie was revoked by the SARFT. It is barred from Internet distribution as well124.  
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Overall, Chinese producers choose different strategies to negotiate with official censors 
based on different situations. Unlike moviemakers who may have more opportunities to receive 
international investments, television producers are basically restricted to domestic markets. 
Since they have few chances to recoup the losses from overseas markets if their programs are 
banned by the government, television producers are more cautious in their treatment of the 
content of their programs and adhere more closely to the State’s censorship rules. Consequently, 
few of them choose to challenge the bottom line of censors, and not reject their requirements. In 
most of cases, television producers would rather work with the government and make much 
effort to ensure the political correctness of their programs. As a result, they prefer to employ 
juxtaposition strategy more often than other strategies. As television programs receive stricter 
censorship than movies, de-politicalization becomes increasingly indistinguishable with the 
juxtaposition because producers need to add in some mainstream contents to please the censors. 
5.3 Localization of Western TV Practitioner 
The government responses toward Western media appear to be more and more conservative in 
recent years. A series of policies issued around 2003 and 2004, for example the No. 34, 44 
policies and ‘Opinions on Promoting the Development of Broadcasting industry’, appear to 
show that the state highly encourages foreign investment in China’s media. But those issued 
after 2005, such as the ‘Notice of No.44’ and ‘Measures Regarding Strengthening the 
Administration of Import of Cultural Products’, send out a series of ‘tightening’ signals for 
western practitioners125. ‘Notice of No.44’ stipulates that foreign broadcasters are only allowed 
to set up one Joint Venture Company with domestic operators in China, and the share held by 
                                                
125The Chinese version of “Opinions on Promoting the Development of Broadcasting industry” (guanyu cujin guangbo yingshi chanye fazhan de yijian) 
can be viewed on http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2004-02/20/content_1323651.htm;  
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http://www.chinasarft.gov.cn/articles/2009/02/18/20090218094637360522.html. This has been regarded as another ‘tightening’ signal for foreign 
broadcasters because no more new policies are issued to clarify the official attitude toward foreign investment and the only one document that once 




foreign broadcasters is restricted to less than 49 percent. Besides, ‘Measures’ also tightens the 
approvals for setting foreign broadcasting organizations in China and strengthens control over 
the content censorship of imported TV programs. ‘Measures’ stipulates that in principle, no 
additional foreign satellite TV channels will be permitted to broadcast in China. The government 
will strengthen the administration and censorship of existing foreign TV channels. ‘Measures’ 
also stresses that TV products have strong ideological connotations so that Chinese partners are 
responsible for supervising their co-productions with foreign producers and prevent ill culture 
and ideologies, especially from the West, from invading China.  
Such strengthened regulation policies result in a higher production risk for foreign 
practitioners than that of their domestic rivals. A higher production risk implies a more cautious 
treatment to programs’ content. Western practitioners hence make much effort to make their 
products non-offensive to China’s censorship as they have foreseen an increasingly profitable 
media market in China. In order to quickly hold their feet in the country and invite less political 
interference from the government, western practitioners choose to cooperate with local 
broadcasters and sacrifice their political appeals by localizing programs’ content to cater for 
both domestic audiences and authorities. 
5.3.1 Localization---an adaptation strategy of western media 
5.3.1.1 Localized Culture  
Catering to local taste is an important part of the localization strategy employed by western 
practitioners. In recent years, imported TV programs are losing their charm in China while 
locally-produced ones are gaining far more popularity (Lu, 2003). Various studies have found 
that audiences show an obvious preference for local content as they can easily comprehend the 
language used and may feel more comfortable as these programs are set in similar cultural 
backgrounds. Subtitles seem insufficient to satisfy the audiences’ demands. Brent’s study (1998) 
has also found that the most popular programs in China tend to be the locally or regionally 
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produced soap dramas and television series, such as Outlaws of the Marsh (Shui Hu Zhuan126), 
which was one of the most watched shows in 1998, and CCTV’s production Aspirations (Ke 
Wang127) which was originally screened in 1990 and re-aired three times due to popular demand. 
A survey conducted by CCTV’s Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS) on July 2002 has also shown that 
the rating of local television programs in Guangdong province has exceeded that of foreign 
products and more than 52 percent interviewed audiences replied that “they prefer local 
information” when asked about the reason of why choose local television programs  (Shi, 2006).  
Such a tendency of preferring local culture has encouraged transnational broadcasters to 
adopt localization into their global business strategy, and produce ‘new content’ for local 
audiences rather than directly importing ready-made programs from other countries. For instance, 
aiming at Asia as a major market, STAR TV which has realized the importance of localization, 
hires local actors, launches domestic branches, opens Mandarin-language television channels, 
and specifically produces local-taste television programs for its Asian audiences (FEER, 2000). 
Other transnational broadcasters have also adopted series of ‘localization’ strategies. Taking 
Viacom in China as an example, it encourages and cultivates lots of local talents in order to 
increase the affinity of its music programs to Chinese audience. It collaborates with local experts 
in China, invites Chinese stars to music shows, sets Chinese music charts, gives awards to 
Chinese folk songs, and even re-produces western imports to make its music programs have a 
more “Local Chinese Look”. Viacom Chief President Sumner Redstone said: “We create music 
with local people for local audiences respecting local culture. I think that's one of the reasons 
why we have been so successful in China” (Georg, 2005).  
Viacom’s MTV Mandarin is one of the most successful localized television programs in 
China. Choosing local host is a basic strategy for Viacom to spread MTV globally. In China, 
Viacom appoints a group of excellent local hosts who are very popular and familiar among local 
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audiences. It has a program called MTV Burr hosed by Zhu Zhu, a Beijing-born Chinese girl 
who was well-known as a magazine model in China. Zhu Zhu was chosen as a MTV host 
because her “international background” wonderfully serves as a bridge between the East and the 
West. Since MTV mainly targets young audiences in China who are eager to learn something 
fashionable and fresh from the West, it needs a host who not only appears to be “international” 
or somewhat “western” to these young audiences but also possesses “cultural affinity” to the 
audiences’ cultural background.  Zhu is the best choice because she once studied in New York 
MTV office and has a good command of English. In the meantime she is born as a local Chinese, 
knows China much better than foreign compeers, and speaks with a native Beijing accent as well. 
In the program MTV Burr, Zhu gives a sightseeing tour in Beijing city to her audiences. She 
goes to Houhai Street to experience some cultural traditions of The Old Beijing, such as the 
hand-made bamboo kite shops, the street massage by Beijing elders, the street calligraphy and a 
rickshaw trip to visit the old architecture in Beijing Hutong. What makes her program particular 
is that Zhu Zhu freely shifts between English and Chinese when introducing these cultural 
traditions. Moreover, she wears modern dresses and uses a young viewpoint, such as pop words, 
to look at the culture of old Beijing. Such a sharp contrast between the tradition and modernity, 
the East and West, the old and the young, all delivers a sense of “collision” that Chinese young 
people are now experiencing in the modern China. MTV Burr is a typical localized program as it 
is made by local talents to include many Chinese cultural elements and has aroused in-depth 
cultural resonance shared by Chinese audiences.  
Ye Li, an undergraduate in Peking University said that “MTV Burr is awesome! ‘Burr’128 is 
a native word in Beijing. But Zhu Zhu uses this word so freely both with Chinese and English. 
‘Burr good’, ‘Burr delicious’, ‘Burr high’…I think I like to learn English in such an interesting 
way. In the meantime, I still can learn more about Beijing history. Those cultural traditions 
                                                
128 ‘Burr’ is an adjective of Beijing dialect. It shares the same meaning of the words like ‘very’ or ‘extremely’.  
153 
 
introduced by Zhu Zhu are so frequently seen that I almost ignore them. Now I have a chance to 
re-experience them by watching Zhu Zhu’s program”. 
As the case of MTV Burr has shown, MTV now gives up its pan-Asia strategy, but turns to 
emphasize local characteristics in both the format format and content of programs. As Charles 
Chau Suk Poon, the managing director of MTV Networks (North Asia) puts it, “Creating 
compelling content for local consumers is equally crucial in China as localization plays a key 
role for doing entertainment business… MTV Networks now produces and shoots all of its five 
Chinese programs… 100 per cent locally in China… If we don't localize the programs and they 
are only with Chinese titles, there is no success here.” (Jian, 2004) 
5.3.1.2 Localized Ideology 
Catering to Chinese authorities is another influential factor that pushes western practitioners 
to adopt the strategy of localization. The party-state is a factor that media TNCs must pay 
attention to and cannot evade from. Keeping a close relationship with the party-state by means 
of localizing the ideology of their cultural products can largely pave a smooth way for their 
business. To bypass or challenge its ideology might be too risky for them to survive in China.  
Murdoch is one of them who are deeply aware of the importance for working with the party-
state. Making a speech shortly after his bought of STAR TV in 1993, Rupert Murdoch once 
proclaimed that satellite television was “an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes 
everywhere.” China’s government responded by immediately banning private satellite dishes 
(Barraclough, 2000: 266). Murdoch then embarked on a long journey of courting Chinese 
authorities. After that, Murdoch immediately cut down the BBC programs relayed by STAR TV 
channel since the content was regarded as the anti-China information. In 1994, Murdoch’s 
subsidiary company published an English version of the Chinese mainstream book called My 
Father, Deng Xiaoping and assisted in its distribution outside China; In 1995, his subsidiary 
newspaper The Times sponsored an Chinese relics exhibition in British Museum; In 1998, 
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Murdoch donated one million US dollars to the disaster-affected area in China and financed the 
building of the website of China’s official newspaper People Daily (Xinhua News, 2005). In 
Mar 2001, James Murdoch, his son, publicly stated that some western media are particularly 
hostile towards the Chinese government by only presenting negative human rights issues in 
China. ‘Falun Gong’ was a dangerous movement for Chinese state, he said, “It clearly does not 
have the success of China at heart.” (Carter, 2001) Such continuous efforts by Murdoch have 
finally paved the way of knocking on China’s door for him. Phoenix, with forty-five percent of 
its shares held by Murdoch, is one of the few foreign channels that were permitted to broadcast 
in Guangdong province first. With an acquiescence given by China’s media officials, Phoenix 
expands its business into more mainland cities and now it successfully covers thirteen percent of 
the Chinese audiences. Meanwhile, STAR TV’s widely-owned channels, such as Channel V 
(87.5%), ESPN (50%) and National Geographic Channel (66.7%) are granted access into China 
as well (Zhang, 2003). The admissions of these channels, however, are most likely to benefit 
from Murdoch’s public image of some who is close with China’s government. 
Nowadays, it seems that western media TNCs are happy to work with Chinese authorities as 
they have foreseen the “benefits” of localizing the ideology of their cultural products, or more 
specifically, de-westernizing and catering to Chinese official ideologies. Paul Crouch, president 
of the world’s largest Christian TV network—Trinity Broadcast Network (TBN), which is the 
first religious television channel allowed to enter China in 2000—defended the Chinese 
government against western media criticism revolving around the ban of ‘Falun Gong’. He 
publicly supported religious freedom in China in a press conference and said that some 
westerners had a distorted and unbalanced view of China when reporting human rights and 
religious freedom issues.” (BBC, 2000) Viacom CEO Sumner Redstone added that he was very 
conscious of the taste of the Chinese government. Those years he went to China were mostly 
spent on building friendly relationships and trust with various officials of the Chinese 
government. As a result of collaborating with state broadcasters, its business was successful in 
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China. Nickelodeon has been the highest rated product on the CCTV kids’ channel and Viacom 
is expected to triple its MTV distribution in China to ten million (TIME, 2004). 
5.3.1.3 Localized Partnership 
To have a strategic alliance with China’s media is another important part of localization. 
Localization is highly encouraged by China’s state because it not only ensures that western 
cultural imports do not challenge its ideologies, but also opens a window for Chinese products to 
be distributed outside. The eagerness of media TNCs to collaborate with Chinese authorities 
dovetails an urgent need of the state to do propaganda work, or their so-called “external 
publicity.” “If you want to find a foothold in China, you should do something for it first”, said 
by a marketing manager in STAR TV Beijing office129. Media TNCs are now becoming clearer 
of what Chinese state wants from them—a localized partnership (guanxi130 ) with Chinese 
authorities from which both of the two interest groups can benefit. “It might be unimaginable in 
the West but, in China, it is quite understandable and ineluctable. We should learn how to do 
business with the party-state. It is part of the process of localization”, added by my interviewee, 
the marketing manager in STAR TV. As the cases mentioned in earlier sections regarding the 
Chinese government’s “going-out project”, SARFT negotiated with News Crop., AOL-TIME 
Warner and Viacom about to air China’s official channel CCTV-9 through their U.S. and 
European TV networks which was treated as a precondition for granting access for their 
channels in Guangdong province. Largely due to media TNCs assistance rather than overseas 
market demands, CCTV official programs have already extended its global reach as large as the 
areas including the big cities in the U.S., Europe, Asia and Africa. 
The party-state also encourages other types of localized partnerships to increase the export 
of Chinese programs. Foreign broadcasters choose to work with semi-governmental bodies in 
China, such as state media CCTV or SMG (Shanghai Media Group), as part of their plans to 
                                                
129 Field notes: Interview on 22 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
130 Chinese title: 关系 
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enter the Chinese market. In 1997, Southern Star Production House (Australia) cooperated with 
CCTV to produce a children cartoon program Supernatural Valley (Shenqi Shangu131). Southern 
Star covered half of the cost and assisted in the international distribution of this program. 
Meanwhile, Southern Star also expressed its desire to have more chances to work with CCTV, to 
bring more programs besides children cartoons into China with CCTV’s assistance. Besides, 
Time Warner (USA) and CINAR (Canada) both worked with CCTV to reproduce and adapt 
some Chinese programs for western viewers, such as Chinese Wild Animals (Zhongguo Yesheng 
Dongwu132) and Journey to the West (Xi You Ji133), which have gained good ratings in overseas 
markets (Li, 2003). In recent years, regional broadcasters also attempt to work with state 
broadcasters or media groups to enter the Chinese market. Media companies in South Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan are keeping an eye on it. Collaboration comes in various 
forms, such as the exchange of actors and producers, the co-writing of theme songs for TV 
serials, and the circulation of co-opt programs in regional TV networks.  
5.3.2 The Consequences of Localization---Constructive or Destructive 
Some studies assert that the influx of foreign broadcasters and massive importion of foreign 
programs will challenge or have a damaging influence on local culture in a post-WTO China. 
They claim that the consumption of an increasing amount of cultural products made by foreign 
producers may lead to the diminishment or disappearance of national or ethnic identity, and also 
may erode authentic culture in China (Zhang, 2006;Meng, 2001;Zeng, 2005). However, this 
thesis attempts to argue that the consequences of localization adopted by western practitioners 
are not to destructive, but constructive to the Chinese culture.  
5.3.2.1 Cultural Adaptation of Western Practitioner  
Firstly, localization is a form of cultural adaptation for media TNCs. Cultural adaptation, here, 
does not only refer to a simple comprise strategy, such as the adding of Chinese subtitles to 
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132 Chinese title: 中国野生动物 
133 Chinese title: 西游记 
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foreign programs, but also refer to an active devotion to local cultures in order to minimize 
cultural differences. Having Chinese subtitles along is not enough to achieve high audience 
rating now. Creating compelling contents that fit local taste is a crucial task for transnational 
broadcasters. It is infeasible to produce localized programs in foreign nations and only with 
foreign producers. In order to shoot content that are entirely local for Chinese audiences, western 
broadcasters actively delved themselves into local culture—a thorough participation in China’s 
culture—so that they can produce TV shows that attract local viewers by means of minimizing 
the cultural difference between the west and China. Their production groups are made up of 
mostly domestic experts, including producers, performers, directors, designers and composers. 
In most cases, they delegate the execution of programming assignments to production 
companies directly. What these companies make is not very different from the ones screened on 
local TV channels. Moreover, these programs are purposely produced to emphasize local 
characteristics, full of native cultural connotations and backgrounds.  
Culturally, the hundred percent localized cultural programs full of native cultural 
connotations produced by transnational media giants, are not perceived to be a threat to Chinese 
culture. These programs have been imbedded with strong indigenous cultural values and norms. 
They are particularly produced to possess high affinity to Chinese culture. Their “Chinese Look” 
makes themselves stay closer to local culture rather than replace the local taste with a global 
culture. The marketing manager of STAR TV Beijing office said: 
Localization is a must for foreign practitioners in China. Now more than seventy percent of our programs are 
made by local talents. What we pursue is not only the Chinese themes and topics, but the cultural connotations and 
values consistent with Chinese audiences as well… In order to make programs that are completely localized, we 
cooperate with many production companies in China. We hope that local talents can increase the cultural affinity of 
our programs.134 
                                                
134 Field notes: Interview on 20 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
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Ideologically, media TNCs choose to cooperate with Chinese authorities and accommodate 
rather than challenge them as they cannot risk testing the baseline of China’s censorship. 
Working closely with the state or party organs such as CCTV and SMG is the best and safest 
plan for them. The cultural adaption requires them to adhere to the rules of the game, and be 
consistent with the political ideology in China so that they are able to run business with less 
political intervention. For example, as Fung’s study (2008)points out, Channel V adopts a 
strategy of “de-westernizing” its programs to make a compromise in Chinese market and MTV 
adopts a similar strategy from which it attempts to pursue a balance between western modernity 
and Chinese ideology. 
Economically, a large amount of transnational capital brought by media TNCs can 
contribute to the prosperity of local broadcasting industry since local media companies, 
especially state broadcasters, can benefit from cooperating with foreign partners. In fact, this is 
one the considerations the Chinese state has in mind. It hopes a controlled collaboration with 
transnational capital can speed up the development of local media industry, improve the quality 
of programs and enhance the national standards of China-made programs so that Chinese media 
is sufficiently prepared for the “going-out” project. The cultural adaptation of media TNCs fits 
the needs of Chinese state because the Chinese state prefers “economic globalization” to attract 
more global investments, but refuses “cultural globalization” to keep its ideological 
independence and stability. What media TNCs bring to China, to a large extent, is economic 
investment which has been used to hire local producers to produce local programs.  
5.3.2.2 Reflexive Awareness of Audience 
Secondly, imported foreign programs offer opportunities of reflexive awareness for Chinese 
audiences. Audiences are not passively receiving the pre-given meanings when watching a 
television program. Rather, they are very active and critical while consuming cultural products. 
An increasing exposure to alien culture does not necessarily result in a loss of national or ethnic 
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awareness. In other words, watching a lot Hollywood movies does not necessarily mean that 
Chinese audiences are being Americanized. Instead, local audiences form a reflexive awareness, 
asking questions like “Who am I?” or “Who am I not?” Reflexive awareness is a new way of 
shaping cultural identity. It has been awakened or augmented due to the exposure to a large 
number of unfamiliar images. Recipients of cultural products are sometimes urged to reflexively 
consider about their own identities as they feel increasingly uneasy about the influx of foreign 
culture.   
National or regional consciousness, rather than a homogenous global identity, has been 
enlarged as the exposure to other cultures increases. Despite visible evidence of cultural 
homogenization in our lives, like the western-style dress, people do not seem to feel a reduced 
sense of membership in their groups. Instead, their feeling of belonging becomes much stronger 
(Morris, 2002). Harvey (1989: 306) argues that “localism and nationalism have become stronger 
precisely because of the quest for the security that place always offers.” There is little evidence 
that shows the existence of ‘cultural abrasion.’ What have been observed are an increased level 
of reflexive awareness and the development of a protective attitude within the receiving nations 
(Varan, 1998).   
Various studies in China also have similar findings that an increased level of reflexive 
awareness has been engendered by watching a large number of imported TV programs from the 
West. Furthermore, an extremely protective attitude toward local culture and a strong sense of 
nationalism against the West have been evoked as well (Xu, 2009;Pan, 2008;Xu, 2006). Chinese 
audiences tend to regard “western culture” as a serious threat to the cultural values in their own 
countries, and hence they have been evoked to protect their own cultures self-consciously. 
Meanwhile, they tend to have a marked preference for locally or regionally produced programs. 
Reflexive awareness offers them new opportunities to shape a sense of belonging, reinforcing 
bonds and solidarity in their societies. “We watch local-made television programs as it let us feel 
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more ‘patriotic’. Indeed, we sometimes watch foreign movies as well, but we think that 
watching Chinese programs is a kind of way for us to show support to our culture”, said by some 
undergraduate students in Wuhan University135. This is agreed by the producer in Guanhua 
Company who has worked in television industry for more than ten years: “not only audiences, 
but also producers may have a stronger feeling of nationalism (when exposed to many imported 
programs). I always consciously produce certain programs to show my respect to Chinese 
culture. For example, the programs to introduce the Four Great Classical Novels and traditional 
festivals…I hope that my program can arouse audiences’ nationalism and make them more 
appreciate our own culture”136.  
Proponents of cultural imperialism, therefore, tend to misinterpret the consequence of 
foreign media imports as they tend assume that the audience is a passive when consuming 
cultural products. The globalization of media production does not automatically eliminate 
national or other cultural differences, and bring about a unified, homogenized global culture.  
Rather, a large amount of media imports offer opportunities for shaping the reflexive awareness 
of audiences, which in turn leads to a reinforcement of cultural cohesion and protection of local 
culture in receiving societies137. 
5.3.2.3 Active Competition of Local Industry 
Thirdly, similar to the concept of active audiences, local Chinese broadcasters also actively 
exhibit their ability to compete with media TNCS. With rapidly growing competency, local 
Chinese broadcasters have emerged as powerful competitors to principal Western broadcasters 
seeking entry into China. In the mean time, their growing competency has also played a 
powerful role in limiting the influx of western cultural products in Chinese market. For example, 
in Guangzhou, the city which has been regarded as the battlefront of severest competition with 
                                                
135 Field notes: Informal discussion on 23 Dec 2007, Wuhan.  
136 Field notes: interview on 27 Nov 2007, Beijing.  
137 Similar findings of increased nationalism and cultural cohesion of Chinese audiences can be found in the book TV Drama in 
China (2008)ed. by Zhu, Keane and Bai. 
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transnational broadcasters in China, local TV has successfully exceeded foreign TV’s 
penetration in recent years. Foreign TV channels once occupied 72.5% market share as early as 
in 1999 while local channels only hold 27.5%. The situation changed from 2004, the market 
share of foreign TV dropped to 50.6%, with a decrease of 21.9% and that of local TV increased 
to 49.4%. In the first half of 2005, local TV first exceeded foreign competitors’ penetration and 





Figure 5-1: 1999-2005(first half) Comparison of Market Share between Foreign and Local 
TV Channels 
Source: Qu (2006: 74) Globalization: A TV Game, Press of Yangcheng Evening News. 
Furthermore, the fact that audience prefers locally and regionally produced programs not 
only spurs the indigenized strategies of global companies, but also spurs the globalized reactions 
of local industries. Chinese broadcasters exhibit their objectives to increase program sales across 
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targeted geo-linguistic regional markets where their programs have consistently proven to be 
more popular than Western imports. For example, historical costume dramas made by Chinese 
producers have sold well in the so-called ‘Cultural China’ markets, including Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore and etc.  
China now begins to shake off its role as a passive recipient, but turns to use the media as an 
agent of influence and a tool to exert “soft power” in the 21st century. Traditionally, there is 
more concern on the effects of imported media and the passive blocking responses of receiving 
societies. However, what has been underestimated is that local culture and media industry do not 
wait passively to be challenged forever, but may actively compete. Besides audiences in China, 
Asian broadcasters have also planned to target populations in overseas markets. For instance, 
TVB has moved into North America and Canada to serve Chinese speaking subscribers. 
Similarly, the Korean broadcaster MBC has established a channel aimed at Koreans in the 
United States. South Asian broadcaster Zee TV has also entered into UK and USA, targeting the 
Indian population (Chadha and Kavoori, 2000). The increasing number of cultural exports from 
Asian countries now serves as the catalyst for raising reverse influences that local brings to 
global and suggests a complex yet novel reciprocal interaction between them. The process of 
media globalization hence cannot be simply understood as a unidirectional top-down process of 
global power on local media industries, but a complex reciprocal interaction between these two 
forces, with bottom-up influences that the local brings to the global taken into account. 
5.4 Regionalization of East Asia TV Practitioner  
5.4.1 Rise of A Regional Market          
A local or regional cultural taste shared by the audiences not only encourages western 
transnational broadcasters to adopt the localization strategy, it also spurs East Asian broadcasters 
to use the regionalization strategy. In other words, the competition of each (Western and 
Regional practitioners) to enter the Chinese market forces them to adopt different strategy 
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(Localization and Regionalization) to increase the cultural affinity of their programs. 
Regionalization, here, refers to the way that several countries in the same region (i.e. East Asia) 
begin to cooperate with each other to produce and exchange television programs which are 
tailor-made for regional audiences. They target audiences in a geographical area by providing 
TV contents with regional characteristics, such as a similar cultural background (i.e. the 
Confucian traditions in East Asia). Since the late 1990s, East Asian producers have been rapidly 
increasing their co-productions in order to compete with cultural products from other regions, 
especially from the West (Chan, 2009;Hong and Hsu, 1999;Dal, 2003).  
       Asian NICs might be among the first pathfinders that led to the trend of regionalization in 
East Asia. For instance, TVB (Hong Kong) successfully emerged as a regional broadcaster that 
catered for Chinese language viewers. TVBS (cooperation with Taiwanese) also aimed to 
provide TV programs for mandarin-speaking viewers in Asia. Korea and Singapore joined in 
this trend too by launching their own satellite TV channels, transmitting their own programs and 
sending out their own perspectives to the regional audiences. 
The rise of an East Asian regional market has accelerated recently with the integration of 
China. With its incredible number of television viewers and their potential purchasing power, 
the opening of the Chinese market to foreign media after its entry into WTO has drawn great 
interest from regional broadcasters. Korea is one of the successful regional content providers in 
China, and has exported one third of its television programs to China in 1998 (Dal, 2003). TVB 
has also achieved a great penetration into the Chinese mainland market with its huge library of 
more than 75,000 hours of Chinese programming (To and Lau, 1994). From 1982 to the late 
1990s, the percentage of TV imports in Chinese TV stations has increased from eight to thirty 
percent, from which the majority has been supplied by regional broadcasters. It is believed that 
the percentage is higher than that of official statement because the real number of TV imports of 
local TV stations is very likely to exceed that of official data (Hong, 1998: 71). In the meantime, 
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TV imports, especially from the West, have decreased rapidly as regionalization speeds up. 
According to the data collected by Zhang, it even declined to negligible in 2006 (Figure 5-2).     
 
Figure 5-2: Percentage Allocation of TV imports in China from 2004-2006 (First half) 
Source: Zhang, B., (2006) ‘Six Wave of TV import in China, Korean Drama Takes Thirty   
Percent’ (Zhongguo Liuci Yinjing Gaochao, Yinjingju: Hanju Zhan Sancheng).  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2006-09/17/content_5100210.htm  
5.4.2 Cultural Proximity   
Cultural proximity is a major factor contributing to the regional flow of TV programs in East 
Asia. As various empirical studies have proved, TV viewers prefer a strong dose of local or 
regional production in their TV menu. As the data collected from thirty four national broadcast 
TV networks in nine Far East Asian countries has shown, indigenous producers supply more 
than seventy five percent of all programming in this region (Waterman, 1994). Regionally-
produced cultural contents are increasingly appealing to local audiences since they are more 
likely to choose programs that are set in cultural backgrounds that are similar to theirs than those 
with heterogeneous languages, values and norms. Regional taste has played an important role in 
audiences’ reception process. Cultural differences (or abrasions) tend to reduce the popularity of 
western imports among domestic audiences in China.  
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Cultural proximity implies a “geo-linguistic" similarity shared by TV viewers 
(Straubhaar, 2003). It is able to cross national boundaries and may bond viewers together by 
shaping an imaginary regional identity (Chua, 2004;Chua and Iwabuchi, 2008). It is a rather 
broad concept that may involve diverse cultural dimensions such as language, ethnicity, humor, 
history, dress, lifestyles, family values and even, ideology.  
Confucian heritage seems to be a plausible interpretation for the cultural proximity 
shared by East Asian members. The similar cultural background derived from Confucianism in 
ancient China, including education, language, values, norms, customs, and cultural evolutions 
has fostered the possibility for shaping a regional market in this region. Chua also (2004) points 
out that East Asian region’s allegedly common Confucian heritage has constructed an 
imaginable ‘East Asian Identity’. Such a regional identity becomes more apparent when the 
regional trade of television programs in East Asia increases. And the audiences have been 
required to transcend their nationalities to reflect on such abstract identification which in turn 
provides the opportunity to increase the regional flow of TV programs.  
5.4.2.1 Case of Korean Wave 
Cultural proximity can be realized through watching TV programs produced by regional 
broadcasters. The so-called Korean wave is a good example. Chinese viewers can easily find out 
cultural similarities and thus understand and be deeply sympathetic about the stories portrayed in 
Korean dramas. Such cultural proximity can be described from two aspects: 
First, Chinese and Korean cultures share the traditions of Confucianism. Such cultural 
traditions include not only similar values and norms, but also the way of emotional delivery. 
Both Chinese and Korean societies show their respects toward certain Confucian values, such as 
the recognition of the family, obedience to the authority and seniority, acceptance of filial piety, 
the importance of family and society’s harmony and solidarity, etc. Both Chinese and Korean 
people appreciate the specific manner of emotion delivery which tends to be implicit and 
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reserved as compared to that of the West. Once curious about western images, Chinese 
audiences have gradually found themselves unable to achieve an in-depth comprehension of 
such a heterogonous value system. Korean drama, however, has engendered resonance with 
Chinese audiences due to the familiarity of cultural and historical components, as well as the 
way of emotion delivery of the oriental people.  
Jewel in the Palace (Dae Jang Geum, Da Chang Jin138) is a typical example. This Korean 
drama was widely circulated within an East Asian regional market. It told a story of an ordinary 
girl, named Changjin, who became the first female physician to the emperor Jungjong in Chosun 
Dynasty of Korea. The main theme of this drama focuses on how this female physician prepared 
elaborate foods for the emperor that involved the knowledge of Korean royal cuisine and 
traditional medicine. Chinese audiences found this drama particularly interesting as it showed 
plenty of familiar cultural scenes of ancient Korea which were significantly influenced by the 
traditional Chinese civilization. In the first test after Changjin entered the palace, the exam 
question was referenced from San Guo Zhi (The History of the Three Kingdoms), an official and 
authoritative record on the period of Three Kingdoms of China; when the emperor Jungjong was 
sick, the medical book that loyal physicians consulted was Shang Han Za Bin Lun (Treatise on 
Febrile and Miscellaneous Disease) written by Zhang Zhongjin, one of the most famous China's 
ancient herbal doctors. Moreover, many Chinese characters, such as “大明朝”, “东汉”, “曹操” 
and “诸葛亮”, frequently appeared on the paintings, boards, scrolls, monuments, letters and 
books in this drama. All these cultural scenes generate a sense of familiarity and intimacy 
between Chinese audiences and the programs.  
Such cultural proximity has also been reflected by whichever of Korean dramas that are 
favored by Chinese viewers, from the historical drama Li Suan (Yi San139 - King Jeong Jo) to 
                                                
138 Chinese title: 大长今 
139 Chinese title: 李算 
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the modern love story Mermaid Lady (Renyu Xiaojie140), and from the romantic tragedy Autumn 
Fairy Tale (Qiutian de Ttonghua 141 ) to the life comedy The Bathhouse People (Zaotang 
Laobanjia de Nanrenmen142). Yang Tingting, a 17-year-old school girl, told me that “my mum 
and many of my friends love to watch Jewel in the Palace. They think that watching it (Jewel in 
the Palace) is just likes watching a Chinese drama because they can learn a lot of Chinese 
cooking and medicine knowledge from it”143. Another male interviewee, Liu Chen, a mid-age 
male engineer, told me that he preferred Korean dramas to western ones because “the behaviors 
of oriental people are understandable”. He added that “the women appeared in western dramas 
are sometimes terrible for me. They show love too straightforwardly and they are too strong, 
such as the mother portrayed by Terminator and those women in Desperate Housewives; on the 
contrary, the oriental girls are my type…The beautiful Korean girls speak softly. They are more 
considerate and look more tender and feminine”.144  
Second, besides familiar cultural scenes and behavior manners of Korean people, both 
Chinese and Korean societies are experiencing a similar process of social transformation from 
which their Confucian traditions are under attack from the force of western modernity. Modern 
values, such as individualism, have heavily shaken traditional collective values and relationships 
for shaping a nuclear family in these two Far East Confucian societies. Under such a context, 
Korean drama, which is well known for portraying family issues in detail, has exquisitely caught 
such a psychological change among people who are now undergoing the conflicts caused by the 
rapid social transformations.  
Golden Era of Daughter In Law (Xifu de Quansheng Shidai145) is a good example. This 
drama portrays the life of a new generation daughter-in-law. Jo Mi Jin is a young and lovely 
                                                
140 Chinese title: 人鱼小姐 
141 Chinese title: 秋天的童话 
142 Chinese title: 澡堂老板家的男人们 
143 Field notes: Interview on 1 February 2008, Changsha.  
144 Field notes: Interview on Oct 30 2007, Beijing.  
145 Chinese title: 媳妇的全盛时代 
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woman who works in a clothing design company. Like most of the office ladies, she is very 
ambitious and capable of doing well at her job. She marries her team leader Boksu and becomes 
a daughter-in-law of his family. Boksu’s family has a restaurant that sells pig feet, and of which 
has been in existence for more than 60 years. Being the only and oldest son of his family, Boksu 
is expected to shoulder the responsibility of carrying on his family's legacy according to cultural 
traditions. Although Jo Mi Jin is a very independent and modern young lady, she has to abide by 
tradition and moves in to live with his family members. This series focuses on the conflict and 
struggle between the young daughter-in-laws and their traditional mother-in-laws. It shows an 
interesting picture for audiences of how different family members adjust themselves to each 
other.  
Through portraying a series of important events in one’s life, such as the dating process 
between a young man and women, the first visit to one’s parents-in-law, preparation for 
wedding ceremony, getting pregnant and giving birth, Golden Era of Daughter In Law vividly 
shows how tradition and modernity (embodied by the old and young generations respectively) 
clash, struggle, negotiate, compromise and co-exist in an oriental society. Since such conflicts 
have also been experienced by a large number of Chinese modern families, Korean drama has 
been deeply favored by Chinese viewers who see strong relations between the stories and their 
own lives while watching these dramas (Xu, 2008).  
5.4.3 Ideological Proximity 
Ideological proximity is another reason that fosters the rise of regionalization in East Asia. 
Regionalization is hastened not only by cooperation between TV producers, but also by the 
advocacy of states which adopt the position of cultural protectionism. Western media, rightly or 
wrongly, are always accused of causing cultural “pollution” (an ideological term used by 
Chinese State) in Asian societies, like growing disrespect for authority, moral deterioration, the 
collapse of cultural identity and even, the spread of violence (Chan, 2000). Ruling elites have 
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strong fears of the ideological effects that western TV content may bring about and these 
cultural protectionists attempt to increase a regional flow of TV products to limit the spread of 
western context. 
The official advocacy derives from such considerations: first, to reduce the imbalance of TV 
trade between the west and east; second, to lower their dependency on western importations and 
turn to alternative content suppliers; third, the last but the most important, to maintain political 
stability by importing products with more cultural proximities and fewer ideological challenges. 
Hong has persuasively proposed similar arguments in his studies (1999) and has offered other 
reasons that motivate Asian states to advocate regionalization, such as the promotion of a 
regional media industry through which Asian NICs can compete more effectively with the 
western media industry. 
The Chinese government has recognized the benefits of promoting a regional TV trade. 
Ideologically, it is less risky to import Confucian-based programs than those from the West. The 
former possesses a common value system with that of Chinese ethics. Traditional values, such as 
collectivism, compliance to authority, recognition of family solidarity, filial piety and paternity, 
in regional programs are consistent with those in China. By contrast, in western contexts, 
characters have been strongly depicted as independent individuals who can decide freely for 
themselves and have less responsible relationships with their parents’ families and higher-level 
groups. Respecting individual freedom rather than obedience to family seniors or national 
leaders, western culture has been assumed to have damaging effects on Confucian values such as 
that of being collectivistic. Although it is not correct to assume a cultural homogeneity in East 
Asian region, such as a recent cultural debate about the purity of Chinese ancient medicine 
evoked by Korean drama Jewel In Palace, it still seems a better alternative for the Chinese 
ruling party to import cultural products from its neighboring countries other than from the West 
(Xu, 2008).   
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As President Hu Jingtao has brought ‘values of harmony’ (Hexie146), which are part of 
Confucianism, into the state’s ideology, Confucian-centered regional TV programs have been 
highly welcomed by China’s TV officials. Premier Wen Jiabao once declared that the Chinese 
state highly supported the import of Korean TV programs into China since Korea shared a long 
history of good relationship of cultural exchange with China (Xinhua News, 2007). The TV 
Drama Channel, CCTV 8, is predominantly filled with Korean soap operas during prime time, 
and has been teased by Chinese audiences as a ‘Korean Channel’. Quantitatively, China now has 
been able to supply more than eighty percent of broadcasting schedules by its own. The rest, 
about twenty percent of the total schedules, is made up of programs made by regional 
broadcasters, including Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. As Figure 5-2 has shown, regional 
import indeed acted as a powerful force to resist the domination of western programs in Chinese 
market. The number of regional imports has increased significantly in the last few years while 
that of western imports has decreased rapidly and is almost negligible in 2006.  
5.4.3.1 Case of Phoenix 
Phoenix Satellite TV is necessarily mentioned here as it appears to be very special one compared 
with other regional broadcasters. The particularity of Phoenix lies in the unique China-orientated 
ideology that its programs have strongly represented and the unfathomable relationships its CEO 
Liu Changle may have with Chinese authorities. Liu once worked as a former People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) colonel and an official of China National Radio. He has maintained a 
close relationship with Chinese high-level officials and won their trust with Murdoch’s 
assistance (it might be a mutual aid between Liu and Murdoch). Such particularities made 
Phoenix one of few stations that could cover sensitive political news and achieve great success 
in mainland China. It is a feat which is unimaginable for other foreign media. 
                                                
146 Chinese title: 和谐 
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  Theoretically, it is impossible for foreign broadcasters to provide news programs through 
the Chinese cable system. Limited number of foreign news channels can be viewed at hotels that 
are ranked three-star or higher, and some foreign affair departments. Phoenix Chinese, 
nevertheless, as a news and information channel, has been granted landing rights to the 
Guangdong cable network in 2001. Afterwards, it also received permission to transmit signals to 
the mainland through PRC’s own media satellite in 2007 while other foreign TVs were still 
worried about entering China (Fung, 2008: 121). Besides Guangdong province, Phoenix Chinese 
is also largely relayed by other provincial or city cable networks in China with the state’s silent 
acquiescence (it is heard that some Chinese senior leaders would like to watch Phoenix Chinese 
as well). Hence it may achieve a much higher penetration in mainland China than that of other 
foreign media.  
The strong “mainland China” backgrounds of Phoenix may be the major reason why the 
state allows such a large foreign Mandarin-speaking news channel to broadcast in China. 
Although Phoenix’s headquarter is located in Hong Kong, its operation predominantly focuses 
on mainland. The “mainland China” background of Phoenix TV can be reflected from three 
aspects: 
First, majority of its personnel comprises the experts who worked in Chinese TV stations 
and graduates of top communication universities in China. For example, Liu Chun, the Deputy 
Head of Phoenix Chinese Channel, graduated with a Master’s degree from the Communication 
University of China (CUC) in 1994, worked in CCTV’s news programs for many years, and 
knew the rules of how to get along with TV officials in mainland China very well. Wang Jiyan, 
currently the Executive Vice President of Phoenix and Head of Phoenix Chinese Channel, was 
once a teaching staff in CUC as well and knew his student Liu Chun well.  Other working staff, 
such as Xu Gehui and Yang Lan who is now the CEO of SUN TV, has plentiful experiences of 
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working in China’s state media and has close relationships with mainland TV officials like Liu 
Changle.  
Second, the major political and social issues covered by Phoenix largely focus on those 
that take place in mainland China or are related to China in order to attract mainland audiences. 
For instance, its news talk show Tiger Talk is heavily dependent on big events in mainland 
China, such as the drastic changes of mainland stock and estate market in 2008, the “South 
China Tiger Event” in 2007, the corruption of national academician in mainland universities and 
the reconstruction of the Old Summer Palace in Beijing. Although Tiger Talk declares an 
international look for Chinese worldwide, it partially focuses on debates revolving around 
mainland Chinese and eventually appears to be a mainland-centered Chinese program.  Besides 
Tiger Talk (Yihu Yixi Tan147), other types of programs also focus heavily on mainland issues, 
such as the news commentary Global Connection (Quanqiu lianxian148), the documentary The 
world (Lengnuan Renjian149) and the interview show Interview with China (Wenda Shenzhou150).  
Third, the perspective of Phoenix’s news report, news critics and commentaries is 
heavily China-orientated. Phoenix adopts a typical “playing-in-margin” strategy, which accounts 
for why Chinese audiences (in/outside China) favor it and the CCP tolerates it. To Chinese 
audiences, Phoenix tends to be a combination of both local and foreign TV since it provides 
information predominantly focused on mainland China and its comments appear rather new to 
audiences as the Chinese state media never dares to make; To Chinese officials, Phoenix is a 
foreign but ideologically friendly TV (it might be the precondition for the existence of Phoenix 
in China) and exactly plays the role of what CCTV needs to be in the overseas market - a 
“Chinese perspective international news channel” - which implicitly matches what Chinese 
authorities want from promoting a “going-out” project. Besides, the Chinese state also hopes to 
                                                
147 Chinese title: 一虎一席谈 
148 Chinese title: 全球连线 
149 Chinese title: 冷暖人间 
150 Chinese title: 问答神州 
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shape a democratic image for itself by granting the existence of Phoenix in mainland China. 
Phoenix is ideal as it delivers moderate and ideologically friendly criticisms other than offensive 
and anti-China comments; To foreign audiences, Phoenix is a Chinese TV which not only 
broadcasts information aiming at mandarin-speaking viewers but also adopts a China-orientated 
ideology serving for the Chinese authorities. Such multiple-identities that Phoenix has make it 
one of few foreign broadcasters that can cover sensitive political issues in China and also 
explains why Chinese authorities accept a Chinese news channel owned by a foreign broadcaster. 
5.5 Summary 
The Chanye Hua Reform in the post-WTO China has engendered increased commercialism in 
the TV industry, which evoked worries of the weakening of state’s control and the threats of 
foreign media. This chapter has examined how TV practitioners in the Chinese market negotiate 
with official censors. Based on the strategies that TV practitioners have adopted, it has been 
found that the increasing commercial operation of state broadcasters, participation of domestic 
private producers and growing openness for foreign media in China do not result in the 
reduction of the party-state’s control power over the TV industry. TV contents have shown a 
strong tendency of being more ideological than ever.  
Domestic private producers undertake a rather high degree of production risk, they therefore 
have to closely follow ideological guidelines in order to pass the censorship process more easily. 
Their programs tend to be even more conservative (or left) than those produced by state 
broadcasters since they cannot afford losing funds if their programs are rejected by official 
censors. Juxtaposition, a way to combine the spirit of Socialist mainstream melody with the 
expressionistic techniques of commercial style, has been widely adopted by independent 
producers to achieve programs’ popularity and political-correctness at the same time. It can be 
observed that a lot of private production companies are currently interested in shooting the ‘Red 
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Classics’ TV dramas. Even their de-politicalized entertainment programs are particularly 
designed to add in some politically-right topics to cater to official censors. 
State broadcasters are also highly encouraged to adopt the strategy of juxtaposition as the 
authorities have realized that the ‘propaganda work’ is hardly effective if it keeps on losing 
audiences. With the use of the juxtaposition strategy, the Socialist Mainstream Melody that 
traditionally has been regarded as a certain genre with too many patriotic and sermonic 
characters has now regained its popularity among Chinese audiences. State broadcasters also 
cooperate with domestic independent producers to shoot more commercial but ideologically 
mainstream masterpieces to strike a balance between the political and market interests. The huge 
success of such improved mainstream programs in recent years has not only achieved high 
viewership but also triggered a strong wave of nationalism and heroism, as well as the cohesion 
of cultural identities. Meanwhile, the state has also set up official awards to ensure the 
widespread of mainstream programs so that its work of ideological education still appears to be 
effective. 
Foreign practitioners, compared to domestic producers, have a much higher production as 
they are regulated by more restricted policies from the state. As they are only allowed to enter 
China by setting up one joint venture with a Chinese partner, foreign media choose to cooperate 
and even rely upon state media so that they have to sacrifice their political appeals for economic 
interests. By relying on local cultural resources, such as talents and facilities, as well as 
acquiring most advertising from the mainland China, these TNCs avoid overstepping on political 
and ideological boundaries for fear of penalty.  
Western broadcasters widely adopt the localization strategy to increase the cultural affinity 
of their TV programs. The consequences of localization have been found to have little 
destructive influences on Chinese local culture and ideology but many constructive influences 
instead. Ideologically, western media choose to accommodate themselves to Chinese authorities 
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rather than challenge them since they cannot risk testing the baseline of Chinese censorship. 
Working closely with the state or party organs such as CCTV ensures that their TV contents are 
consistent with the political ideology in China and that they are able to run business with less 
political intervention; culturally, their efforts targeting cultural adaptation have made them able 
to produce hundred percent localized programs. The localized “Chinese Look” makes their 
programs stay closer to Chinese culture rather than replace it with a global taste. Local audiences, 
in the mean time, posses strong reflexive awareness through which Chinese people do not seem 
to feel a reduced sense of membership in their societies, but feel more bounded to it than ever; 
economically, state media could also benefit from collaborating with global capital since it not 
only improves the national standards of local TV production but also increases the opportunities 
for Chinese media to “going out”.  
Regional broadcasters filter into China by adopting the strategy of regionalization. A 
regional flow of East Asian TV programs has been highly advocated by Chinese government. In 
contrast to western products which have been assumed to have damaging effects upon Chinese 
culture and ideology, those TV programs produced by regional broadcasters are preferred by 
both Chinese viewers and officials. Due to a certain geo-linguistic similarities shared by East 
Asian members, regional TV programs are deemed to have less ideological challenges and more 
cultural affinities to the Chinese society. Although it is not correct to assume a cultural 
homogeneity in East Asian region, it is still less risky for Chinese ruling party to import 
Confucian-based programs than programs from the west so as to maintain political stability. 
Moreover, regionalization effectively constitutes a force that resists the western-centered 
unidirectional flow of TV programs, lowering China’s dependency on western cultural imports.  
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6 Chinese TV in the 21st Century  
With the state’s unreserved embrace of the market economy, television today is no longer a 
simple party mouthpiece in China. It has become a profit-seeking business with the increased 
involvement of commercial considerations. Based on the historical relevance of Western 
experiences, some studies have argued that increased commercialism in post-WTO China may 
lead to a crackdown of the Party’s monopolistic control over television and cause a serious 
threat to cultural security in China. It seems inevitable that Chinese television will step away 
from the ideological straitjacket imposed by the Party and become more liberalized and 
democratized. 
 However, what has been empirically observed in contemporary Chinese television is, in 
fact, quite different from these arguments. There is no sign of the easing of political control 
despite the increased number of permitted foreign satellite TV channels, the wider geographical 
coverage given to some of them, and more cooperative partnerships with foreign broadcasters. 
China’s unique approach to developing the commercial operation of its broadcasting system --- 
Chanye Hua reform --- has resulted in television practitioners in the Chinese market operating 
according to commercial imperatives but still being subjected to close censorship and regulation 
by the party-state. 
In fact, the broadcasting market continues to being monopolized by state capital with a 
lopsided policy orientation. However, private capital, including both domestic and overseas 
capital, is becoming more and more marginalized. Under such circumstances, the effectiveness 
of the state’s political control has not been weakened but has, instead, been strengthened as a 
result of the ongoing Chanye Hua reform. There have thus been few challenges to cultural 
security due to the political self-consciousness of private producers, who would rather make 
sacrifices to cater to the Chinese authorities by producing more ideologically-friendly TV 
content in order to ensure their survival and profit-making capability in the market. As such, 
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Chinese TV seems to be less likely to become more liberalized despite the liberalizing forces of 
market reform. The direction that Chinese TV is taking in the 21st century and the dynamics of 
these changes need to be further explored. 
6.1 Ideological Function of Chinese Television 
Chinese television has been regarded as a political tool that has been strongly manipulated by 
the Chinese government to reinforce its intensive propaganda work. However, after the 
government adopted the economic reforms that introduced a market logic into the Party-
controlled media system, there have been a series of signs that Chinese television is becoming 
increasingly commercialized, such as a rapid increase in the number of entertainment formats 
and a decrease in explicitly propaganda issues in television content. This change in television 
content has invoked much attention and is believed by some to constitute a powerful force in 
providing more autonomy to TV practitioners, weakening the state’s control power and 
ultimately leading to the distancing of Chinese television away from the ideological 
indoctrination model (Polumbaum, 1988;Yu, 1990;Lull, 1991) cited from (Zhao, 1998: 4).  
Some studies have documented the “de-emphasis of ideology” on Chinese television 
during commercial reform since the 1980s. For example, Lee (1990) comprehensively captured 
such commercial changes that have occurred in Chinese television. First, as Lee has documented, 
the state’s ideological influence has become less and less intrusive. Second, the relative de-
emphasis on ideology has made it possible for various cultural genres, such as entertainment 
shows and other less ideological material, to flourish. Third, television has been manipulated to 
promote economic modernization instead of class struggle, leaving China to be “far less 
totalistic in the ideological arena” (Lee, 1990).  
After China’s accession into the WTO, there has been renewed emphasis on the 
symptoms of the “de-ideologization” of Chinese television, in an overwhelmingly negative light. 
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Some scholars have suggested that in becoming a member of the WTO, China will suffer from 
an even more rapidly increasing Western, and especially American, form of cultural imperialism. 
The concern is that “poisonous” Western values would invade socialist China by means of 
widely disseminated Western television programs that utilize a superficial ‘happy therapy’---
known for satisfying audiences with illusory happiness through heroic successes or Cinderella-
type stories---in order to inflict mass audiences with addictions to hedonism, money worship and 
individualism. It has been asserted that a widely observed “de-ideologization” of Chinese 
television content is a dangerous sign for cultural security in China and would be a cultural 
disaster for post-WTO China if the state continues to encourage the rampant growth of 
television commercialization without tightening political control (Meng, 2001;Zhang, 
2006;Zeng, 2005).  
These studies have made valuable contributions to achieving an understanding of the 
fast-changing nature of Chinese television. However, my empirical findings do not seem to back 
up such arguments. On the contrary, based on my findings, I argue that the ideological function 
of contemporary Chinese television has not been weakened but, in fact, strengthened since the 
ongoing market-oriented reforms. In order to specify on this argument, the rest of this chapter 
investigates the argument in three aspects. First, I argue that a broadened concept of ideology in 
contemporary China has provided more space for TV producers to create politically-correct 
stories. These stories still serve an ideological function although they do not explicitly promote 
political doctrines. Second, although the amount of explicit propaganda content has decreased in 
television programs, the effectiveness of state propaganda work has actually been improved by 
employing more commercial presentation techniques to promote the state’s ideologies. Third, 
although private producers have been granted admission into the area of television production, 
their content creation process has been heavily influenced by the state’s political control and 
their “political self-consciousness” has caused them to adhere to the state’s ideological 
requirements more closely than state broadcasters.  
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6.1.1 A Broadened Concept of Ideology 
The ideology of a nation-state is subject to change over time, and cannot be seen as a static set of 
doctrines. As Hartley has pointed out, the evolution of ideology should be seen as “an active 
practice” that operates on the level of common sense and everyday consciousness (1994: 143). 
No matter how it varies over time, the fundamental nature of ideology, as Thompson has argued, 
is to “serve to establish and sustain relations of domination” (Thompson, 1990: 58).  
The CCP’s ideology has often been defined as a set of rigid dogmas, such as Marxism, 
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The narrow scope of CCP’s ideology, however, seems to 
already be incompatible with the rapidly changing social context in China. Since the Party began 
to adopt market reforms in the 1980s, a broader conception of political ideology has been 
proposed with the inclusion of ideas about promoting national and personal economic 
development as well as success through the market. Zhao (1998: 5) has persuasively argued that 
“although the party has not relinquished Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, it is 
counting on ‘delivering the goods’ rather than on ideological doctrines alone for its legitimacy”. 
Television has been strongly manipulated to promote the party-state’s policies and directives, in 
order to persuade people about the correctness of economic-oriented policies and to inform them 
about the positive results of these policies. As Zhao has observed, the increasing presence of a 
variety of entertainment forms with reduced explicitly propagandist content during the 1980s 
and 1990s does not mean that the media is no longer doing ideological work or dominating 
politically. The promotion of economic success on television is no less ideological than the 
promotion of class struggle during the Mao era. Although the ideology of national and personal 
development through the market has replaced the popularity of Marxism, Leninism and Mao 
Zedong Thought, its grip on the people is no less totalistic.  
The state’s ideology is subject to change in the 21st century as well. A broader 
conception of the current political ideology in China has been extended from the explicitly 
political to the social and psychological dimensions. By including more values in what the state 
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encourages, such as continuing to promote personal economic success and showing more respect 
to Confucian philosophy, the barriers between political ideology and folk morality and everyday 
consciousness in China become more and more indistinguishable. The state’s broadened 
ideology through the inclusion of Confucian values implies a tendency for the new generation of 
Chinese leaders to attempt to improve the acceptability of its propaganda work in order to retain 
its governance by involving more moral values in political ideology, or say, to seemingly “de-
politicize” it to respond to a rapidly changing social situation.  
This broadened ideology consequently allows more room for Chinese television 
producers to create mainstream stories that may not promote rigid doctrines (Marxism, Leninism 
and Mao Zedong Thought) but that may still contain ideological aesthetics and serve an 
ideological function. For example, the CCTV commercial TV drama A Native of Beijing in New 
York (Beijing Ren Zai Niuyue151) discussed in the earlier chapter promotes the ideological 
values by presenting a complex official sentiment towards the West. Another CCTV historical 
drama Yong Zheng Dynasty (Yongzheng Wangchao152) puts forward the ideological values of 
calling on social justice by presenting a positive image of the ancient emperor      . Other types 
of dramas, such as family dramas and love stories, also serve as vehicles for state propaganda 
work by taking a mainstream tone of calling for social stability and harmony although they do 
not explicitly promote rigid doctrines.  
Here, I argue that political ideology advocated by the contemporary Chinese regime is 
different from that in previous times. The studies arguing for a de-ideologization of Chinese 
television tend to base their arguments on narrow perceptions of CCP ideologies, such as the 
rigid dogmas of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong without considering the new development 
of ideology. Based on a critical understanding of ideology as a dynamic concept, propaganda 
cannot be narrowly defined as a set of symbolic forms (i.e., delivered by television) to promote 
                                                
151 Chinese title: 北京人在纽约 
152 Chinese title: 雍正王朝 
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explicit doctrines and dogmas. Propaganda should be generally understood as “the attempt to 
transmit social and political values in the hope of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, and 
thereby behavior” (Cheek, 1985: 52). Therefore, as long as the symbolic forms delivered by 
television serve to sustain party-state governance, even though they do not explicitly promote 
Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, they continue to do the party-state’s propaganda 
work and serve the ideological function of television.  
6.1.2 Effectiveness of Propaganda Work 
There has been a significant amount of evidence documented by the studies that argue for the 
tendency of Chinese television to de-emphasize ideology; however, these pieces of evidence are 
not convincing enough to support the conclusion that the Chinese state’s political control over 
television has faded away and that the ideological function of Chinese television has been 
weakened. Based on the empirical investigations described in earlier chapters, the argument can 
be made that the effectiveness of the party’s propaganda work is actually improved when the 
operations of Chinese television are more responsive to market discipline. With the empirical 
effects of the Chanye Hua reform, Chinese television is less likely moving into a highly 
commercialized phase in which private capital is gaining dominance over state capital, but very 
possibly evolving into a new stage in which the state broadcasters, especially CCTV, are 
gradually achieving a monopolization of the media market due to the privileges they are 
guaranteed by the party-state. Furthermore, in this new stage, the increasingly commercialized 
operations of television practitioners can be granted by the state only with some preconditions 
imposed. First, television ownership should be placed under strict state control; second, the 
“political attribute” of television should remain more important than the “commercial attribute”. 
Under such circumstances, a seemingly increased level of commercial operation and a reduction 
in explicitly propagandist television content does not necessarily result in the concession of state 
control over television and the withdrawal of its propaganda work.  
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In fact, the ideological function of television has not been impaired at all despite a 
decrease in explicitly propaganda content being shown on television screens. The Chinese 
authority has realized that state ideology can actually be better promoted by embracing more 
elements of commercial television services into its propaganda work. There is now the 
recognition that if mainstream programs keep losing audiences, the ‘propaganda work’ is hardly 
able to achieve its effectiveness. As one of the objectives for the state to push the Chanye Hua 
reform, current television programs do cut down on the amount of explicitly propagandist 
content and added in more components of commercial expression, such as entertaining, 
suspenseful and romantic scenarios, in order to make them more attractive. In the meantime, 
propaganda work is not withdrawn from such commercial expressions of television but rather, is 
wisely embedded within the commercial content using a special narrative strategy. Juxtaposition, 
the strategy of promoting the spirit of the socialist mainstream melody by employing 
commercial expression approaches, has been widely exploited by Chinese producers to fulfill 
political requirements while achieving economic profits at the same time. By utilizing such a 
narrative strategy, the socialist mainstream melody no longer has overbearing boring and 
sermonic tones. Diverse types of Chinese mainstream programs, such as Red Classics, dynasty 
serials, anti-corruption serials, family dramas and even youth dramas, have now gained a high 
level of popularity among Chinese viewers, especially the young viewers aged from 20s to 30s 
as the majority of viewership of these mainstream television dramas (Zhong, 2008). As a result, 
the state’s propaganda work to promote political ideologies and values of the ruling party can 
now be consumed and accepted by audiences in a more smooth and effective manner. 
6.1.3 Political Influence on Television Content Creation 
It is safe to assume that private television producers, especially overseas ones, are not interested 
in assisting with the promotion of state ideology. Indeed, what they care about is how to make 
profitable television programs by employing eye-catching components, such as entertaining, 
criminal, violent and sexual scenarios. Partly as a result of such considerations, some studies 
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have expressed concerns that private television production companies, especially overseas ones 
which have been granted admission after China’s WTO accession, will bring severe challenges 
to Chinese television regulation as what private producers care about is market revenue rather 
than the social benefits of television programs. Nevertheless, I argue that, far from this scenario, 
private producers in China do not enjoy full autonomy and their content creation has been 
heavily influenced by political forces. What they create actually tends to be subject to even more 
political requirements and is even more conservative (of left) than that of state broadcasters. The 
main reason for this phenomenon is that the state still has a tight grasp on broadcasting resources 
and censorship, and private producers appear to be too weak to negotiate with it.  
With the right to broadcasting and censorship still tightly held in the hands of the 
government, private producers, both domestic and foreign, cannot survive without collaborating 
and even relying on the monopolistic state media to ensure that their programs can be aired on 
television channels. They cannot afford to lose funds, refinance and reshoot their programs, if 
their television content is defined as “offensive” by the state censors. As the number of times 
that a program is refused increases, the production risk increases as well. As a result, private 
production companies tend to choose topics that are the most unlikely to be refused by the 
censors in order to reduce their production risk. Ideologically-friendly content and the socialist 
mainstream melody that are highly recommended by TV officials have thus become the safest 
choices for them. In contrast, anti-ideology and anti-mainstream content is intentionally evaded 
by private producers for fear of penalty.  
The empirical findings indicate a “political self-consciousness” that is widely shared 
among private producers in China. In order to more easily pass through strict censorship and to 
ensure that their programs are aired on TV, private producers would rather make the sacrifice to 
please Chinese television authorities by producing more ideological TV content. For example, 
they may add in a lot of politically correct content to promote the state ideology in their 
185 
 
programs. They also love to adopt the juxtaposition strategy to decorate their commercial 
dramas in order to ensure the political correctness of their programs. For example, some 
producers have creatively adapted traditional crime and suspense series that inevitably include 
easily-banned commercial components such as crime, violence and sex scenarios into 
“commercialized” socialist mainstream stories. They have done this by placing the stories within 
the context of an anti-Japanese or anti-KMT backdrop, and promoting the altruistic spirit of CCP 
members through these anti-enemy stories while still applying commercial presentation 
approaches, such as violence and crime, to add excitement to these stories, which thus invites 
less political intervention from the authorities.  
More and more private production companies are now become interesting in shooting 
Red Classics mainstream dramas. For example, the Beijing Xiaoma Benteng private production 
company153 produced a mainstream drama called My Brother Name Shunliu (Wo de Xiongdi 
Jiao Shunliu154) in 2009; another private production company, Tianyi Yingshi,155 produced the 
mainstream drama Soldiers Sortie (Shibing Tuji156) in 2006. These Red Classics dramas not only 
look safe enough to be accepted by the censors but are also more likely to be aired on prime 
time,157 which may result in more market profits for them. Besides mainstream dramas, even the 
entertainment programs produced have been flavored with some politically correct topics. For 
instance, entertainment reports may show movie stars expressing support for Beijing’s Olympic 
Games and invoking patriotic values among adolescents. Sometimes, entertainment programs 
produced by private producers tend to be even more conservative (or left) than those produced 
by state broadcasters.  
                                                
153 Xiaoma Benteng (小马奔腾) is a private television production company in Beijing. It was founded in 1998. More details can 
be found on its website http://www.htvfilm.com.cn/intro.asp. 
154 Chinese title: 我的兄弟叫顺溜 
155 Tianyi Yingshi (天意影视) is a private television production company in Beijing. It was founded by famous producer Wu Yi, 
director Kang Honglei and Huayi Brothers, one of the most well known private production companies in China. Details can be 
found on its website http://www.tianyi.tv/.  
156 Chinese title: 士兵突击 
157 Since Feb 2007, the SARFT regulation states that only mainstream TV dramas are allowed to be aired during prime time on 
satellite television channels. (Details can be viewed on http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-01/22/content_5634257.htm, 
accessed on 7 Mar, 2010). More advertising revenues can be drawn out during this time period than during any other 
broadcasting schedule.  
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In sum, although the Chanye Hua reform has opened up the sphere of TV production to 
private producers, it has nevertheless also limited their operations by placing them in a 
powerless position. The processes of creating content, such as the selection of topics and the 
utilization of narrative strategies, have consequently become increasingly subjected to political 
influence from the party-state.  
6.2 State Broadcasters in China’s Media Market  
A sustained opening up to the West has led to the emergence of discourse on media privatization 
in post-WTO China. Media privatization has often been deemed as a threat to the Party’s 
monopolistic control over Chinese television. The possible penetration of Western media TNCs 
and the proliferation of privatized television production in the post-WTO period are believed to 
pose a major challenge to the monopoly of Chinese state broadcasters, undermining their job of 
promoting the Party’s ideologies, forming a national consciousness and preserving China’s 
cultural uniqueness.  
As discussed in the earlier chapter, Zhang (2006)  has asserted that the state’s cultural 
sovereignty would be seriously threatened if the state continues to encourage the rampant 
growth of commercial television services. The relaxation of entry barriers toward foreign 
programs and the privatization of television production and advertisement areas are very likely 
to exacerbate the situation of cultural imperialism in China. He also asserted that, in the services 
of television production and advertisement where the government has made a commitment to 
remove the most restrictions on foreign private capital, privatization could very possibly result 
in the monopoly of Western broadcasters and the marginalization of local Chinese competitors, 
who could be forced to air the television content that the West prefers.  
Such arguments may have been proposed based on conjectured scenarios. My empirical 
findings do not seem to support these perceptions. On the contrary, I argue that state control 
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over television and the state capital in the Chinese television market have not been marginalized. 
Instead, the state media has quickly gained a dominant position in the market and the state’s 
power has been centralized and strengthened during the process of Chanye Hua reform. This 
section addresses three aspects of my argument. First, foreign producers have been led into 
marginalized positions because they are politically and culturally regulated by more restrictive 
media policies than those imposed on domestic producers. As such, they have adopted 
localization and regionalization strategies in order to negotiate with the Chinese censors so that 
their businesses can be successful in China. These strategies, however, can be partly regarded as 
a reflection of their marginalized status. Second, domestic private producers have also been 
pushed into marginalized positions, because they lack broadcasting resources and have built up 
unequal business relationships with state broadcasters. Under such circumstances, they must 
cooperate closely with state broadcasters in order to minimize their production risks and tend to 
resort to strict self-censorship to ensure their survival and profit-making capabilities in the 
market. Third, state broadcasters have been offered favorable conditions by Chinese media 
officials so that they quickly develop and gain a monopoly position in the television market. 
6.2.1 Marginalized Foreign Producers---Localization & Regionalization 
Certainly if competing in a completely free market context, Chinese broadcasters, which seem to 
be too weak to compete with large media TNCs, are very likely to lose out. However, the media 
market in China is not really a purely commercialized and privatized platform on which various 
media capital are able to contest freely and fairly. Zhang’s argument is based on a conjectural 
picture, and the conjectured ‘monopoly’ of western media TNCs is less likely to occur based on 
my empirical findings. In fact, my findings tend to support the argument that the localization and 
regionalization strategies adopted by foreign producers can be partly regarded as a reflection of 
their marginalized status in China. 
Although they have been granted limited admission into the Chinese market, foreign 
capital, especially Western foreign capital, still face a more severe situation than their domestic 
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rivals. With heavily biased policy protection toward state broadcasters, foreign media are 
regulated by more restrictive policies, such as market access conditions, the percentage of joint 
venture shareholdings, personnel structures, the content of manuscripts and application 
procedures for obtaining Television Program Production License, etc. For example, as the policy 
restricts foreign broadcasters from setting up more than one joint venture company with 
domestic operators in China, this less politically supportive background for foreign broadcasters 
has forced them to seek powerful partners, such as the state media CCTV and SMG (Shanghai 
Media Group), to enter China with, rather than to collaborate with domestic private producers 
who themselves rely on the state media.  
Lured by massive Chinese audiences and their large potential purchasing power, 
transnational media giants tend to sacrifice their political and cultural appeals for their economic 
interests. They choose to cater to the Chinese authorities and remain within the state ideology 
rather than attempt to challenge or bypass the strict censorship regulations in China. Otherwise, 
their survival and profits cannot be assured. One good piece of evidence of this is the logo of the 
China Entertainment Television (CETV), “no sex, no violence, no news”. Mr. Chua, the CETV 
founder, has stated, “I actually watch CNN all the time. But I understand the political situation 
in China, and that's why I left news completely out of it” (Landler, 2001). Furthermore, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, most of these transnational media giants have predominantly adopted 
“localization” and “regionalization” strategies to produce “new content” that caters to both the 
Chinese authorities and Chinese audiences, rather than directly importing their ready-made 
programs which may result in ideological or cultural “abrasions” in China and invite 
overbearing political interventions from the state. Their adoption of localization and 
regionalization strategies may reflect their marginalized status to some extent, which can be 
addressed from the following three aspects. 
189 
 
Culturally, localization and regionalization are forms of cultural adaptation. These two 
strategies may invite less official intervention because what they have brought about seems to 
pose few challenges and has more affinities with Chinese culture. Cultural adaptation does not 
only refer to a simple strategy of compromise, such as adding Chinese subtitles to foreign 
programs, but also refers to active devotion to the local and regional culture in order to shoot 
100% localized or regionalized programs and to minimize cultural differences for their target 
viewers. By adopting these two strategies, with a large amount of native cultural values and 
norms embedded into the programs, what media TNCs have produced tends to possess a high 
level of cultural affinity to Chinese culture.  
Localization and regionalization are also forms of ideological accommodation. 
Maintaining a close relationship with the party-state by means of producing cultural products 
that are ideologically friendly either locally or regionally can help pave the way for the business 
of media TNCs. Bypassing or challenging the state’s ideology is too risky for their survival in 
China. These days, foreign media TNCs appear to be happy to work with the Chinese authorities 
as they have foreseen the “benefits” of localizing or regionalizing the ideology of their cultural 
products, or to put it more precisely, of de-Westernizing, Confucianizing and even consisting of 
Chinese official ideologies. Examples include the Trinity Broadcast Network (TBN), Viacom’s 
MTV and Murdoch’s STAR TV mentioned earlier. 
Localization and regionalization are also forms of economic collaboration. For Western 
broadcasters, their eagerness to enter China dovetails with the urgent need of the party-state to 
engage in so-called “external publicity” (Duiwai Xuanchuan158). The rule seems to be: “If you 
want to find a foothold in China, you should do something for it first”. Western media TNCs are 
beginning to understand what the Chinese state wants from them---a partnership (guanxi159) with 
Chinese authorities from which both parties can benefit. As mentioned in earlier sections, the 
                                                
158 Chinese title: 对外宣传 
159 Chinese title: 关系 
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SARFT negotiated with News Corp., AOL-TIME Warner and Viacom to air China’s official 
channel CCTV-9 through these TNCs’ U.S. and European-based TV networks. This is a 
precondition for granting the Western media TNCs channels in Guangdong province. For 
regional broadcasters, the partnership is featured as a state-supported form of television 
regionalization. Based on the so-called Confucian heritage shared by a regional market, 
producers from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan and Singapore are eager to export their 
cultural products into China. As they are catering to a “geo-linguistic" similarity of Chinese TV 
viewers, their television products are assumed to possess more cultural proximity and fewer 
ideological challenges to China. Therefore, the Chinese state is supportive of a partnership with 
regional broadcasters and attempts to lower the country’s dependency on Western imports while 
maintaining social stability by promoting an exchange of regional television programs. 
Overall, localization and regionalization are such forms of “economic collaborations 
with less ideological and cultural antagonisms”. They have been widely adopted by foreign 
producers since localized and regionalized programs are able to cater to the local viewership 
with less intervention from the Chinese state. The “marginalized status” of media TNCs in 
China has forced them to adhere to the rules set by the ruling Party, and they choose to 
collaborate with the Chinese authorities rather than to challenge them. As a result, the television 
content they create also appears to be culturally and politically friendly rather than rude and 
offensive.   
6.2.2 Marginalized Domestic Private Producers---Self-Censorship 
Compared to foreign broadcasters, domestic private producers are driven to worse situations due 
to their lack of sufficient funding. With less financial support from the party-state, Chinese 
independent producers have to ask for investments from private companies or ask the bank for a 
loan for their projects. However, uncertainty over whether the program can pass state censorship 
regulations or have the opportunity to be aired on TV stations has often resulted in a deficiency 
and instability in financing. Currently in China, almost 80% of domestic private production 
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companies can barely sustain their business as they lack sufficient funding, production talents 
and sophisticated facilities (Fu, 2007). Under such circumstances, domestic private producers 
have to cooperate with and even rely upon the monopolistic TV stations in order to minimize 
their production risks and to increase the likelihood that their programs will be broadcasted. As a 
result, the most common manner of producing TV programs for independent producers is not 
independent production, but predominantly cooperation with state-owned TV stations. In most 
cooperative cases, independent producers take responsibility for the whole process of 
programming. TV stations provide the funds and ultimately reserve the program’s copyright. For 
independent producers, cooperation has been the best, or at least the safest, plan compared to 
independent production. Independent production involves taking a higher production risk since 
TV stations can arbitrarily depress the selling price of ready-made programs due to their 
monopolization of broadcasting resources and can easily cancel contracts with excuses like a 
political ban from the party-state.  
Therefore, the content creation of domestic private producers is subject to more official 
ideological requirements due to their disadvantaged positions. Faced with a strict as well as 
unpredictable censorship system in China, Chinese independent producers have to resort to self-
censorship and choose to shoot certain types of themes that are preferred or at least not likely to 
be banned by TV officials. As the detailed investigation in Chapter 5 has shown, “Socialist 
Mainstream Melody” produced through a juxtaposition strategy and programs with a de-
politicalization strategy which are becoming increasingly indistinguishable from the “juxtaposed” 
ones, have thus become the safest and the mostly likely narrative strategies since they not only 
cater to audiences but also do not offend the official censors. 
6.2.3 Monopolization of State Broadcasters---Effective Propaganda Work 
Unlike speculations made by some scholars that Chinese television would be quickly remove the 
ideological straitjacket imposed by the CCP, the party-state continues to exercise strict control 
over the entire broadcasting system and enables its propaganda work to be even more powerful 
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by ensuring the monopolistic position of state broadcasters. Despite the increased number of 
permitted foreign broadcasters, the wider geographical coverage given to some of them, and 
moderate opening up of domestic private capital, there is no sign that the state is easing its grip 
on the scrutiny of content and release of television programs. On the contrary, the party-state has 
put much effort into sustaining centralized power over its mouthpieces, the state media, by 
pushing a series of market-orientated Chanye Hua reform measures which seem to have led to a 
rampant growth in media commercialization but have empirically resulted in the monopolization 
of state broadcasters due to a lopsided policy orientation.    
Chenya Hua reform has been implemented with unique Chinese characteristics. 
Excessive political intervention rather than market principles has played a dominant role during 
the reforms. Although market factors have a certain amount of influence on policy-making, the 
major imperatives for pushing Chanye Hua reform are the party-state’s anxieties that have been 
compelled by China’s accession into the WTO. As it is not driven by sophisticated market 
conditions, the market-orientated reform has proceeded with obvious contradictions that can 
largely be featured as “economic liberalization without political democratization”. The central 
guideline “to let television operate as a market-oriented enterprise but serve as a political 
mouthpiece” captures precisely the fundamental paradox of policy-making, namely the conflict 
between market and political logics, and explains why the Chanye Hua reform has not been able 
to touch the core of the Chinese TV system and has ultimately not led to a proliferation of 
private capital but to a monopolization of state media.  
The monopolistic position of the state media has been reinforced through the following 
reform measures. Separation of TV Production and Broadcasting (STVPB) has opened up the 
area of television production to private capital but has transferred the responsibility of producing 
TV programs from state-owned TV stations to private and foreign producers. Traditionally 
serving as both content suppliers and broadcasters, state broadcasters have always faced the 
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dilemma of seeking market returns and political correctness in their programs at the same time. 
The programs produced to fulfill the Party’s propaganda work cannot always satisfy market 
demand, while those produced to respond to audiences’ desires often risk strict censorship. With 
this dilemma shifted to private and foreign producers, state broadcasters can continue to 
monopolize the broadcasting channels, and set up unequal business relationships with private 
sellers. 
The monopoly of the state media has also been reinforced through another reform 
measure, Broadcasting Consolidation and Reorganization (BCR), which has hastened the nation-
wide reorganization of the television system, and retrieved the state’s centralized regulatory 
power from a large number of local resistance forces, and finally redistributed it into the hands 
of a few state-owned Broadcasting Groups which are consolidated through political orders rather 
than market demands. Furthermore, with another two reform measures - Channel Specialization 
and the Going-out Project, the state media has rapidly been able to occupy most of the shares in 
the television market because of the unreserved assistance offered by the Chinese authorities, 
which their private rivals can never achieve. 
Excessive political interventions in the Chenye Hua reforms have restricted the “self-
sown” commercial development of Chinese television in some ways. However, it has also 
provided favorable conditions for state broadcasters to achieve market dominant positions. In 
2005, programs made by private producers made up a total of 2100 hours, only 16% of total 
programming in China’s media market. In contrast, programs made by TV stations160 made up 
11,170 hours, or 84% of total programming. According to the data collected by CSM media 
research, more than 90% of television entertainment programs are made by TV stations, with 4.5% 
coming from CCTV, 52.1% from provincial TV stations and the rest, 10%, from private 
producers (Xie, 2007). Another survey conducted by CSM media research showed that among 
                                                
160 Programs made by TV stations do not refer to those made by TV stations only, but also refer to those made by private 
producers with copyright owned by TV stations.   
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the eight largest production companies that have been responsible for more than 20% of total 
programming hours, only one is an independent production company while the rest, 7 
production companies, are either state-invested or under the direct control of TV stations 
(SARFT, 2006: 171). Overall, private producers have suffered from a drop in circulation while 
state broadcasters have possessed absolute advantages in China’s media market. 
6.3 Cultural Security in post-WTO China 
While Chapter 1 provided a detailed discussion of cultural security, this section briefly re-
introduces the concept of cultural security in national television. It can be briefly characterized 
as “the ability of the state” to secure state communication sovereignty that the cultural flows on 
television screens are under effective control; to preserve the national culture that includes 
certain components promoted by the state such as political ideologies and cultural traditions that 
are protected at the national level; to strengthen soft power that the state is able to exert on 
international influences by improving national television competitiveness, the attractiveness of 
locally produced programs and the friendliness of foreign produced programs.  
 The cultural security of television has been widely discussed in recent years, especially 
in the Chinese literature. After China became a member of the WTO, a popular argument was 
made that the cultural security of Chinese television would be severely threatened. As the state 
continues to embrace the market economy and adopt neoliberal reform policies in the new 
century, it would seem reasonable to argue that an increased commercialism and direct 
competition from foreign media may pose a major challenge to cultural security in post-WTO 
China. However, I hold a different viewpoint and argue that the cultural security of Chinese 
television has not been seriously threatened to the extent that some existing studies have claimed. 
On the contrary,  the cultural security of Chinese television has been strengthened rather than 
weakened as television producers has become increasingly subjected to the government’s 
political and cultural regulations. The party-state’s propaganda work is now more effective than 
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it was before. This section examines cultural security from the following three aspects: 
communication sovereignty, national culture and the state’s soft power. 
6.3.1 Communication Sovereignty 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the market-orientated Chanye Hua reform has resulted in 
greater and more effective state control of the country’s television system. A series of reform 
policies issued after China’s accession into the WTO, however, have not led to a weakening of 
communication sovereignty but instead, a reinforcement of the “state’s exercise of authority 
over flows of ideas and information inside their territories”. The reinforced communication 
sovereignty of the state has not only heavily influenced imported televisual content but has also 
positively affected televisual exports. Since the arguments have been made in earlier sections, 
this section briefly summarizes it and moves forward to discuss “national culture” directly.   
6.3.2 National Culture 
As a certain cultural form defined from the perspective of regulators, national culture, which 
includes such components as state ideology and cultural traditions, has been seen as a 
fundamental concern of cultural security for the government. It has been urged to be paid 
attention to largely due to the increasing influx of alien cultural products into the nation-state, 
which are assumed, whether rightly or wrongly, to have negative effects on the national culture. 
Particularly in the context of increasing global flows of cultural products, Chinese national 
culture seems to be gradually overpowered by Western capitalist culture, which signifies an 
impending tendency towards cultural homogenization where all other cultures would be 
inevitably destroyed.  
However, my empirical findings lead to other conclusions. As discussed in the previous 
sections, foreign broadcasters have been found to stay within the state ideology and local 
cultural tastes in order to ensure their survival and profit-making capabilities. Domestic private 
producers are also eager to create mainstream programs to cater to television officials in order to 
ensure market returns and the political correctness of their programs at the same time. State 
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producers continue to monopolize broadcasting channels and employ the “juxtaposition” 
strategy to effectively carry on the party’s propaganda work. As a result, programs that are 
politically and culturally offensive have not surfaced since the neoliberal policies issued after 
China’s accession into the WTO, but the function of television in promoting political ideology 
and cultural traditions has been reinforced to a large extent.   
From the aspect of state ideology, the Chinese government has employed its massive 
market/audience as well as its rigid control over censorship and broadcasting resources as 
important measures to regulate and shape the content creation of foreign producers. The 
potential for profits drives numerous foreign broadcasters to export TV programs into China. 
The content they create tends to be amicable and does not offend the authorities as they cannot 
afford to challenge the strict censorship regulations in China. Some even choose to cooperate 
with Chinese television officials and stay close to the party-state’s ideology. For example, 
besides the examples of Western media TNCs mentioned in Chapter 5, Hong Kong TV dramas 
and movies, such as Return in Glory (Rong Gui161), The Drive of Life (Suiyue Fengyun162), Life 
and Death (Sheng Si Die Lian163), IP Man (Ye Wen164) and Dark October (Shiyue Weicheng165), 
also include many components of nationalism, anti-Japanese and anti-West sentiments, in order 
to get past the strict censorship in China. To obtain a “green-light” in the mainland market, 
foreign producers have also shown their willingness to cater to the TV censors in China. For 
example, a song named Mandarin (Zhongguohua166) performed by Taiwanese singers SHE was 
once criticized by the Taiwanese for being too eager to enter the Chinese market by not only 
intentionally but also poorly flattering Chinese officials.    
                                                
161 Chinese title: 荣归 
162 Chinese title: 岁月风云 
163 Chinese title: 生死谍恋 
164 Chinese title: 叶问 
165 Chinese title: 十月围城 
166 Chinese title: 中国话. The Chinese version of the lyrics can be seen at http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=206516867. The main idea 
of the lyrics is: the language of Chinese becomes very popular now. People from every corner of the world begin to study 
Chinese. The language of “Confucian” becomes internationalized. Mandarin has been treated seriously by people in the world.  
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From the aspect of cultural traditions, “cultural resources” including shooting scenes, 
drama scripts, screenwriters, popular actors, and directors who foreign producers need to consult 
for their trans-border productions have also played an important role in equipping imported TV 
programs with more regional and local cultural affinity. As cooperation with foreign 
broadcasters has been highly encouraged by the Chinese government in order to boost China’s 
international TV sales, it has become much easier for foreign producers to shoot TV programs in 
China, to borrow local actors, directors and even cultural or historical consultants for co-
productions. As both foreign and local staffs are involved in the joint productions, the created 
content thus unavoidably aims to cater to both international and local Chinese audiences. Under 
such production conditions, cultural “conflicts” and “abrasions” are not likely to happen, as it is 
not worth risking the loss of such a large number of potential viewers in China. Consequently, 
shooting TV dramas in China has not only become an alternative for foreign producers to save 
on budgets and render drama scenes “authentic” instead of using the artificiality of the studio, 
but is also an opportunity for them to double their sales by embracing mainland audiences. This 
is especially important for Hong Kong producers who shoot historical or costume themes about 
ancient China. For example, Tian Long Ba Bu167, an adaption of Jin Yong’s wuxia novel, 
includes many scenes that were shot in mainland China. Co-productions with more cultural 
affinity have hence become commonplace in the Chinese media market since foreign producers 
would rather sacrifice cultural or political pursuits than lose potential audiences in China.  
6.3.3 The State’s Soft Power 
Exercising soft power in the international arena is an important complimentary component of 
cultural security. As discussed in Chapter 2, although there is no causal relationship between 
expanding soft power and protecting local culture, the effort to expand state power by means of 
increasing cultural exports actually has positive implications for securing national culture in the 
following two ways. 
                                                
167 Chinese title: 天龙八部 
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On the one hand, the removal of unconditional protection by the party-state in the 
overseas market and the necessity of promoting salable products overseas have boosted 
improvements in the professionalism of Chinese broadcasters, which in turn improves the 
quality of China-produced mainstream programs and subsequently the attractiveness of the 
national culture to domestic audiences. Chinese TV officials have realized that their 
“propaganda work” is ineffective if it keeps on losing both domestic and overseas viewers. It has 
become necessary to upgrade the quality of its socialist mainstream programs by injecting them 
with elements of commercialized television services. Juxtaposition has thus emerged partly as an 
outcome of this process. The Socialist mainstream programs produced using this strategy have 
recently gained greater popularity among both Chinese and foreign audiences (Wang, 2008). 
Besides the example of Drawing Sword (Liang Jian168), other cases like Soldiers Sortie (Shibing 
Tuji169) and My colonel and my corps (Wo de TuanZhang Wo de Tuan170) have been successful 
as well. Soldiers Sortie not only achieved a high audience rating in Chinese television and 
effectively promoted the party-state’s propaganda work, but was also successfully sold to Japan 
at a very high price, about US$10,000 per episode (Sina, 2008). This is a great success for the 
Socialism Mainstream because the Japanese market has been widely known as the one in which 
foreign cultural products find it difficult to enter, and Chinese Socialist mainstream programs 
used to be considered boring and ideologically overbearing by overseas viewers.  
On the other hand, promoting positive images of the nation-state to foreign audiences 
and allowing them more access to local voices may make foreign audiences more tolerable and 
acceptable to local cultures. This may, in turn, enhance the approachability of foreign-made 
programs since foreign producers tend to adopt less negative but more amicable portrayals of the 
nation and subsequently have less “harmful” effects on the national culture171. Along with the 
                                                
168 Chinese title: 亮剑 
169 Chinese title: 士兵突击 
170 Chinese title: 我的团长我的团 
171 Although the CCP’s efforts at improving China’s soft power may have positive implications on the content production of 
Western media, there may still be an increase in negative portrayals of China as the West becomes increasingly panicked about 
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effects of strict censorship in China, those foreign broadcasters who attempt to enter the Chinese 
market for seeking profits tend to produce culturally and politically amicable content. 
Hollywood movies such as Mulan, Kungfu Panda and 2012 have all displayed an obvious 
tendency on the part of foreign producers to cater to Chinese audiences (as well as the 
authorities, perhaps). They have realized that it is not worth losing their potential viewership in 
China by portraying the Chinese as enemies or otherwise negatively in their movies. One 
comment in a Chinese official newspaper stated that “Mulan touches the surface of Chinese 
culture; now Kung Fu Panda catches the real value of Chinese culture... the producers show 
their respects toward Chinese culture and Hong Kong’s Kung Fu Movie” (People Daily, 2009). 
Roland Emmerich, the 2012 director, also revealed that he finally decided to add more China 
elements and change the ending of the story because he was deeply touched by the stories of 
those affected by the Chinese Sichuan earthquake in 2008, and he attempted to use this movie to 
show his respect to the courage and fortitude of the Chinese people (Liu, 2009). Displaying an 
appreciation for both the Chinese people and for Chinese ancient philosophy, 2012 positively 
portrays China as the only country that is capable of building a series of massive arks to save 
humanity from extinction, and that the kindly American president is too powerless to save his 
citizens. “It is just like a love letter from Emmerich to China”, commented by one enthusiastic 
Chinese audience member. Thousands of Chinese filmgoers have thus been driven to watch this 
U.S. film just because they want to see how China has been depicted by Western producers as 
being able to save the world. “In a country that carefully selects and censors all foreign movies 
(only 20, including those from Hong Kong, are allowed in each year), 2012 is one of the first 
blockbusters to pass Chinese censors without having any content cut” (Kuo, 2009). 
In sum, based on the arguments above, the cultural security of Chinese television has not 
been found to be seriously threatened despite what some existing studies have claimed. Instead, 
                                                                                                                                                       
the rapid growth in China’s economic and military power. While the West is showing a greater appreciation of Chinese culture, it 
should be noted that the changes in economic and political relationships might also result in negative feelings of the West 
towards China’s international expansion. 
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it has been strengthened, as the Party-state has been found to become more and more powerful 
in exercising its control over 1) the cultural flows of television screens, which has been achieved 
by keeping the monopoly of its mouth pieces, TV stations, and marginalizing the private rivals 
that have to collaborate with and even depend on the former; 2) the content creation process of 
television producers, both domestic and foreign, who are driven to produce politically and 
culturally amicable content rather than offensive content; and 3) the effectiveness of television 
propaganda work by boosting improvements to Chinese broadcasters’ professionalism and 
upgrading the popularity of Socialist mainstream programs toward both domestic and foreign 
audiences.   
6.4 Chinese TV Regulation and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism 
In Chapter 2, it was mentioned that Siebert’s Four Theories of the Press tends to specify the 
normative evolution of mass media from an authoritarian to a libertarian model. With the 
collapse of the Soviet model, this grand narrative of evolution seems to “have claimed world 
historical relevance”, and celebrates “the triumph of liberalism and capitalism on a global scale” 
(Zhao, 1998: 8). Zhao has also pointed out that this grand narrative has informed much of the 
research and interpretation of changes in the Chinese media, such as the focus on the struggle for 
market freedom against state control and concerns over whether economic development will 
eventually lead to market liberalism. 
It has been generally assumed that commerce goes against the established power. 
“Politics” and the “market” are two opposing forces that always operate as ‘push-and-pull’ 
factors in such circumstances (He, 1998). Market reforms have thus been considered as catalysts 
for breaking up government communication monopolies. Although the inherent antagonism 
between these two forces are significant in understanding the state-market context, the dynamics 
between these two forces are sometimes too complicated to be able to make such an argument 
that Chinese television regulation will ultimately become liberalized because of the “liberalizing” 
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force of the market. As such, what the future evolution of Chinese television could be and which 
model can best explain its development need further exploration.   
6.4.1 Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model 
Some studies have argued that market reforms do not signify a shift toward the liberal state in 
China. “There is no hint that the Chinese state is peacefully evolving into a liberal state because 
of the ‘liberating force’ of the market”. Instead, the Chinese state has been recasting itself into a 
modern authority---something akin to a “bureaucratic-authoritarian regime”---with a seemingly 
decreasing authoritarian character, but still maintaining its political power more and more by 
regulatory and administrative means rather than by strong coercive orders (Lee, He and Huang, 
2006;Ma, 2000: 27). 
The Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Model (BA) was introduced by O’Donnell (1973) to 
indicate a close relationship between increased modernization and authoritarian government. In 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, modernization theorists optimistically expected an increase in 
democracy in economically advanced third-world countries. However, large-scale economic 
growth and industrialization in some countries in Latin America and East Asia in the late 1960s 
and 1970s did not lead to the development of democratic institutions; instead, as argued by 
O’Donnell (1973;1978), they were associated with military takeovers and the rise of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism. In the BA model, strong intervention on the part of the 
government appears to be required in order to guarantee social stability so that new transfusions 
of international capital can be obtained which may be sought through repression of the political 
and economic demands of the masses (Im, 1987).  
This model’s broad theoretical implications included the authoritarian Asian regimes of 
South Korea (Park, Kim and Sohn, 2000), Taiwan (Lee, 2000) and Singapore (Sim, 2001) as 
being “noted for justifying their suppression of press freedom and civil liberties on the grounds 
that economic growth is predicated on social stability”. The Chinese leadership has also 
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consistently claimed that its economic reform has brought enormous benefits to people and 
made China mighty and proud in the world arena. Yet, some have argued that China’s 
impressive record of economic growth is achieved at the expense of social justice, such as the 
widening gap between the rich and the poor. The concept of Bureaucratic-authoritarianism is 
thus useful in examining the relationship between China’s rapid economic development and its 
dictatorship, as this newly industrialized country shares many similarities with the countries 
mentioned above (Lee, He and Huang, 2006: 581). 
The possible rise of a BA regime in China has been echoed in other schools of thought in 
China as well. These are known as Neo-conservatism and the New Left, and they have gained 
prominence since the early to late 1990s. As Fewsmith (2001) has described, China’s political 
and cultural landscape from the 1990s to the present has been largely defined by the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown in 1989. This crackdown muted the intellectual ferment of the 1980s which 
included protests against corruption and privilege and appealed for democracy. Neo-
conservatism gained currency after this period of chaos in the early to mid 1990s, finding its 
roots in neo-authoritarianism. It argued for a middle path between the traditional conservatism 
of the Old Left and the wholesale marketization pushed by radical reformers. Rejecting the 
liberal call of the 1980s inspired by Western liberal democratic theory, Neo-conservatism 
demanded a greater role for the state to ensure the success of economic reform and to move 
towards indirect (elite suffrage) democracy in China. Another school of thought, ‘The New Left’, 
came into being in the mid to late 1990s. It also rejected the idea that Western-style liberal 
democracy was the only way to make social progress and argued for a strong state to bridge the 
gap between the haves and the have-nots. Regardless of their differences in ideas on the role of 
the market, both these two schools of thought consistently call for strict government controls in 
China at the expense of civil rights and freedom of speech. Although the Tiananmen event did 
not change the beliefs of Chinese liberals, it did mute their voices and relegate them to a 
marginal place in China’s contemporary discourse. 
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These two schools of thought that have gained currency in China’s contemporary politics 
have prepared the grounds for the acceptance of such an authoritarian state in China. As the 
major state institutions are bureaucratized to accommodate to the capitalist economy, however, 
there is no indication that the Chinese media will become something akin to the model of liberal 
media in Western capitalist societies. On the one hand, unlike the romanticized view of a 
democratic market, the state continues to exert blunt forms of censorship and can punish 
dissenters with direct orders without legitimate regulations. Examples of this include Lost in 
Beijing (Pingguo172), mentioned in Chapter 4, and the actress Tang Wei of Lee Ang’s movie 
Lust Caution. Tang Wei was punished by an internally-delivered political ban not to appear on 
any movie, television show or even advertising in China. Such an unpredictable regulatory 
pressure has forced media actors to seek the support of the state and to promote the authorities’ 
interests instead of those of the masses. On the other hand, the media sector has been pushing for 
Chanye Hua reform, which transforms the media from a propaganda apparatus into more 
business-like but still state-owned enterprises that will serve the state and satisfy the market at 
the same time. The state grants limited democracy and operational autonomy to media workers 
through a series of legal and administrative means. This satisfies both media workers and 
consumers as juxtaposition has been widely employed as an effective strategy by media workers 
to continue their job of ideological delivery on behalf of the party-state by providing “attractive” 
and “interesting” propagandist messages to their audiences. Although the media sector has been 
bureaucratized to operate and has enjoyed relative autonomy, this does not necessarily mean an 
increasing detachment of the media from the state. The leadership of the party and the media 
sector in China is always intertwined within such state-owned media enterprises. This has 
resulted in what Ma (2000: 28) describes as “the state becomes both an actor and a regulator of 
the market”. For example, the newly appointed CCTV president, Jiao Li, serves as a media 
business leader and a top Party propaganda official at the same time. The media sector maintains 
                                                
172 Chinese title: 苹果 
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an alliance with the state for winning support. Meanwhile, the state has also attempted to 
transform itself into a modern authority by tolerating and allowing limited freedom to the media 
sector as long as the latter continues to serve the interests of the party-state.    
 Bureaucratic-authoritarianism seems to be the appropriate model for analysis. Neither 
the traditional “Authoritarian Model” nor the “Liberal Model” can adequately address the 
fundamental changes to contemporary Chinese media. In the state-market complex, the market 
actually limits social discourses and reinforces dominant ideologies in the Chinese media forum. 
The state remains the center and exerts powerful control over the country’s media. In fact, there 
seems to be no reason for media actors to challenge the party-state’s interests if their profits can 
be assured. It makes no difference whether their profits are derived from a freely competitive 
market or a protected and distorted one. This is especially so if the giant broadcasting groups are 
consolidated with political commands. Overall, the market-orientated reform with unique 
Chinese characteristics has resulted in the fact that excessive political interventions rather than 
market principles play a dominant role during the reforms. Those seemingly neoliberal policies 
adopted by the Chinese state with empirical complexities are less likely to move the Chinese 
media into a free competition mechanism in the future, which is far from a platform from which 
various media capital are able to contest freely and fairly. Instead, it is more likely to move it 
into a new stage in which the state will continue to exercise its strong control power and media 
practitioners are led to a cooperative, albeit less ideologically and culturally antagonistic, 
relationship with the former.   
6.4.2 Juxtaposition---As a dominant narrative strategy in the future 
In the BA model, the party-state exercises strong regulation power over television and 
utilizes television to carry out propaganda work to maintain its governance. Yet, this does not 
mean that such a state can presume complete compliance from its audiences and produce and 
broadcast television programs without considering their feelings. In fact, with the advancement 
of communication technologies and the commercial development of media services, not only 
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have the volume and variety of audiovisual products been exponentially increased, but the 
accessibility to audiovisual products has also been greatly improved. Consumers now have more 
choices regarding content resources. For instance, they are no longer restricted to watching 
CCTV’s programs. They can easily shift to other commercial TV channels to watch 
entertainment programs produced by local TV stations. With the wide use of media technologies, 
television is no longer the only medium to tune in to. They are now able to watch programs on 
the Internet, or movies in the cinema. Both these media are more difficult for the regulators to 
control, especially the former. As such, the diversification of choices and the convenience of 
media access have resulted in a situation whereby the party-state in China cannot simply employ 
the blocking-out and production of television programs conveying solely their own perspective 
in this new era of globalization. 
The refusal to watch CCTV programs or even TV as a whole can be viewed as an 
expression of dissent by the grassroots. Although the Chinese state is able to maintain a 
monopolization of power in the 21st century, such dissent continues to challenge the means that 
the Chinese state utilizes to maintain its domination. Since economic reform in the 1980s, the 
Chinese leadership justifies its suppression of media liberties by claiming that its economic 
reform can be achieved through centralized regulation and the economic reform has brought 
about enormous benefits to the people. By including the promotion of economic success into its 
political ideology, the Chinese state also attempts to improve upon the effectiveness of its 
propaganda work by softening the ideological tone of its mainstream programs. Media officials 
have begun to pay more attention to the feelings at the grassroots level and recast a new image 
that seeks to persuade people through an acceptable rather than the “preaching” manner used in 
the past. Since the success of Drawing Sword, the party has begun to realize that a God-like 
image of a CCP member is too unrealistic for ordinary people to accept. Instead, a humanistic 
portrayal of CCP heroes who behave just like ordinary people is preferred by audiences. As a 
result, the party-state hopes to upgrade the quality of socialist mainstream programs by giving 
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more freedom to media producers to search for an appropriate manner that is acceptable to 
themselves and to audiences at the same time. Hence, it can be argued that in the future, the way 
for CCP to do propaganda work will no longer be “indoctrinatory”, but gradually become 
“flexible and soft”.  
 Given the moderate freedom for creation provided by regulators, media producers have also 
become aware of the future that “serving the party-state and satisfying the audience” is going to 
become a dominant guideline for them in creating media content in China. Juxtaposition has 
been found to offer a perfect balance between the demands of these two sides. It is thus viewed 
by media producers as an effective way for them to survive in such a state-market context. 
Challenging or bypassing the state’s ideology may not be a wise action for them to take. Instead, 
staying close to the Chinese authorities while keeping audiences interested has been the 
alternative to which they would like to refer and ensures their survival and profits in the future. 
In the meantime, juxtaposition is also being updated into a flexible and multifaceted 
narrative strategy as China’s politics is also changing from time to time. Staying close to the 
Chinese authorities does not mean a rigid and invariable promotion of such dogmas as Marxism, 
Socialism and Maoism. It also requires producers to capture precisely the changes in 
contemporary politics and discover the extent of the boundaries---“where is the freedom” with 
which the authorities can really tolerate to allow them to creatively tell a story. Now the 
willingness of the Chinese authorities that it attempts to shape a ‘modern and democratic’ image 
for itself by granting a limited amount of freedom to media workers has provided opportunities 
for producers to stretch the censorship bottom line. For instance, in the situation where Chinese 
officials were eager to increase the effectiveness of their propaganda work, earlier TV dramas 
produced using the juxtaposition strategy, such as Drawing Sword (Liang Jian173), successfully 
broke through a Gao Da Quan 174(perfect) depiction for CCP members and received official 
                                                
173 Chinese title: 亮剑 
174 Chinese title: 高, 大, 全 
207 
 
recognition by providing a humanizing image to CCP members. As the mainland leadership is 
currently trying to build a friendly connection with Taiwan, contemporary TV dramas produced 
using the juxtaposition strategy, such as Lurk (Qian Fu175), skillfully challenge the stereotype of 
KMT members, who are always portrayed as “bad guys” in traditional Socialist Mainstream 
Melody and pass the censorship regulations by providing a complex yet acceptable humanizing 
image of KMT members. In other words, the limits of censorship are flexible to the point that 
Chinese producers can continue to negotiate with the official censors. As China’s politics is 
expected to be moderately democratic, Chinese producers are currently making a great effort to 
test how to negotiate and what could be the degree of negotiation. 
 Lurk is a good example that demonstrates how Chinese producers manage to find out 
“where is the freedom” and adapt to a changing political climate. The story of Lurk begins in 
early 1945, shortly before the full outbreak of civil war between the Communist Party and the 
KMT. Yu Zecheng is sent by the KMT Military Council (Jun Tong176) to assassinate an ex-
KMT leader who has just defected to the Japanese. Yu succeeds and is appointed to take more 
assassination assignments which seem antithetical to his patriotic beliefs. At the same time, Yu 
is selected by the Communist undercover agents as a prime target for inciting defection. In face 
of his conflicting beliefs, which way will Yu choose? This TV series is an exciting espionage 
battle of the wits that realistically portrays the life and hardships of a spy. Stepping away from 
the black/white or good/bad portray of civil war characters, Lurk moves into the gray area and 
does not shy away from commenting on the faults of both the KMT and the Communist Party.     
Traditional mainstream dramas were regarded as negative carriers of the party’s propaganda 
work because they often blindly praised the Communist Party without objectively judging 
history. By making stereotypical portrayals of the CCP, the KMT and the Japanese, the old 
mainstream dramas that told the stories of anti-KMT and anti-Japanese wars predominantly 
                                                
175 Chinese title: 潜伏 
176 Chinese title: 军统 
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portrayed the Japanese as brutal enemies who killed thousands of Chinese without mercy, 
depicted the KMT as a self-serving ruling party afraid to fight against the Japanese, and praised 
the CCP as a selfless force that put aside its conflicts with the KMT and sacrificed its political 
interests to “serve the people”. It cannot be said that these stereotypical depictions have distorted 
Chinese history, but such a rigid and invariable black/white narrative strategy has oversimplified 
these three military forces and tends to provide a too perfect yet boring image to CCP members, 
invoking much dissent among Chinese audiences. 
 Lurk successfully passed the strict censorship regulations by depicting KMT nationalists in 
a somewhat positive light because of the recent up-and-up relationship between the CCP and 
KMT. The mainland leadership is currently seeking an unprecedented friendly rather than 
oppositional relationship with Taiwan. Such a political shift opens a window for producers to 
depart from the traditional unilateral portrayals of the KMT, finding a limited “creation space” 
to provide a moderately positive portrayal of KMT nationalists which seems to be tolerated by 
the Chinese censors and is interesting to audiences. In fact, spy stories such as Lurk actually 
have their roots in criminal and suspense series which were forbidden to be aired during 
primetime by SARFT since 2004. As these stories overwhelmingly focused on the anti-
corruption themes that Chinese audiences love to watch, the SARFT was worried that such anti-
corruption stories may invoke discontent among the Chinese people towards current social 
inequalities. The producers who were shooting or planning to shoot anti-corruption stories had 
been placed in an awkward situation as they had already spent money on pre-production. In 
order to retrieve their investments, these creative producers keenly captured a contemporary 
political change and skillfully placed their old stories into the anti-Japanese or anti-KMT 
backdrop. On the one hand, they promote the Communist Party’s altruistic spirits through anti-
enemy stories. On the other hand, they keep those commercial presentation approaches, such as 
suspense, mystery, violence, crime and romance, to make their stories exciting. Moreover, such 
shows also attempt not to irritate the CCP censors by shifting the corruption scenarios to KMT 
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officials. At the same time, to avoid boring the viewers, the KMT nationalists are given a 
humanizing and non-stereotypical depiction. With such adaptations, the old anti-corruption 
stories have been changed into mainstream-style spy stories. They are thus merely “new wine in 
old wineskins”. Gao Qunshu, a commercial Chinese director who has travelled a similar road of 
adaptation confessed that “the television drama Rush 1937 (Dao Feng 1937177) is rewritten by 
me. Criminal stories are changed into anti-Japanese stories; I turn the trash into wealth!” (Kuai, 
2009: 30)  
The adaption of spy stories has vividly shown how Chinese producers are able to negotiate 
with the TV censors and attempt to stretch their bottom lines in the state-market context. As 
China’s politics changes from time to time, “freedom” becomes flexible as well. As a dominant 
narrative strategy with potential for expansion in the future, juxtaposition is also adapting itself 
to become flexible enough so that producers can creatively tell their stories and still remain 
under the guidelines of “serving the state and satisfying the audience”. Under such a 
Bureaucratic Authoritarian model of regulation, the market forces have been gradually led to a 
collaborative relationship with the state. The rendering approaches to content creation tend to be 
commercial-style, with the values orientated toward the mainstream yet with political 
flexibilities.  
 As a closing remark, I would like to point out that the arguments made in this thesis are 
made on the basis of an analysis of television in China. Such arguments may also be applicable 
to other areas of media research, such as the Internet and cinema, since the regulating guidelines 
may remain the same at the state level. Nevertheless, careful examination is required when 
attempting to use the analyses of television on Internet and cinema studies. After all, television 
receives greater control from the party-state while the Internet and cinema are more difficult for 
regulators to control. The Internet offers a common and convenient platform from which 
                                                
177 Chinese title: 刀锋 1937 
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Chinese citizens can publish articles. These “cyber citizens” can express their grievances from 
every corner of the country with postings on blogs and forums. Along with the prevalence of 
pirated foreign videos (or video clips) posted by cyber citizens, this makes it very difficult to 
control what is broadcast on the Internet. Cinema is somewhat more difficult to control than 
television as it is able to attract more international investments and its profits are not merely 
driven by the domestic market alone. If a movie is banned by the Chinese censors, it would not 
be a fatal attack on filmmakers as they would still have opportunities to broadcast it in foreign 
countries. Moreover, the new ideas from the party-state to promote “going-out” of Chinese 
media in the new century may also provide a license for some outward-looking independent 
filmmakers who particularly break free of the ideological straightjacket of the domestic market 
by incorporating different styles and themes178. Once they have achieved success in an overseas 
market, the Chinese propaganda officials would be forced to concede. This gradual liberalization 
potentiality may provide lessons for others, especially the Chinese television producers who are 
now actively pursuing new markets.  
Despite these potential influences on the TV regulation, recent events on the Internet and in 
cinema seem to suggest that the party-state continues to exercise strong control over these two 
mediums as well. The case of Google’s withdrawal from China in 2010 is perhaps the most 
prominent example. While it is difficult to ascertain the exact reasons for Google’s leave-taking, 
what deserves even more attention is the reaction of the other transnational companies in China. 
Microsoft's chief executive Steve Ballmer had stated his company's position in a detailed blog 
post: “We have done business in China for more than 20 years and we intend to stay engaged, 
which means our business must respect the laws of China” (Michael, 2010). Similarly, other 
American and Europeans companies tend to hold such assumptions on doing business in China 
                                                
178 Some recent studies may provide suggestions for understanding this. Sun, W. N. (2007), ‘Dancing with Chains: Significant 
Moments on Chinese Television’. International Journal of Cultural Studies. Vol (10), no.2, 187-204; Sun, W. N. (2010), 
‘Mission Impossible? Soft Power, Communication Capacity, and the Globalization of Chinese Media’. International Journal of 
Communication. Vol(4) 54-72; Anne-Marie Brady (2008) Marketing dictatorship: propaganda and thought work in 
contemporary China. Rowman & Littlefield.  
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that “Remember: first, you have to be in China. Second, if you are in China, you play by their 
rules; otherwise you will be shown to the door.” (Schneider, 2010). These responses indicate a 
willingness on the part of transnational companies to play by China's rules, although Google is 
one of the few companies that is refusing to do so. The case of the political ban imposed on the 
actress Tang Wei who performed in Lee Ang’s movie Lust Caution, released in mainland China 
in 2007, is another example. She was punished due to her extreme pornographic performances in 
the film. For almost three years, Tang was banned from appearing in the Chinese media and she 
remained silent during this period. These examples are mentioned because they seem to support 
the argument that the party-state remains a strong control power within the sphere of the Internet 
and cinema as well. Moreover, media actors for the Internet and cinema may also have to work 
with the Chinese authorities to ensure their survival and profit. It is worth further examining in 
future studies whether such an argument of the strong state in media regulation could be 
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